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Abstract 
 
Technological progress has been enabling companies to add disparate features to 
their existing products. This research investigates the effect of adding more features 
on consumers’ evaluation of the product, by examining in particular the role of the 
congruity of the features added with the base product as a variable the moderates the 
effect of increasing the number of features. Grounding on schema-congruity theory, I 
propose that the cognitive elaboration associated with the product congruity of the 
features added explains consumers’ evaluation as the number of new features 
increases. In particular, it is shown that consumers perceive a benefit from increasing 
the number of features only when these features are congruent with the product. The 
underlying mechanisms that explains this finding predicts that when the number of 
incongruent features increases the cognitive resources necessary to elaborate such 
incongruities increase and consumers are not willing to spend such resources. 
However, I further show that when encouraged to consider the new features 
thoughtfully, consumers do seem able to infer value from increasing the number of 
moderately incongruent features. Nonetheless, this finding does not apply for those 
new features that are extremely incongruent with the product. Further evidence for 
consumers’ ability to resolve the moderate incongruity associated with adding more 
features is also shown, by studying the moderating role of temporal construal. I 
propose that consumers perceive an increase in product evaluation as the number of 
moderately incongruent features increases when consumers consider purchasing the 
product in the distant future, whereas such an increase is not predicted for the near 
future scenario. I verify these effect in three experimental studies. Theoretical and 
managerial implications, and possible avenues of future research are also suggested. 
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Introduction 
 
Nowadays consumers have the possibility to buy products having a lot of 
features. For example, they can purchase a single product that functions as cell 
phone, game console, calculator, text messaging device, wireless Internet connection, 
PDA, digital camera, MP3 player and GPS, or a refrigerator with a TV in the door. 
Furthermore, BMW 745’s dashboard alone has more than 700 features and some new 
Nokia cell phones include ringer profiles, picture messaging, MP4 playback – all 
features absent from previous models (Thompson et al. 2006). 
Broadly speaking, technological progress creates growing opportunities for 
companies to add features to their products. The increase of the number of product 
features is a common way to enhance and differentiate the products (Goldenberg et 
al. 2003; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Thompson et al. 
2005) and has typically the aim to provide greater functionality and utility to 
consumers. This strategy has become especially popular with the development in 
electronics and information technology (Thompson et al. 2005), which enables 
companies to include more functions and make products that cost less and require 
less time to be manufactured (Freund et al. 1997). Manufacturers persist in producing 
feature-rich products for two main reasons. First, they aim to serve their own 
efficiency goals. In fact, adding features costs next to nothing and, importantly, helps 
satisfy the needs of heterogeneous consumers, which is cheaper than to make 
targeted products with fewer features. Second, what drives companies to consider 
adding as many product features as they can is often their fear of being perceived as 
having fewer features than their competitors. Fear that people are making their 
decisions off a checklist, and that who has the most features wins. In this sense, 
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marketers see every new feature their company dreams up as a point of 
differentiation and every feature competitors dream up as a necessary point of parity 
(Thompson et al. 2006). 
However, despite many manufacturers’ belief that additional features make the 
products more appealing for consumers, anecdotal evidence suggests that in many 
cases introducing new product features does not improve products’ evaluation, 
because consumers do not always use all the features of the products they buy 
(Ammirati 2003). In this vein, product innovations fail because managers overvalue 
them and have more faith in such innovations than is warranted (Gourville 2006). As 
a consequence, although adding product features leads products to have objective 
advantages over previous own and competitors’ models (Carpenter et al. 1994), this 
is often not enough to succeed.  
The understanding of the mechanisms underlying this evidence requires scholars 
and practitioners to make a broader set of considerations. In particular, it seems 
important to consider, in addition to the afore-mentioned supply-side explanation for 
adding product features, a demand side. In this sense, in addition to the increase of 
the product capabilities, new features may produce psychological costs by generating 
overload and confusion in consumers’ mind, as responses to the increased product 
complexity (Mick and Fournier 1998; Thompson et al. 2005, 2006). Thus, even 
though engineers are often tempted to equip existing products with more functions, 
this strategy leads to the intangible costs of reduced usability. The risk of exploiting 
technological progress as much as possible is to introduce product innovations that 
give answers to questions that nobody asked. In the light of this phenomenon, 
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sometimes firms are forced to limit the number of features that technology would 
allow them to add to their products.  
Consistent with the managerial trade-off between benefits and costs of adding 
product features, existing empirical research on the effect of the introduction of new 
features on product evaluations shows both positive and negative effects. These 
results appear to conflict with each other. For example, economic theory (e.g. 
Lancaster 1996, 1971), multi-attribute attitude models (e.g. Fishbein 1963; Bettman 
et al. 1975; Bernardo and Blin 1977), market research techniques (e.g. Srinivasan et 
al. 1997) and experimental research on trivial differentiation (e.g. Brown and 
Carpenter 2000; Carpenter et al. 1994; Kraus and Carpenter 2005) have all found that 
adding product features is beneficial for consumers. Conversely, other research 
indicates that the effect of the introduction of new product features is not necessarily 
positive (e.g. Klemperer 1987; McLaughlin and Skinner 2000; Mukherjee and Hoyer 
2001; Shugan 1980; Thompson et al. 2005; Wiklund 1994). In particular, these 
scholars argue that managers rarely consider the costs of adding new product 
features. Such costs should not be meant as financial costs, but mainly as intangible 
customer usability costs. These intangible costs are typically defined in terms of a 
decrease of product usability, that is as the increase of the difficulty to use the 
products as the number of features increases. In this vein, adding many features can 
generate “feature fatigue”, making products overwhelming (Thompson et al. 2005).  
In sum, all these studies provide support for the existence of a trade-off between 
the functional benefits and the cognitive costs generated by adding product features. 
In other words, adding features to products may lead consumers to balance two 
competing needs: functionality and ease of use. In fact, on the one hand consumers 
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may infer functional benefits from new features, but, on the other hand, they may 
consider the costs of learning required to use the new features.  
In the light of the presence of both benefits and costs of product enhancing, it 
seems important to understand whether products should be definitely enhanced with 
additional features or should be kept as they currently are. However, experimental 
research presents a dearth of studies explaining what determines whether consumers 
are likely to perceive a benefit from adding more product features. 
Basing on this, I propose an innovative behavioral account for product evaluation 
as more features are added to products. This account aims to help resolve the 
previous empirical conflict about the effect of adding features to products. The main 
research questions can be formulated as follows: 
 
When is increasing the number of features likely to increase product evaluation and 
when is it not? 
What are the psychological mechanisms underlying consumers’ reactions to the 
introduction of  new product features? 
 
I answer these questions by investigating the effect of the congruity of the new 
features with the base product, shedding light on the role of two constructs, cognitive 
elaboration and temporal construal, in explaining consumers’ reactions to product 
enhancing. More specifically, I propose that whether adding more features increases 
product evaluation depends on how congruent with the base product such features 
are. I show that only when the features added are congruent with the product, 
evaluation increases as the number of new features increases. Conversely, as the 
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number of incongruent features increases, the cognitive elaboration required to deal 
with these features increases, and consumers are not willing to spend all the 
cognitive resources necessary to elaborate these features and try to resolve the 
incongruities. However, building on schema-congruity theory, I further show that 
consumers are able to resolve the moderate (but not the extreme) incongruity of new 
features even when the number of features is relatively high, if encouraged to 
consider these features thoughtfully. Finally, in the last experiment I provide further 
and converging evidence of consumers’ ability to resolve the moderate incongruities 
of new features. This is done by investigating the role of temporal construal: 
consumers perceive value from increasing the number of moderately incongruent 
features when induced to imagine purchasing the product in a relatively distant future 
scenario, whereas they do not value the increase in the number of such features in a 
relatively close future scenario. 
The main contribution I intend to make to the existing marketing, behavioral and 
technology management literature consists in presenting the behavioral mechanisms 
underlying consumers’ reaction to adding more product features. In addition, almost 
all previous studies have considered the case of adding only one new feature. I 
propose that two psychological constructs, cognitive elaboration and temporal 
construal, are likely to drive consumers’ reaction to increasing the number of 
features. The investigation of the role of these constructs is made possible by 
introducing the kind of features added as a key explanatory variable. The results of 
my experiments provide some interesting suggestions to practitioners about what 
kind of features to add to products and what product enhancing strategy to employ on 
the basis of the knowledge of the mechanisms underlying consumers’ reaction. 
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The thesis is organized as follows. First I review the literature about the effects of 
adding product features on consumers’ evaluations of products. This part is divided 
into different sections in order to present the very different predictions existing in 
economic, marketing and experimental research on this topic. Second, I present my 
theoretical model that explains when consumers do tend to perceive value from 
adding product features and when they do not, and what the mechanisms underlying 
these different outcomes are. This section includes a review of the literature on 
categorization and schema-congruity theory. Third, I report the results of three 
studies designed to test my research hypotheses. Then, a general discussion follows. I 
conclude with the theoretical and managerial implications of my work, and some 
suggestions for future research on this and related topics. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Literature review: the effect of introducing new 
product features on product evaluation 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
Marketing and consumer research present a lively debate about the effect of 
adding product features on product evaluation. In this chapter I present both evidence 
about the positive impact of introducing new product features on consumers’ 
judgments and evidence that adding product features does not necessarily lead to 
improvements in product evaluation.  
In particular, recent work has been pointing out that adding features may generate 
an effect that is not as clear and unambiguous as the effect predicted in earlier work. 
In this respect, economic theory predicts that adding features makes products more 
appealing and models consumers’ preferences using an additive utility function that 
links product attributes to consumer demand (Lancaster 1971). Similarly, the basic 
multi-attribute attitude model (Fishbein 1963) assumes that consumers adopt an 
additive integration rule when making product judgments. This additive formulation 
predicts that product (or brand) judgments can be decomposed into affective values 
for its attributes which add together to estimate the global scores. This means that 
when individuals are exposed to attributes having the same evaluation as the existing 
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ones product (or brand) evaluation increases (e.g. Anderson and Fishbein 1965; Day 
1972; Wilkie and Pessemier 1973). Finally, an analogous pattern is expected by 
using market research techniques that estimate market shares on the basis of the 
partworths for each product attribute (e.g. conjoint analysis and discrete choice 
models). Because these partworths are used to predict market shares, each positively 
valued feature increases a product’s market share compared with products that do not 
have the feature (Srinivasan et al. 1997). 
Consistent with these findings, other research has found that additional features 
may provide positive differentiation and further reasons for consumers to purchase 
the product even when they are perceived as trivial and unnecessary (Carpenter et al. 
1994; Kraus and Carpenter 2005).  
Contrary to these predictions, recent marketing and behavioral studies have 
shown that adding product features might not improve product evaluations. For 
example, it has been shown that the impact of new features on product evaluation 
depends on factors such as attribute-specific associations (Broniarczyk and Gershoff 
1997), brand price/quality (Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Broniarczyk and Gershoff 
2003), and the size of choice set (Brown and Carpenter 2000).  
Moreover, other research indicates that adding product features can have a 
negative effect on consumers’ judgments of the product because these features can 
generate negative inferences (Hutchinson and Alba 1991; Simonson et a. 1994). 
Recent work has also been showing that new product features can have a negative 
effect on consumers’ evaluation, but this effect is explained by the negative effect of 
new features on consumers’ ability to use products (Wiklund 1994; McLaughlin and 
Skinner 2000; Mick and Fournier 1998; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Thompson et al.  
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2005). The effect predicted leads to “feature fatigue”, defined as the negative 
affective reaction that consumers may have after the introduction of many new 
features (Thompson et al. 2005). This reaction is motivated by the evidence that 
consumers account not only for functional benefits but also for learning costs when 
features are added to products (Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). As a matter of fact, 
every additional feature “is one more thing to learn, one more thing to possibly 
misunderstand, and one more thing to search through when looking for things you 
want” (Nielsen 1993, p. 155). Such a problem may be particularly relevant in the 
case of technological products and/or attributes having relatively high technological 
content. This arguing finds further theoretical support in the research on information 
overload, which suggests that individuals are vigilant about the mental effort 
required to process the information (e.g. Keller and Staelin 1987), and in the need for 
cognition literature which indicates that individuals are sensitive to cognitive effort 
(e.g. Cacioppo et al. 1983). Importantly, these findings offer evidence that runs afoul 
of the traditional economic prediction that increasing the number of features 
enhances evaluations.  
Taken together, all these studies provide empirical support for the existence of a 
trade-off between the functional benefits and the cognitive costs deriving from the 
introduction of new product features.  
Most of them are discussed in more detail in the rest of this chapter.  
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1.2 Positive effects of adding product features on product 
evaluation 
 
 
1.2.1 Traditional models 
 
 
Broadly speaking, traditional economic and behavioral models support the belief 
that adding features enhances product evaluation. 
More specifically, the fundamental belief of multi-attribute models (e.g. Wilkie 
and Pessemier 1973; Bernardo and Blin 1977; Bettman et al. 1975; Shocker and 
Srinivasan 1979; Meyer 1981, 1987; Jaccard et al. 1986; Holbrook and Havlena 
1988; Lim et al. 1988; Neslin 1981; Kahn and Meyer 1991), decompositional models 
(e.g. Green and Carmone 1970; Stefflre 1971, 1972; Green and Rao 1972), as well as 
economic theory of consumer preferences (e.g. Lancaster 1966, 1971; Rosen 1974; 
Ladd and Zober 1977; Ratchford 1975, 1979; Agarwal and Ratchford 1980) is that 
products (or brands) are sets of attributes.  
Each of these approaches adopts models that are designed in such a way as to 
yield specific predictions about the inferences consumers are likely to make about 
product desirability on the basis of certain attributes. The paradigm of judgment 
modelling which underlies this reasoning is the multi-attribute utility analysis 
(Anderson 1974, Keeney and Raiffa 1976), whose basic tenet is that consumers make 
product choices by first evaluating alternatives on each of a number of attributes. 
After this evaluation, consumers use an integration rule to form an overall evaluation 
of each product, and they are thought to choose the alternative with the highest 
evaluation or utility (e.g. Shocker and Srinivasan 1979). 
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Despite this common belief, the economic view and the multi-attribute attitude 
view have been typically seen as two extremely different approaches to the 
modelling of consumer preferences for products. This distinction was addressed, 
among the others, by Huber (1975) who underlined the sharp contrast existing 
between the studies which had considered consumer preferences as related to 
psychological variables (e.g. Wilkie and Pessemier 1973) and the studies which had 
evaluated the relative effectiveness of preference models on objective attributes (e.g. 
Lancaster 1966). He argued that objective physical attributes have the advantage to 
be less ambiguous and more easily controlled than psychological attributes, so that 
they allow a better determination of their causal effects. 
A great deal of research in the field of consumers’ preferences for a brand (or a 
product) adopted multi-attribute attitude measurement model. In its basic linear 
compensatory form (Fishbein 1963), such a model shows that individual’s attitude 
toward a brand can be expressed as a function of the importance that consumer gives 
to an attribute and individual’s beliefs that the brand possesses that attribute. As 
further explained by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), the underlying assumption of this 
model is that an additive process exists, according to which the individual 
evaluations of each single attribute contribute to explain the global attitude that 
consumers form about the brand. On the basis of the additive hypothesis, it is 
predicted that when consumers are exposed to additional attributes having the same 
valuation as the existing ones, product (or brand) evaluation increases (Fishbein 
1963; Anderson and Fishebein 1965; Wilkie and Pessemier 1973). 
Generally speaking, multi-attribute attitude models deal with the relationship 
between individual differences in perception and brand preferences. Consistently, 
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these models define product attributes as perceived rather than objective 
characteristics of the product. Overall product judgment is thought to reflect the net 
resolution of an individual’s cognitions (beliefs), as to the degree to which given 
objects possess certain attributes, weighted by the salience (or, alternatively, 
importance) of each attribute to the individual. In other words, multi-attribute attitude 
models generally assume that items (e.g. brands) should be seen as a linear 
combination of their “partworths” (e.g. Bernardo and Blin 1977). Such a way to 
evaluate products is defined as compositional method and is typically seen as 
opposed to the decompositional method (e.g. Holbrook 1981; Jain et al. 1979; 
Steenkamp et al. 1994). The difference between these two methods consists in the 
fact that compositional methods start with a set of explicit perceptions or beliefs 
about brand attributes and use them as the basis for predicting brand evaluations. By 
contrast, decompositional models start with measures of preferences for attribute 
bundles and use them to infer the values attached to the underlying attributes. 
Whereas the most classical example of compositional approach is given by the linear 
compositional attitude model (Fishbein-like), in which affect is predicted by 
weighting belief or satisfaction scores by desirability or importance values and then 
summed, conjoint analysis represents the best known example of decompositional 
methods, as much as on the basis of global item evaluations it allows to infer the 
partworths of the underlying brand or product features (Green and Rao 1972; Green 
and Srinivasan 1978; Green and Wind 1973). 
In sharp contrast with the multi-attribute attitude view of consumer preferences, 
which defines product attributes as psychological and “perceived” variables, 
economic theory of consumer preferences assumes that product characteristics are 
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physical, tangible and objectively measured (Lancaster 1971, pp.114-115). In 
particular, Lancaster distinguished between objective properties of the products and 
the properties of consumer preferences for products. This distinction makes it 
possible to judge a consumer’s success in maximizing his own utility without 
knowledge of consumer’s preferences or utility. 
Led by the pioneering works of Lancaster (1966, 1971) and others (e.g. Rosen 
1974), the economic theory of consumer preference is based on the premise that 
goods are valued for the attributes they have, and that different items are essentially 
different packages of attributes. Consistent with the economic tradition, the demand 
functions for product characteristics are derived from the utility maximization 
framework. In particular, an additive function linking product attributes to consumer 
demand is used (Lancaster 1971; Shocker and Srinivasan 1979; Anderson 1981): 
each positively valued attribute increases product evaluation by increasing 
consumers’ net utility. 
The most comprehensive economic theory of multi-attribute product choice is 
represented by Lancaster’s model (Ratchford 1975; Agarwal and Ratchford 1980). 
Lancaster’s basic statement is that consumer utility or satisfaction is derived from the 
properties or characteristics which goods possess rather than from goods themselves. 
As a consequence, the demand for an item is a derived demand because consumers 
do not buy just the item, but a specific combination of attributes. The model is 
explained in terms of the maximization of an ordinal preference function for 
characteristics under budget constraint. Alternatively, Ladd and Zober (1977) 
proposed an economic model of consumer behavior which adopted the same 
definition of product characteristics as Lancaster’s one but distinguished between 
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objective properties of products and the services offered by the consumption of 
products. These scholars argued that consumers’ utility is not given directly by the 
objective properties of things (Lancaster 1971, p. 6, and pp. 114-115) but is given by 
the services derived from them. In particular, they modelled consumers’ utility as a 
function of the amount of consumption services that a consumer may be able to 
obtain from consumption of goods, under the assumption that he aims at maximizing 
his own utility function. Furthermore, the amount of services depends on the total 
quantity of characteristics consumed and the total amount of a characteristic obtained 
from a given product depends on the quantity of the product consumed. Another 
model in the field of the economic theory of brand preferences is proposed by Rosen 
(1974). Consistent with Lancaster’s view, Rosen considered products for their own 
characteristics and the demand function for product characteristics is derived from 
the utility maximization framework. This model focuses on the market for a good 
that can be completely described as a bundle of objectively-measured characteristics, 
assumed to be positively valued by consumers. Goods are assumed to be indivisible 
and each consumer is assumed to buy no more than one unit at a time. In this way the 
model can be applied to durable goods. 
Similarly to the economic approach, such marketing techniques as conjoint 
analysis and discrete choice models employed in marketing research to modelling 
consumers’ preferences for hypothetical new products use objective characteristics to 
determine how consumers react to changes in such attributes. Their typical approach 
consists in estimating partial values (partworths) for every product attribute 
(Srinivasan et al. 1997), and then in linking market shares to each of these 
parthworths (Green and Krieger 1989; Horsky and Nelson 1992; Shocker and 
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Srinivasan 1974, 1979; Srinivasan et al. 1997, Thompson et al. 2005). Because 
market shares are predicted on the basis of these parthworths, each positively valued 
feature increases a product market share compared to products without the feature. 
With respect to the goals of this research, the analysis of the afore-mentioned 
traditional frameworks reveals that, beyond the many conceptual differences among 
them, all these approaches converge in supporting the belief that increasing the 
number of features (or attributes) makes products more appealing. 
In the next section, I analyze in greater detail multi-attribute product judgments, 
first by reviewing the literature about multi-attribute attitude models and then by 
presenting a number of works that have relaxed some of the assumptions of multi-
attribute attitude models and have broadened the investigation on how consumers 
form their product preferences in a multi-attribute task. 
 
1.2.2 Multi-attribute product judgments 
 
 
1.2.2.1 Multi-attribute attitude models 
 
Multi-attribute attitude models define objects as bundles of attributes leading to 
costs and benefits of differential desirability to individuals or segments of the market 
(Wilkie and Pessemier 1973). This definition underlines the importance of the role 
played by individuals’ cognitive structures in determining the success of marketing 
strategies. In essence, consumers’ beliefs and perceptions should be considered as the 
main antecedents to brand strengths or weaknesses on relevant attributes.  
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The discussion about the most relevant issues of these models typically falls 
within the framework of a basic multi-attribute attitude model. The basic linear 
compensatory model is given by the following equation: 
 
 (1) 
where: 
i  = attribute or product characteristic 
j  = brand 
k  = consumer or respondent  
 
such that: 
 Ajk   = consumer k ’s attitude score for brand j 
ikI  = the importance (or salience) weight given to the attribute i  by consumer 
k  (i.e., the evaluation of the attribute) 
ijkB = consumer k ’s evaluative beliefs as to extent to which attribute i  is 
offered by brand j  (i.e., the extent to which a consumer believes that the 
object possesses the j th attribute). 
 n = number of salient attributes. 
 
Attitude toward an object is defined as a composite of the perceived 
instrumentality of that object as a means of attaining certain goals, weighted by the 
relative importance or salience of the goals (Day 1972). Substituting “values and 
beliefs” for “goals”, this definition means that attitude is a weighted function of all 
the evaluative beliefs associated with that object. Evaluative beliefs provide 
information about the attribute or similarity judgments made by the consumer (Day 
1972). As regards the weights employed to define this model, the notions of salience 
and importance are commonly used. Although these two concepts are often used 
interchangeably, consumer behavior literature presents studies that focused either on 
the one or the other. More specifically, salience is defined by Fishbein (1967) as “the 
1
n
jk ik ijk
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strength of the beliefs about an object” or “the probability that the object is related to 
the concept, attribute, or other object”. This means that a salient attribute is an 
attribute that consumers consider in brand evaluation (Sampson and Harris 1970).  
Importantly, the notion of salience has been investigated in the research about 
information processing in situations of consumers’ overload. Since consumers are 
often overwhelmed by information about multiple product features, product 
evaluations and choices are often based on those few features that receive attention 
(Wright 1974), after consumers have screened the overall product information (Haley 
1971). Ratneshwar et al. (1997) argued that consumers turn their attention to those 
product features that provide the benefits they are seeking, that is to those product 
features that they perceive as salient (e.g. Bettman and Sujan 1987; Haley 1968; 
Huffman and Houston 1993; Park and Smith 1989; Wright and Rip 1980). On the 
other hand, the notion of importance of product attributes has been systematically 
addressed by Jaccard et al (1986). Grounding on Myers and Alpert’s (1977) 
definition, they defined attribute importance in terms of change. Hence, an attribute 
is perceived as important if a change in the individual’s perception of that product 
attribute leads to a change in the attitude toward the product.  
The model presented in equation (1) has an additive form, as much as it assumes 
that the affective value of an item can be decomposed into affective values for its 
components (e.g. attributes) which add together to estimate the composite scores. As 
a result, overall attitude is an algebraic sum of weighted belief scores. This means 
that when an individual is attributed with additional traits having the same valence as 
those he was previously attributed with, the overall evaluation does increase (Day 
1972; Anderson and Fishbein 1965). 
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Beyond the additive models, another common form of multi-attribute attitude 
models is represented by the averaging models. The distinction between additive and 
averaging models is addressed by Troutman and Shanteau (1976)1, who examined 
whether a consumer judges brands by adding or averaging attributes information. 
The difference between the two models consists in the fact that while adding implies 
that “the more the better”, averaging approach predicts that when consumers process 
two pieces of information, such as two different attributes, they look at the type 
rather than the number of information to make a judgment about a brand or a product 
(McGuire 1976). As a consequence, averaging model predicts that combining mildly 
positive information with highly positive information produces a less favourable 
impression than highly positive information alone. In other words, for the averaging 
model any single attribute importance weight varies according to the weights of other 
attributes integrated in consumer judgments. So, if the weight of the first attribute 
increases the real weight of the second attribute decreases. On the contrary, in the 
adding models each attribute’s weight is independent of the other attribute’s weight. 
Furthermore, averaging model predicts that the real weight of each attribute is 
decreased when a new attribute is included in the judgment. 
As reported by Troutman and Shanteau (1976), additive models had been 
strongly predominant in the research on consumer judgments2. However, according 
to these scholars, additive models are not always able to provide an adequate 
description of the cognitive processes involved in consumer impression formation. In 
this respect, previous judgment research in psychology had found extensive support 
                                                 
1
 See also Anderson (1971). 
2
 Troutman and Shanteau report that the only exception was represented by the work of Bettman, 
Capon and Lutz (1975b). In particular, these authors investigated adding versus averaging models and 
tested the adding assumption of Fishbein’s (1963) attitude model and likewise reported support for 
averaging. 
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for averaging information processing (attitude judgments: Youngblood and 
Himmelfarb 1972; judgments of other persons: Anderson 1974; perceptual 
judgments: Anderson 1970; decision-making: Lichtenstein et al. 1975, Shanteau 
1975; children’s judgments of toys: Butzin and Anderson 1973). Consistently, 
Troutman and Shanteau (1976) demonstrated that consumers evaluate both durable 
and nondurable products by averaging attribute information rather than by adding it. 
In other words, consumers seem to look more at the quality of the attribute 
information than at the quantity. This finding has relevant implications for 
advertisers because it suggests them to present only the most favourable product 
information, because adding moderate information – even if it is still favourable – 
tends to weaken product impression. 
Further interesting evidence of the composite consumers’ judgments comes from 
the research on the evaluation of bundles of products or services. As reported by 
Yadav (1994), traditional economic analyses about bundles (e.g. Adams and Yellen 
1976; Schmalensee 1984) begin with the additivity assumption, which predicts that 
the overall utility of a bundle equals the sum of the bundle items’ individual utilities. 
However, later works (Dansby and Conrad 1984; Guiltinan 1987; Hanson and Martin 
1990) highlighted the restrictiveness of this additivity assumption, while some other 
studies (Goldberg et al. 1984; Gaeth et al. 1990) provided support for the hypothesis 
that consumers tend to average rather than add individual items’ evaluations to form 
a bundle’s overall evaluation. Yadav (1994) proposed an anchoring and adjustment 
model of consumers’ evaluations of bundles. According to this model, consumers’ 
evaluation process begins with the anchor selection stage in which consumers 
identify the most important item for their evaluation task. The remaining items are 
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subsequently evaluated following a decreasing order of their perceived importance. 
Then, consumers make upward or downward adjustments to reflect the new 
information according to a step-by-step information-processing logic. In Einhorn and 
Hogarth’s (1985) opinion, anchoring and adjustment processes often result in 
outcomes that can be modelled as weighted average, and Johnson and Puto (1987) 
argued that averaging is very consistent with anchoring and adjustment. Similarly, 
Yadav predicted that adjustments made while evaluating a bundle of items result in 
weighted averaging. In this vein, the overall evaluation of a bundle’s items can be 
expressed as a weighted average of the individual items’ evaluations. 
Multi-attribute attitude models have been also extensively used to provide a 
guide for strategic marketing decisions, especially as regards product-positioning 
issues (Huber and Holbrook 1979). One of the most challenging aspects of designing 
new products is to find the product features that will best substantiate a desired 
product positioning (Neslin 1981). In multi-attribute models’ view competing brands 
are represented through their perceived locations (coordinates) in a “perceptual 
product space” whose axes are relatable to the attributes (Shocker and Srinivasan 
1979)3. Working with attribute data, Green and Rao (1972) compared a variety of 
product spaces that can be potentially derived, while Huber and Holbrook (1979) 
argued that there are important distinctions among various compositional approaches 
to building product spaces from attribute data. In particular, methods differ in terms 
of their treatment of affect, ranging from those containing evaluative dimensions, 
such as principal components analysis, to others, such as partials and/or discriminant 
                                                 
3
 As Shocker and Srinivasan, among many authors, note, the term product and brand are used 
interchangeably (see also Day, Shocker and Srinivasan 1978). 
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analysis, which produce dimensions that are more objective in reflecting 
homogeneous perceptions across consumers.  
 
1.2.2.2 Multi-attribute judgments with uncertainty, risk and learning 
 
One of the implications of the multi-attribute attitude models is that if one can 
fully specify the multi-attribute function that describes the cognitive attribute 
integration rule, one should be able to use it to forecast how consumers’ attitude 
towards a given product will change given changes in one or more of products’ 
attributes (Wilkie and Pessemier 1973). Such forecasts had typically been 
constrained by the assumption that consumers be fully aware of the value of product 
attributes at the time of their choice. However, Meyer (1981) presented a model of 
consumer impression formation which relaxes this assumption. This model has the 
aim to show how consumers integrate the subjective values of the attributes of 
alternatives given uncertainty about these values. Such uncertainty is represented 
both by the limited amount of information available about products’ attributes and by 
the variability present within the attributes. The model shows that when presented 
with no information about alternatives’ attributes, consumers assign a below-neutral 
utility value to the attribute and then integrate this value with the subjective values of 
known attributes to yield an overall product evaluation. As regards within-attribute 
variability, it has the effect of lowering the perceived desirability of that attribute. 
These findings show that the underlying integration rule is one of averaging. 
The multi-attribute models’ assumption of consumers’ total awareness of the 
value of the alternatives’ attributes had also been previously questioned by Pras and 
Summers (1978). Their objective was to “develop and test a general procedure for 
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adapting multi-attribute models to cover decision making under risk” (p. 429), 
namely the “risk associated with uncertainty about the true brand/attribute ratings”. 
They developed a risk-adjusted measure for brand/attribute evaluations. Consistent 
with the belief that consumers have a certain degree of uncertainty in their 
brand/attribute evaluations, Pras and Summers represented such evaluations through 
a subjective probability distribution over the possible attribute ratings and argued that 
the risk-adjusted measure of consumers’ judgments depends on the mean of this 
distribution, on its skewness and on the consumers’ tolerance for risk for a given 
attribute with respect to the range of possible attribute ratings. Consumers can be risk 
neutral, risk taker or risk avoider with respect to an attribute. Risk neutral consumers 
are indifferent between two distributions having the same mean but different 
dispersions; on the contrary, risk takers prefer the distribution with the largest 
variance and, finally, risk avoiders prefer the one with smaller variance. Such a risk 
adjustment measure was based on the consideration of the potential role of the 
skewness of the distribution beyond mean and variance. If presented with two 
distributions having the same means and variances but different skewnesses, risk 
neutral consumers tend be indifferent between them. On the contrary, risk avoiders 
should be more sensitive to the upper portion of the distribution and risk avoiders 
should be more sensitive to the downside portion of the distribution. The 
consequence is that the mean could be sufficient to capture all the relevant 
characteristics of the distribution for those who are risk neutral, whereas the variance 
and skewness should be considered for risk avoiders and risk takers. 
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Another way to model risk in multi-attribute consumer judgments is given by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern utility theory (1947)4, which transforms the independent 
variable by a function that reflects the decision maker’s response to uncertain 
outcomes. Imagine that a consumer is told that car A has a guaranteed mileage of 25 
mpg, whereas for car B mpg is uncertain and it is equally likely to be 30 or 20 mpg. 
If the consumer prefers car A, he is called risk adverse, whereas if he chooses car B 
he is called risk taker, and finally if he does not have any preference he is risk 
neutral. In the case of neutral consumer, the utility of 25 mpg is 0,5 times the utility 
of 30 mpg plus 0,5 times the utility of 20 mpg. As a consequence, a linear model 
would apply. On the contrary, risk adverse utility curve would be concave, whereas 
risk taker function would be convex. Hence, von Neumann-Morgenstern theory 
reduces to common linear additive models only when consumers are risk neutral, 
whereas it provides a greater array of functional forms. 
Currim and Sarin (1984) provided further support for the importance of 
modelling consumer preferences when risk is a relevant consideration. They argued 
that predictions can be improved if the standard multi-attribute attitude models and 
conjoint models are extended to incorporate risk attitudes. They found that the 
predictive accuracy of these models was approximately the same as for utility models 
derived from von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities only in the case of decisions made 
under certainty. On the contrary, when decisions were made under uncertainty the 
utility models were shown to have a better predictive accuracy.  
Contrary to these papers, Kahn and Meyer (1991) studied situations in which 
consumers were uncertain not much about the objective value of product attributes, 
                                                 
4
 It is worth noting that this theory lies outside the consumer behavior domain. 
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but how to assign a weight to a known attribute when trading off with other attributes 
(e.g. price). Since trade-off heuristics are often unstable (e.g. Payne 1982; Meyers 
1987; Tversky et al. 1988), the weight that a consumer is likely to assign to an 
attribute is better described by a distribution of possible weights rather than by point 
estimate (Eliashberg and Hauser 1985). Kahn and Meyer hypothesized that 
consumers approach weight uncertainty by first imagining a distribution of possible 
weight values and then taking the subjective expectation of this distribution. 
Furthermore, they argue that for attributes that increase the status-quo level of utility, 
uncertainty in weight importance is negatively related to the expected weight for that 
attribute. Otherwise, for attributes that preserve a status-quo level of utility, 
uncertainty in weight importance is positively related to its expected weight. In other 
words, enhancing attributes will be associated with ambiguity aversion whereas 
preserving attributes will be associated with ambiguity seeking.  
Another important limitation of the standard multi-attribute model is to provide a 
static description of the relationship between consumer judgments of products and 
their attributes’ perceptions, while it does not explicit whether or not the integration 
rule linking evaluative beliefs about product attributes to product judgments evolves 
over time. In addressing this limitation, Meyer (1987) analyzed the process by which 
consumer judgment rules are dynamically updated. In particular, he conducted two 
experiments to investigate how a multi-attribute judgment rule is learned through 
induction in a novel product class. In the light of this, Meyer (1987) addressed such 
an issue, focusing on the process of learning, the determinants of learning rates and 
the biases in learning across attributes. He found that consumers can be good learners 
from experience given a proper learning environment. When multi-attribute rules are 
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deterministic and subjects can access the outcomes of previous judgments, 
directionally correct forecasts of value are made after as few as four learning 
episodes. Moreover, a systematic bias in attribute learning exists, by which 
individuals learn what is associated with a good option more rapidly and with greater 
accuracy than what is associated with bad ones. 
In their study on pioneering advantage, Carpenter and Nakamoto (1989) found 
that the way in which consumers learn about brands and form their preferences 
explains pioneers’ advantage. Specifically, since when a market is in its early stages 
consumers do not know much about brand attributes importance, pioneer can drive 
consumers toward both attributes evaluation and the creation of an ideal attribute 
combination. In other words, early entrants have the possibility to lead consumers to 
a learning process about their preference for the product. The perspective adopted by 
Carpenter and Nakamoto is one for which consumers form their preferences 
following a three-stage process. The first stage considers consumers prior to be 
exposed to any brand in the category. In this stage buyers know little or nothing 
about products in the novel category. This means that the distribution of ideal points 
across consumers in a vector space is likely to be uniform, because attribute relative 
values are still ambiguous. The second stage considers consumers after being 
exposed to the initial trials of the pioneer brand. According to an updating logic, trial 
lets consumers update their preferences: since in the early stages of the market 
consumers do not have sufficient information about other alternatives, they evaluate 
favourably pioneer’s attribute combination (Meyer 1987). Then, they update their 
preferences according to the value of attribute combination they have been learning. 
The third stage is represented by consumer’s evaluation of multiple brands that 
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typically enter the market after the pioneer. Later entrants generally include me-too 
or copycat brands, which claim to be just like the pioneer but less expensive, and 
differentiated entrants, which offer significantly different attribute combinations. 
Carpenter and Nakamoto argued that pioneers have a market share advantage over 
differentiated later entrants because of the big difference existing between their 
attribute combination and the ideal one.  
 
1.2.2.3 Inferential processes and multi-attribute product evaluations 
 
Another extension of the research on multi-attribute consumer judgments is given 
by the inclusion of the effect of the inferential processes into product evaluations. 
The typical multi-attribute model assumes that consumers evaluate a brand in 
terms of its visible and accessible attributes, which are integrated to form 
preferences. As I reported above, there are two basic methods of integration of the 
information. In addition to the classical additive method, some authors (e.g. 
Anderson 1974; Troutman and Shanteau 1976) have argued that new information can 
best be accounted for by an averaging process. However, this test requires one to 
assume that inference across attribute levels does not occur (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975, p. 232). 
An alternative perspective is proposed by Huber and McCann (1982). According 
to these authors, an inferential process may occur in contexts where information 
about an attribute is missing, i.e. not visible or accessible in the product description. 
The fundamental characteristic of this process is that visible attributes serve as cues 
that the subjects use to make inferences about other (invisible) product attributes. 
Such inferred attributes are combined with accessible attributes to arrive at 
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preference or choice. Their findings show that omitting an attribute decreases mean 
purchase likelihood, as though consumers assigned a discounted mean value to the 
missing attribute. This effect has been shown to be positively related to the 
importance of the attribute dropped; deleting quality has a greater effect than deleting 
price. Importantly, Huber and McCann provided strong evidence that even without 
prompting (i.e. requiring responses to infer the value of the missing attribute) 
inferences had a significant positive impact on marginal values.  
Grounding on Huber and McCann results, Lim et al. (1988) extended the 
research on inferential processes by making a more rigorous test of inferential model, 
compared with additive and averaging models, than the test presented in Huber and 
McCann’s study. The main difference with respect to Huber and McCann’s model is 
the operationalization of the inference model, as much as Lim et al. considered not 
only purchase intentions but also preferences. In this respect, they tested the 
inference effect on a preference scale in addition to the purchase likelihood scale 
used by Huber and McCann. Furthermore Lim et al. did not consider the role played 
by price as one of the attributes. As a matter of fact, since they considered preference 
formation as a process distinct from intention formation, price may have at least two 
different roles within these two processes. Finally, Lim et al. replicated the analysis 
made by Huber and McCann on the three competing models (inference, additive and 
averaging models) for predicting the effect of inference in a context where 
information about one of the two attributes was missing. They tested the predictions 
of the three models more stringently by utilizing one supportive pair of attributes and 
one conflicting pair of attributes, while Huber and McCann had tested these three 
competing models only with conflicting pairs of attributes. For supportive attributes, 
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the inference model predicted an increase in the marginal value of an attribute; the 
additive model predicted no change, and the averaging model predicted an increase. 
For conflicting attributes, the inference model predicted a decrease in the marginal 
value of an attribute; the additive model predicted no change, and the averaging 
model predicted an increase. The marginal value of an attribute has been defined as 
the rate of change in the preference as a function of the change in an attribute. These 
predictions are inconsistent with the predictions of the popular additive models (Lim 
et al. 1988, p. 315). Lim et al.’s results for conflicting attributes were inconsistent 
with Huber and McCann’s findings because the latter stated that “even without 
prompting, inferences had a significant positive impact on marginal values” (p. 332). 
According to Lim et al., when inference on one conflicting attribute based on the 
other attribute is not induced explicitly, inferences do not have an effect on marginal 
values. On the contrary, they have a strong effect when they are induced explicitly. 
Attribute inferential processes have been also investigated by Johnson and Levin 
(1985). They argued that when consumers face missing attribute information, they 
may assign a value to the missing attribute and integrate this value into product 
evaluation. This is equal to assume that consumers treat missing information in the 
same way as they treat available attribute information. This contrasts the assumption 
of both adding and averaging models, which assume that consumers consider only 
those attributes for which information is available and ignore attributes for which 
information is not available (Troutman and Shanteau 1976). Starting from the pattern 
of inferences theorized, for instance, in the work of Huber and McCann (1982), 
Johnson and Levin proposed a model of inferred information, which considered the 
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following additive model of information integration based on a single presented 
attribute 1A  and a missing attribute A2: 
'
1 1 2 2R w a w a= +   (2)  
where R  is the evaluation response, 1a  is the subjective value of 1A , '2a  is the 
inferred value of 2A , and 1w  and 2w  are the weights associated with 1a  and 
'
2a . If 
1w  + 2w  = 1, this additive model becomes an averaging model. Furthermore, 
'
2 1a ma k= +    (3) 
where m  represents the perceived relationship between the presented and the 
missing attributes and k  is a scaling constant. Substituting equation 3 in equation 2, 
they got: 
1 2 1 2( )R w mw a w k= + +   (4) 
From equation 4 it is possible to argue that when individuals perceive a positive 
relationship between the two attributes (that is, m > 0) they use this relationship to 
assign values to the missing information, similarly to the effect predicted by 
averaging model. When individuals do not perceive a relationship between the 
attributes or they do not use a perceived relationship to infer missing values (that is, 
m = 0) the effect is identical to that of original additive model. Finally, if individuals 
perceive a negative relationship between the two attributes (that is, m < 0) the effect 
of manipulating attribute 1 will be less when attribute 2 is missing than when 
attribute 2 is present. As a consequence, this result contradicts the prediction of the 
original additive model and averaging model, as much as these do not consider 
inferred values. 
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As regards k , if k  < 0, then evaluations based on missing information will be 
relatively low compared to evaluations based on more complete information; 
otherwise, if k > 0, then evaluations based on missing information will be relatively 
high compared to evaluations based on more complete information. 
Johnson and Levin’s results mitigate the conclusion that advertisers should 
present only the most highly favourable information about product ignoring the less 
positive features (Troutman and Shanteau 1976). As a matter fact, when missing 
information is positively related to available information, the consumer’s 
assumptions about the missing information may reinforce available information.  
 
1.2.3 The positive effect of adding trivial features 
 
 
In addition to the classical economic and behavioral models and to market 
research techniques, more recent work provides evidence that adding product 
features increases product evaluation not only when such features are valuable for 
consumers, but even when they are trivial, or irrelevant. 
Trivial features are defined as features that do not provide the consumers with 
any real benefit. More precisely, trivial attributes have been defined as “those 
attributes with a trivial and/or subjective relationship to perceived quality as well as 
objectively irrelevant attributes” (Brown and Carpenter 2000, p. 372). Nonetheless, 
the definition of trivial attributes includes different types of attributes. In particular, 
trivial attributes may be those attributes that consumers perceive as “ambiguously 
positive” even though they do not provide any real benefit (Brown and Carpenter 
2000), or those attributes for which consumers have existing preferences (Carpenter 
et al. 1994). Furthermore, they may include fictional attributes that provide novel 
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associations without adding any real benefit to the product (Brown and Carpenter 
2000; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001), or attributes that have known value to consumers 
but are irrelevant to both the brand performance and the consumer choosing the 
product (Brown and Carpenter 2000; Simonson et al. 1994). 
Contrary to the prevalent view of “meaningful” product differentiation (e.g. 
Porter 1985), Carpenter et al. (1994), argued that brands could be successfully 
differentiated not necessarily by adding attributes that are meaningful, relevant, and 
valuable for consumers, but also by introducing trivial features, i.e. those features 
that “are irrelevant for providing benefits to consumer, even though they could 
appear valuable” (p. 339). In particular, they studied consumer brand preferences in a 
market for multi-attribute products in which brands differed on a common set of 
attributes, but one of these brands differentiated itself by introducing a unique but 
irrelevant attribute. These scholars also reported that a similar strategy had been 
adopted by Procter & Gamble for the instant Folger’s coffee. This product had been 
differentiated from competitors by adding “flaked coffee crystals”, created by a 
“unique patented process”: the way in which this new feature was presented to 
consumers implied that flaked coffee crystals really improved the taste of the coffee. 
However, at a closer examination, this feature is not relevant for the instant coffee to 
taste better. Furthermore, Broniarczyk and Gershoff (2003) cited the Pantene Pro-V 
shampoo as another example of trivial differentiation. This brand differentiated itself 
from other shampoos on the basis of its pro-vitamin ingredients. Even though 
consumers might believe that vitamins improve hair health, according to Consumer 
Report vitamins in shampoo have no beneficial effect on hair.  
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More generally, it could happen that an attribute that implies greater benefit for 
consumers in reality does not provide the implied benefit. Carpenter et al. (1994) 
show that differentiating a brand by adding a trivial feature (so adopting the so-called 
“meaningless differentiation”) is in many situations a viable strategy for firms to gain 
or sustain their competitive advantage. The rationale for this effect is that consumers 
tend to change their decisional structure and to give a relevant weight to new 
information in their product judgments. As a result, consumers may infer the 
attribute’s value and, in some cases, conclude that it is valuable. When consumers 
are exposed to a trivial attribute and do not have any information about its 
irrelevance, they just rely on this type of information to formulate preference 
judgments. In particular, consumers could be positively influenced by advertising 
claims and tend to find confirmation about the value of the irrelevant attribute 
through product trials. The cognitive mechanism proposed is derived from 
communication theory and predicts that consumers are likely to value positively an 
irrelevant attribute because they infer that the very existence of this attribute means 
that the firm has spent a considerable amount of time and money to promote it and 
then the trivial attribute should be valuable (pragmatic component of product 
information). Furthermore, such an irrelevant attribute conveys an advantage to the 
differentiating product because consumers perceive that it is definitely differentiated 
with respect to the alternative options. Carpenter et al.’s results show that consumers 
judge more favourably a brand differentiated on the basis of an irrelevant attribute 
than a brand that does not have the irrelevant attribute.  
Even more interestingly, these scholars provided evidence that consumers give a 
value to “meaningless differentiation” even in the case in which they are aware of the 
 39 
real irrelevance of the new differentiating attribute. The rationale is that this attribute 
makes the differentiated brand distinctive to the eyes of consumers. In other words, a 
cognitive bias (Gilovich 1981) for positive valuation in consumers’ judgments is 
likely to occur, for which they implicitly continue to assign a value to the irrelevant 
attribute even knowing that it does not provide the implied benefits.  
Overall, these results show that subjects prefer the differentiated brand regardless 
of the information revealed to them, indicating that the primary impact of the 
irrelevant attribute is to increase the salience of the differentiating brand.  
On the other side, this analysis assumed that consumers only have attribute 
information available to them and, hence, are not required to make inferences. 
However, Carpenter et al. also considered the situation in which consumers are 
exposed to price as an additional source of information about the value of the 
differentiating brand. Their findings show that when a brand that was already 
differentiated by an irrelevant attribute was further distinguished by high price, brand 
evaluation increased, regardless of the revelation of the irrelevance. On the contrary, 
at a relatively low price irrelevant attributes were not valued, regardless of whether 
or not consumers acknowledged their true irrelevance. 
As further evidence of the importance of the differentiation based on adding 
features to product, Kraus and Carpenter (2005) have studied the role of this 
differentiation strategy in affecting the process of buyers’ preference formation. 
Their basic tenet is that the success of differentiation depends on the ability of the 
firms “to create a choice context in which a brand’s unique difference becomes 
valuable” (Kraus and Carpenter 2005, p. 4). In particular, they were interested in 
understanding how the context of brand choice influences the perceived diagnosticity 
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of brand differences. Differentiation is defined both as being superior to competitors 
along the existing attributes and as introducing a novel, unique attribute. For the aim 
of my research I will focus my attention on the latter strategy, defined as “attribute 
innovation strategy” (Kraus and Carpenter 2005, p. 6). 
The role of the context in determining the success of the differentiation has been 
described through three factors: the ambiguity of the differentiating attribute, the 
association of the brand offering it, and its price. Brand attributes are defined as 
ambiguous when their meaning, and therefore their value, is unclear, i.e. ambiguous. 
In this case consumers find it difficult to order their preferences among different 
alternatives. Kraus and Carpenter show that attribute innovation strategy increases 
the relevance of the differentiating attribute both if that attribute is unambiguous and 
if it is ambiguous. As regards the effect of attribute innovation on brand preference 
and choice, as well they show, consistent with previous research (e.g. Carpenter et al. 
1994), that a new attribute increases brand preference not only in the case of an 
unambiguous attribute, but also in the case of an ambiguous attribute. In fact, when 
the newly introduced attribute is ambiguous the overall preference for the 
differentiating brand is shown to increase, however trivial that might be. Therefore, 
they demonstrated that uniqueness, whether that difference is based on an ambiguous 
or unambiguous attribute, has value for consumers. As regards brand association, 
they argued that consumers are likely to use it to resolve the ambiguity and, 
hopefully, consciously judge the value of the differentiating attribute and the brand. 
Such a resolution has been assumed to depend on the degree of consistency between 
brand association and the association consumers have about the unique attribute. 
Kraus and Carpenter’s results show that in the case of low perceived inconsistency 
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between the differentiating brand and the differentiating attribute, consumers are able 
to resolve it, so eliminating the ambiguity and reach a judgment about attribute and 
brand; as a consequence, the attribute was shown to be perceived as meaningful and 
the preference for the differentiated brand increased. Otherwise, if the perceived 
inconsistency between the brand and the attribute was high, consumers had more 
difficulties to resolve it; as a consequence, the perceived importance of the attribute 
in brand choice reduced as well the value of the brand offering it. As a matter of fact, 
the presence of incongruity is likely to generate negative affect transferred to the 
differentiating brand. Such findings suggest that a new feature may have either a 
positive or a negative effect on brand evaluations, depending on its degree of 
perceived consistency with the brand association. This result is strongly relevant 
because it is in sharp contrast with the traditional assumption of the additive choice 
models, which predict that adding a valuable attribute will always increase brand 
preference. Finally, Kraus and Carpenter analyzed price as further factor that may 
influence consumers’ judgments of the attribute innovation strategy. Specifically, 
they predicted that the effect of price on preference for a differentiated brand is 
higher (lower) in the case of high (low) attribute ambiguity. In fact, when the 
attribute is ambiguous consumers have been shown to use price cues to draw 
inference about its importance. As a consequence, attribute innovation strategy has 
been found to increase (decrease) the perceived importance of the attribute when the 
differentiating brand is priced at premium (discount). Thus, when price is high 
consumers perceive that the differentiating attribute has a positive valence and is 
relevant to the choice task. On the contrary, Kraus and Carpenter’s findings show 
that when price is relatively low, consumers are likely to infer that the differentiating 
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attribute is not very important compared to the others, even though it could be not a 
bad feature.  
Kraus and Carpenter’s (2005) study contributes to the recent research about the 
effect of adding new features to products or brands on consumer judgments by 
providing evidence of the importance of the context in determining the directionality 
and the magnitude of such an effect.  
 
1.3 Mixed effects of adding product features on product 
evaluation 
 
 
1.3.1 Factors that moderate the effect of adding new features on 
product evaluation 
 
 
Contrary to the studies analyzed in the previous section, recent research has 
shown that adding features does not always improve product evaluations. In fact, 
there are some factors that can moderate the effect of the introduction of new 
features on the evaluation of the product. 
For example, the impact of new features on product evaluation can depend on the 
attribute-specific associations. In this respect, Broniarczyk and Gershoff (1997) 
revisited the concept of meaningless differentiation proposed by Carpenter et al. 
(1994). In particular, they extended the analysis of Carpenter et al. arguing that even 
though meaningless differentiation leads consumers to turn their attention toward the 
meaningless attributes, it is not obvious that consumers always infer a positive value 
for them. In particular, they focused on two points. First, they investigated the factors 
associated with the positive inference that consumers draw from meaningless 
differentiation. Second, they examined if there are some specific contexts in which 
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meaningless differentiation is more likely to affect consumers’ decisions relative to 
other meaningful attribute information. As regards the first point, Broniarczyk and 
Gershoff replicated the empirical analysis conducted by Carpenter et al. by including 
the manipulation of the previously unexamined effect of attribute label attractiveness, 
which is considered as a factor that moderates the impact of meaningless 
differentiation on consumers’ evaluations. In particular, when the differentiated 
attribute is presented by a more attractive label, it will be positively valued; the 
opposite occurs when the attribute is presented by a less favourable label. For 
example, Broniarczyk and Gershoff argued that in their experiment Carpenter et al. 
labelled as “regular” the baseline attribute, whereas “alpine class” was used to label 
the trivial differentiating attribute5. Labelling an attribute as “regular” could imply 
that any differentiation is positive. As regards the second point, Broniarczyk and 
Gershoff showed that meaningless differentiation exerts its strongest effect when 
there is no existing meaningful differentiation between the alternatives.  
In addition, Broniarczyk and Gershoff (2003) proposed a different approach to 
the investigation of meaningless differentiation. While previous research had shown 
that meaningless differentiation was effective even when attribute’s null value is 
disclosed either because of the uniqueness of this attribute (Carpenter et al. 1994) or 
the consumer’s use of the trivial attribute for decision resolution (Brown and 
Carpenter 2000), they argued that the extent to which firms may gain a competitive 
advantage from this strategy also depends on brand equity, which is used as a cue to 
infer the value of a trivial attribute, choice context and the timing of the disclosure of 
meaningless, which is shown to affect the future evaluation of the differentiating 
                                                 
5
 The product used was a down jacket. For Carpenter et al. ’s (1994) experimental analysis, see their 
original paper. 
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brand. A further result of Carpenter et al.’s (1994) study had been that consumers 
may use price information to make inferences about the trivial attribute. In particular, 
when consumers become aware of the trivial attribute’s null value the valuation of 
such attributes at higher price levels results attenuated. On the basis of this finding, 
Broniarczyk and Gershoff (2003) focused on the situation in which the attribute’s 
null value is explicitly disclosed and argued that, at a first look, price levels can be 
assimilated to brand equity. As a consequence, trivial differentiation could be 
ineffective in presence of disclosure about the real attribute’s value for high equity 
brands and in every case for low equity brands. However, they have shown that the 
effect of brand equity on consumers’ evaluation of a trivial attribute might be more 
complex. Brand equity is assumed to be a relevant cue for consumers to manage the 
uncertainty when making evaluations. While in the case in which consumers are 
unaware of the meaningless of the trivial attribute both low and high equity brands 
are able to gain share from close competitors, when consumers are aware of the 
attribute’s null value, they face the uncertainty deriving from their need to 
understand why such a differentiation strategy has been definitely made. In this case, 
brand’s performance association is assumed to moderate consumers’ judgments. In 
particular, high brand equity is likely to provide consumers with a positive inference 
about the trivial attribute even if they are aware before choosing that the attribute is 
not beneficial. So, high brand equity has a mitigating effect on the irrelevance of the 
attribute. Otherwise, low brand equity is perceived by consumers as a confirmation 
of their negative expectations about the performance of brand’s attributes. As a 
consequence, high equity brands are more likely than low equity brands to benefit 
from offering a trivial attribute in the case of disclosure of its irrelevance. 
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Furthermore, Broniarczyk and Gershoff have shown that information provided by 
brand equity could not be sufficient for consumers to completely resolve the 
uncertainty raised by attribute’s value disclosure. As a matter of fact, contextual 
information can also help them make inference about a trivial attribute and it is likely 
to interact with brand equity to impact consumers’ valuation of such attributes. In a 
context in which a trivial attribute is uniquely offered brand equity effect is 
reinforced. Consequently, high equity brand is expected to offer unique advantage 
over mid and low equity brands. On the contrary, when a trivial attribute is shared 
among higher and lower tier brands, lower tier brands will gain a benefit from 
introducing a trivial attribute. At the same time, high equity brands offering a trivial 
attribute will suffer from sharing this attribute with a lower equity brand. As regards 
the effects of trivial attribute strategy on the evaluation of the brand, Broniarczyk and 
Gershoff examined how introducing a trivial attribute affects a brand’s subsequent 
ability to introduce a new attribute by measuring brand dilution. They demonstrated 
that post-choice disclosure has a greater negative effect on subsequent differentiation 
than pre-choice disclosure and that post-choice disclosure is more likely to affect the 
consumers who had originally chosen the trivially differentiated brand.  
Product differentiation based on the introduction of new features has also been 
studied to analyze the effects of these features on brand choice. In this respect, 
Nowlis and Simonson (1996) examined which factors determine the effect of a new 
brand feature on company sales and market share. Grounding on two principles, 
multiattribute diminishing sensitivity and performance uncertainty, they focused on 
the characteristics of the brand to which new features are added, such as its overall 
quality reputation and its level of existing features, as important factors that explain 
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the effect of these features on brand choice. According to multiattribute diminishing 
sensitivity principle, the new features add more value to a relatively inferior product 
than to a superior one. This assumption is in sharp contrast with the basic assumption 
of multiattribute additive models and conjoint measurements about utility functions. 
A new (positive) feature is assumed to be more noticeable against the background of 
an otherwise inferior option and, as a result, an alternative that is superior to a 
competitor on other dimensions is likely to gain less from the introduction of another 
(positive) feature. This tenet is based on the assimilation-contrast framework, 
according to which when a new positive feature is added to a relatively superior 
brand it will be assimilated in the perception of superiority and, as such, it will have 
little impact on the product evaluation. On the contrary, when a new positive feature 
is added to an otherwise inferior option a contrast effect will occur, which will make 
the new feature have a relatively large impact on the overall product evaluation. As 
regards performance uncertainty (see also Meyer 1981), Nowlis and Simonson have 
shown that a greater uncertainty is more likely to occur when the feature is added to 
a relatively inferior brand. Hence, high quality brands and products with more 
existing features gain more from a new feature than low quality brands or products 
with fewer features. These two assumptions lead to opposite predictions. In fact, 
according to multiattribute diminishing sensitivity, a product with inferior existing 
features and a brand associated with lower perceived quality are expected to gain 
more from introducing a new feature, whereas they are expected to gain less based 
on performance uncertainty. Nowlis and Simonson have shown that multiattribute 
diminishing sensitivity plays a stronger total effect than performance uncertainty. As 
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a consequence, a new feature is more likely to contribute to a product with inferior 
features or brand name than to a product with superior features or brand name.  
In addition to the attribute specific associations (Broniarczyk and Gershoff 1997), 
to brand equity (Broniarczyk and Gershoff 2003) and to brand quality/reputation 
(Nowlis and Simonson 1996), Brown and Carpenter (2000) have found another 
moderator of the impact of adding a new feature on brand evaluation, namely the size 
of the choice set. They proposed a reasons-based account for the valuation of 
irrelevant attributes with the objective to resolve the controversy existing in literature 
about whether the effect of introducing a trivial feature on product evaluation should 
be considered positive or negative. In fact, whereas some empirical work had argued 
that adopting a meaningless differentiation produces positive effects on consumer’s 
evaluation of brand and its choice probability (Carpenter et al. 1994), other research 
had showed that such a strategy leads to a reduction of brand choice (Simonson et al. 
1994), or these features may be misleading for consumers in making their choice 
decisions (Hutchinson and Alba 1991). Brown and Carpenter’s reasons-based 
approach adopted a two-way decisional process, whose basic tenet is that consumers 
choose trying to select those options that appear the most justifiable to them. In this 
respect, consumers prefer to choose on the basis of easily justifiable reasons, namely 
reasons based on important, diagnostic attributes: if a brand is clearly superior to 
another on these attributes, the choice will be obvious and, therefore, fully justifiable. 
Otherwise, if none of the brands is superior to the others on relevant dimensions, 
then consumers will choose according to reasons based on trivial features (Shafir et 
al. 1993). This process is called “instrumental reasoning process” (Brown and 
Carpenter 2000, p. 373) because it predicts that consumers make their evaluations in 
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a way that is instrumental to achieve task goals. More specifically, these scholars 
argued that trivial attributes’ valuation depends not only on their value but also on 
the composition of the choice problem: if consumer faces a three (or more)-brands 
choice set in which only one of the options has a trivial attribute, the valuation of this 
differentiating attribute is more likely to be positive than in the case of two-brands 
choice set. Similarly, they demonstrated that if two out of three brands in a choice set 
possess the trivial attribute, a negative valuation is more likely than if only one of the 
three brands possesses such an attribute. In other words, these authors have found 
that consumers are “context sensitive” and instrumental decision makers because 
they confer value that lets them make choices (Fisher et al. 1999). These  results are 
explained by the account that in the case of two equally valued alternatives subjects 
tend to choose the alternative that performs better on the more relevant dimension 
(Slovic 1975), according to the lexicographic approach to product evaluation 
(Tversky et al. 1988). Otherwise, when two or more brands are differentiated only by 
a trivial attribute, consumers are not provided with clear, relevant reasons to choose 
one or the other alternative. Nonetheless, Brown and Carpenter have shown that it is 
not infrequent for trivial attributes to have a tangible effect on choice. When 
considering more than two alternatives differentiated only because one of them 
possesses a trivial attribute, consumers must develop a reason to choose only one of 
the alternatives available at the moment, so they feel motivated to search for positive 
reasons in favour of this alternative (Kunda 1990). They argued that this search will 
be biased because the presence of trivial attribute is the only discriminating factor 
between the alternatives and, as such, it is perceived to “reassure” consumers that 
they are making a confident choice. As a result, positive reasons for the trivial 
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attribute are more likely than negative ones. On the contrary, if there are only two 
alternatives in the choice set, either positive or negative reasons can resolve the 
conflict and the search for reasons will not be biased. 
In sum, in absence of other diagnostic information consumers tend to temporarily 
treat trivial attributes as though they have value to resolve the dilemma of choosing 
between otherwise comparable alternatives. In conclusion, Brown and Carpenter 
(2000) have shown that trivial attributes’ evaluation may be “context dependent” as 
much as it depends on attribute’s ability to expedite a final choice and not necessarily 
on the underlying belief that it really improves product performance. 
 
1.3.2 Negative inferences generated by new features 
 
 
In the previous paragraph I have analyzed some work showing that adding 
features may not lead to an increase in product or brand evaluation, because of the 
effects of some contextual factors on consumers’ judgment. In this section I analyze 
research that indicates that new features can even have a clearly negative effect on 
consumers’ evaluations.  
For instance, Hutchinson and Alba (1991) have investigated several situational 
factors contributing to successful consumer learning. Consumers are thought to 
review multi-attribute information about a specific product, given that only one of 
the attributes is really diagnostic (or relevant) of the target concept. Hutchinson and 
Alba argued that this learning involves a categorization process which implies that 
consumers need to learn which attributes are really important when a new product 
category enters the market. In other words, consumers are often involved in concept-
formation tasks which consist in learning how to best discriminate among the 
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different brands included in the choice set. This discrimination may be difficult when 
the diagnostic attributes are technical and/or non-obvious. In such cases, brands may 
share some irrelevant, unneeded attributes that can definitely play an important role 
in consumers’ judgments and choice. Hutchinson and Alba (1991) focused on the 
factors that are likely to increase analytic process during concept formation in 
consumer settings. Correct analytic classification of brands occurs when 
classification is based on attributes that are diagnostic of class membership. 
Diagnostic (or “criterial”) attributes are defined as those attributes that are used to 
define a concept. Conversely, holistic classification occurs whenever overall 
similarity of brands is taken as the criterion for class membership. In this case, 
irrelevant attributes may be considered into the decision, in addition to diagnostic 
ones, so leading to wrong judgments. Hutchinson and Alba (1991) argued that 
consumers’ ability to identify diagnostic attributes depends firstly on consumers’ 
level of task-involvement. Another class of factors that can influence analytic ability 
is given by external factors, such as the number of attributes that should be processed 
by consumers. In particular, a problem of overload, or complexity, arises when the 
number of attributes to be examined increases. A third class of factors is given by the 
perceptual salience of relevant and irrelevant attributes: when a diagnostic attribute is 
salient, it should be identified more easily, whereas when an irrelevant attribute is 
salient analytic processing is likely to be inhibited.  
In conclusion, Hutchinson and Alba have shown that adding irrelevant attributes 
has the negative effect to draw attention away from diagnostic, relevant attributes. 
Another evidence of the negative effect of the introduction of trivial features on 
product evaluation is provided by Simonson et al. (1994). Consistent with 
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Hutchinson and Alba (1991), they predicted that introducing a new product feature 
may have an effect on the other product features and, in particular, may lead 
consumers to make negative inferences. Their general proposition is that adding a 
trivial feature may decrease the overall attractiveness and the choice probability of 
the product. This effect is predicted to occur not only when consumers believe that 
they are paying for the unneeded features, but even when these features are offered at 
no charge. What are the psychological mechanisms that explain consumers’ 
avoidance of unneeded features and, as a result, a decrease in product choice 
probability? 
The most important cited by Simonson et al. are: 
• Consumers’ inference about product’s value and quality: consumers could 
believe that they are paying for the unneeded feature and realize that product 
is not valuable for them. In addition, they could infer that, because of the 
unneeded feature, the product is of low quality. 
• Reasons-based approach: in essence, consumers look for a choice that both be 
justifiable to themselves and prevent them to be criticized by others; 
differentiating a product by adding a nonvaluable feature provides a reason 
against choosing that product. 
• Dilution effect: irrelevant, nondiagnostic features have the effect to moderate 
people’s predictions (e.g. Tetlock and Boettger 1989) because they lead to a 
dilution of the effect of diagnostic, relevant product features. 
• Averaging: when a trivial features is added to a product, the average value of 
the product as a whole and its choice probability decreased (Anderson 1971; 
Troutman and Shanteau 1976). 
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1.3.3 Learning costs and “feature fatigue” 
 
 
Some recent work has focused on the negative effects of the introduction of new 
product features on consumers’ ability to use the product. The basic tenet of this 
research is that new features can make the product overwhelming and too complex 
for consumers, so often leading them not to perceive an overall improvement in 
product evaluation. 
In this respect, Mukherjee and Hoyer (2001) have analyzed a particular 
characteristic of a new product feature: its degree of familiarity to consumers. Since 
the case of the introduction of familiar product features had been studied extensively 
(Carpenter et al. 1994; Simonson et al. 1994; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; 
Broniarczyk and Gershoff 1997; Brown and Carpenter 2000), Mukherjee and Hoyer 
have examined the impact of novel attributes on consumer judgments and choice. In 
particular, they predicted that two variables, product complexity and attribute 
information discovered during the search, were likely to moderate the effect of novel 
attributes on product evaluation. Such predictions are based both on inference-
making (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Huber and McCann 1982; Johnson and Levin 
1985; Johnson and Payne 1985; Lim et al. 1988) and hypothesis-testing literatures. 
As regards the inferential process, it is predicted that consumers make inferences 
about novel attributes based on a cost-benefit comparison. Because of their lack of 
knowledge about such novel features they make inference both on the potential 
benefits of the novel attribute (i.e. value-inference), and on its potential costs 
(learning-cost inference). Negative inferences are given by the learning costs, which 
are defined as the cognitive burden necessary for consumers to gain the knowledge to 
effectively use the product after the introduction of the novel feature (see also 
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Klemperer 1987; Shugan 1980). Such learning-cost inferences about the novel 
features are assumed to be higher in the case of high complexity products than in the 
case of low complexity products (e.g. Farrell and Shapiro 1980; Keller and Staelin 
1987); consumers are likely to value more negatively high learning-costs inferences 
than low learning-cost inferences (Fiske and Taylor 1984) because they are typically 
adverse to mental effort (Shugan 1980; Keller and Staelin 1987). Mukherjee and 
Hoyer have found that the degree of product complexity determines whether the 
introduction of novel attributes has a positive or a negative effect on product 
evaluations. Specifically, in the case of low-complexity products, adding novel 
attributes is likely to improve product evaluation; as a matter of fact, consumers 
make high value and low learning-cost inferences because the mental effort required 
to accumulate knowledge for effective usage is relatively low. Conversely, in the 
case of high-complexity products, adding novel attributes is likely to reduce product 
evaluation. In fact, in this case both high value inferences (deriving from consumers’ 
beliefs about the improvements in product performance) and high learning-cost 
inferences occur. Based on findings of previous research (Herr et al. 1991; 
Skowronski and Carlston 1987), Mukherjee and Hoyer predicted that negative 
information plays a stronger role than positive information on consumers’ 
evaluations. Consistently, they have shown that learning-cost inferences are more 
impactful than high value inferences. As a result, the addition of novel attributes to a 
high-complexity product had the effect to reduce product evaluation. As regards 
hypothesis-testing, it is argued that consumers form their judgments about novel 
features by integrating their initial inferences with additional information they search 
for to check the validity of their inferences (e.g. Huber and McCann 1982). In other 
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words, consumers are assumed to test their initial hypotheses about the features using 
subsequently collected evidence (see also Hoch and Deighton 1989). In the specific 
case of the introduction of novel product attributes, consumers were assumed to 
search for additional information that confirmed their initial hypothesis about novel 
attributes. In particular, consumers had two inferential hypotheses, one regarding 
value inference and the other regarding learning-cost inference. When novel 
attributes are added to low-complexity products, both of these two initial hypotheses 
assume positive valence. As a consequence, based on confirmatory bias, when 
consumers were subsequently exposed to ambiguous or mixed information about the 
novel attribute they paid more attention to the positive than to the negative part of the 
information encountered during the search. Furthermore, the positive effect of novel 
attributes on low-complexity product evaluation has been shown to be stronger after 
exposure to ambiguous information during search than before search. Otherwise, 
when novel attributes are added to high-complexity products value inference and 
learning-cost inference take opposite values. In particular, consumers had a positive 
valued hypothesis of high value and a negative valued hypothesis of high learning-
cost. Since negative inferences are assumed to be more important than positive ones 
consumers tend to pay more attention to negative than to positive information about 
novel attributes found during ambiguous search.  
In sum, Mukherjee and Hoyer have shown that the effects of novel attributes on 
product evaluation are accentuated by search, even when the information 
encountered during the search is objectively ambiguous in nature. The main 
contribution of Mukherjee and Hoyer’s (2001) study is to provide evidence of the 
existence of a cost-benefit trade-off deriving from adding new features to products. 
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Hence, in addition to the benefits accruing to consumers from using an enhanced 
product having greater functionalities, there are also costs for consumers in terms of 
greater difficulty to use the product after a new feature has been introduced. Some of 
the works analyzed so far have highlighted the growing cognitive burden for 
consumers as the product becomes more differentiated. For instance, Hutchinson and 
Alba (1991) have argued that consumers’ ability to use attribute information to make 
“correct” product judgments may be negatively influenced by the degree of 
consumer overload (see also Chernev 2001). This overload may derive from the 
growing number of attributes used to differentiate a product. Furthermore, 
Mukherjee and Hoyer (2001) have found that consumers tend to make an inference 
about the benefits associated with the new attribute as well as another kind of 
inference about the learning costs associated with gaining the knowledge necessary 
to deal with the new attribute and, finally, to use the differentiated product. 
Furthermore, by considering the possible negative effects of novel attributes on high-
complexity product evaluation, they provided a possible explanation for consumer 
aversion toward high-tech innovations (see also Mick and Fournier 1998; 
McLaughlin and Skinner 2000). This arguing finds further theoretical support in the 
research on information overload, which suggests that individuals are vigilant about 
the mental effort required to process the information (e.g. Keller and Staelin 1987), 
and in the need for cognition literature which indicates that individuals are sensitive 
to cognitive effort (e.g. Cacioppo et al. 1983).  
In Dobscha and Mick’s (1998) words, “certain features of products frustrate and 
overwhelm consumers” by producing negative feelings, such as anxiety and stress 
(Mick and Fournier 1998). Being associated with learning costs and mental effort, 
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new features can muddle consumers and be perceived as one source of frustration, 
anxiety and stress. Huffman and Kahn (1998) investigated the problem of consumer 
overload and confusion in the context of retailer strategies. They argued that large 
assortment strategies offering a wide variety of items within a category can backfire, 
because the emerging complexity can produce information overload and turn 
consumers into dissatisfaction and frustration (see also Jacoby et al. 1974). This issue 
can be even more severe if retailers try to carry this strategy to the point of looking 
for customization, so aiming to provide consumers with exactly what they want.  
The trade-off between the benefits and costs of adding new product features has 
been also addressed by Thompson et al. (2005). They have used the concept of 
“feature fatigue” to indicate the information overload for consumers after the 
introduction of many features. Empirical evidence indicates that consumers may 
experience negative emotional reactions, such as anxiety or stress in response to 
product complexity (see also Mick and Fournier 1998). The increase in the 
complexity of the products results from companies’ desire to enhance the products 
by providing greater functionality for consumers. However, too many features can 
make the products overwhelming for consumers, leading to dissatisfaction (p. 431). 
Broadly speaking, when new features are added to a product, consumers’ 
perceptions are based on the expected value of the functionalities provided by new 
features (e.g. Carpenter et al. 1994; Srinivasan et al. 1997; Mukherjee and Hoyer 
2001; Brown and Carpenter 2000) and on the costs of this strategy (Mukherjee and 
Hoyer 2001; McLaughlin and Skinner 2000; Payne 1982; Payne et al. 1998; Chernev 
2001), meant as difficulty to learn the new features (Klemperer 1987; Shugan 1980; 
Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). Thompson et al. (2005) formalized such a trade-off 
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introducing two concepts, product capability (i.e. the consumer’s beliefs about the 
product’s ability to perform the desired functions) and product usability (i.e. the 
consumer’s beliefs about the difficulty of learning and using the product), and 
focused on the investigation of how consumers balance their competing needs for 
functionality and ease of use when evaluating products. Differently from all the 
studies discussed above, which have measured consumers’ perceptions in response to 
the addition of a single product feature, Thompson et al. analyzed the consequences 
of increasing the number of new product features on both product capability and 
product usability. Their findings show that as the number of new product features 
increases, product capability increases, whereas product usability decreases. Given 
these two opposing outcomes, the question becomes to determine the net effect of 
increasing the number of new product features on overall product evaluations. Do 
consumers give more weight to the benefits or to the costs of the differentiation 
strategy in their product evaluation? Thompson et al. addressed this question by 
analyzing the effect of increasing the number of product features on overall product 
utility. They have found that this effect depends on the relative weights that 
consumers give to capability and usability in their judgments. In particular, 
consumers have been shown to give more weight to product capability in their 
evaluation before using the product than in their evaluation after using the product, 
whereas they give more weight to product usability after than before product use. 
The explanation for these effects is based on the differences in the level of the 
construal (Liberman and Trope 1998). Research on this topic had shown that when 
people evaluate options for the distant future, they favour highly desirable options 
that are less feasible over less desirable options that are highly feasible. However, the 
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opposite is true when people evaluate options in the near future. The relative weights 
of desirability and feasibility change because the construal of more distant future 
events tends to be more abstract, favouring desirability, whereas the construal of near 
future events tends to be more concrete, favouring feasibility (Liberman and Trope 
1998)6. In this vein, Thompson et al. (2005) have shown that before using the 
product, consumers are more focused on desirability issues, such as product 
capabilities, and less focused on feasibility issues, such as usability, than they are 
after using the product.  
In conclusion, Thompson et al.’s results provide support for the existence of a 
cognitive and decisional trade-off for consumers dealing with the introduction of new 
product features. What appears to be desirable in prospect is not necessarily good in 
practice. As a matter of fact, when using an enhanced product, consumers may 
become frustrated and dissatisfied with the number of new features they chose before 
using the product. In sum, “product capability may become too much of a good 
thing” (Thompson et al 2005, p.440). The framework proposed accounts for this 
trade-off by varying the temporal frame of consumers’ evaluations: consumers are 
shown to focus more on value inference or on learning-cost inference depending on 
whether their overall evaluation is made before or after using the enhanced product. 
 
1.4 Conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of the possible effects of adding 
features on product evaluation as reported in the literature. I started by presenting 
evidence about the positive effects, describing the most relevant approaches that 
                                                 
6
 I will explain temporal construal theory in more depth later in the work. 
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support the belief that additional features make the products more appealing for 
consumers. After having illustrated the similar findings of economic theory, multi-
attribute attitude models and market research techniques, I have focused on multi-
attribute product judgments. The basic tenet of multi-attribute models is that product 
evaluation or utility is a function of subjects’ evaluation of product attributes. The 
relationship between overall product evaluation and attributes’ evaluation is 
substantiated by a given integration rule that consumers use to “compose” the 
different pieces of information represented by the different product attributes. Within 
multi-attribute product judgments, I have focused on multi-attribute attitude models, 
first describing the basic additive model that predicts that adding valuable product 
attributes improves consumers’ evaluation, then illustrating an alternative view of 
these models, the averaging one. In addition to this, I have presented some 
extensions of the basic multi-attribute attitude model based on relaxing some of its 
fundamental assumptions. In particular, my analysis has been centred on the concepts 
of uncertainty and risk in consumer evaluations of product attributes, on the 
possibility that consumers gradually learn how to integrate the attributes’ 
information, and on the inferential processes employed by consumers when the 
information about one or more product attributes is missing. Finally, evidence about 
the positive effects of adding features that are trivial and not objectively valuable for 
consumers has been presented to complete the analysis of the positive effects of 
adding features on product evaluation. 
In the following section, I have focused on the evidence about more mixed 
effects of adding features on product evaluation. The analysis has been conducted by 
describing the most relevant studies that have shown that adding features does not 
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always improve product evaluation. In particular, I have discussed those works that 
have found some contextual factors explaining when a new feature could be not 
beneficial in terms of product evaluation. Second, I have presented some research 
about the negative effects of new features induced by the negative inferences that 
they generate when they are added to products or brands. Finally, I have focused on 
some recent work showing that adding features to products may not lead to 
improvements in product evaluation because of the learning costs generated by new 
features. This work have found that adding features may generate negative emotional 
reactions deriving from the increase in the complexity of the products as features are 
added to products. 
Two general points can be made about the research in this field. First, almost all 
the studies discussed here have considered the case of the introduction of one single 
product feature, focusing either on competitive scenarios in which products differed 
on a single feature (e.g. Carpenter et al. 1994; Brown and Carpenter 2000; Nowlis 
and Simonson 1996), or on “stand-alone” evaluations of products, that is comparing 
the evaluations made before and after the introduction of the new feature (Mukherjee 
and Hoyer 2001). In contrast to previous research, Thompson et al. (2005) have 
analyzed experimentally the effect of manipulating the number of new features on 
product capability, product usability and overall product utility, asking subjects to 
evaluate different versions of the single product, each enhanced with a number of 
features. This knowledge seems to be important because sheds light on consumers’ 
ability to perceive benefit from adding more features at once.  
Second, the analysis of the literature presented in this chapter supports the belief 
that the introduction of additional features on products may lead to benefits 
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associated with the increase in the functional value of the products, but also costs 
associated with the need for increased learning and overload. As a consequence, 
product evaluation after adding features often depends on how consumers balance 
these opposing features. 
This finding should be seen as a necessary acquisition in the investigation of the 
effects of the introduction of new product features because it is in sharp contrast with 
the traditional additive models that predict that the success of adding product features 
depends only on the inherent value of the new attributes. According to the classical 
models, when a new feature is positively evaluated it improves consumers’ 
judgments of the product. Contrary to this view, more recent work provides support 
for the important role that many factors other than the inherent value of the attributes 
added to brands are likely to play in determining consumers’ judgments.  
However, few studies have accounted for this cost-benefit trade-off, investigating 
the conditions under which adding features enhances product evaluation and the 
conditions under which this does not occur. For instance, Mukherjee and Hoyer 
(2001) have found that whether a novel feature have positive or negative effect on 
evaluations depends on the complexity of the product. They have shown that 
consumers rely more on learning-cost than value inference when such a novel feature 
is added to high-complexity products, whereas they rely on both of these inferences 
when it is added to low-complexity products. In contrast, Thompson et al. (2005) 
have accounted for this trade-off by arguing that overall product utility depends on 
the weights that consumers assign to product capability and product usability, 
suggesting that the former weighs more in the evaluations that precede the use of the 
product enhanced with new features, whereas the latter weighs more in post-usage 
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evaluations. Hence, when the evaluation is made before product use, as the number 
of product features increases, overall product utility increases, whereas when the 
evaluation is made after product use, as the number of product features increases 
product utility does not increase. More recently, Gill (2008) has studied the case of 
convergent products (CPs), and has found that in the case of CPs with an utilitarian 
base, adding an incongruent, hedonistic feature is valued more than adding a 
congruent, utilitarian one, whereas for CPs with an hedonistic base product, adding 
an incongruent, utilitarian features is valued less than a congruent, hedonistic one.  
In the light of this dearth of empirical investigations of the cost-benefit trade-off 
following the introduction of new product features, other accounts for product 
evaluations warrant consideration. In particular, what remains unclear from previous 
investigations are the constructs that determine the effect of adding features, 
explaining when it leads to an increase in product evaluation and when it does not. 
That said, in the next chapter I present my theoretical model, which contributes to 
this literature by predicting that consumers’ evaluations as more features are added to 
the product depend on what kind of features are added. I ground on schema-
congruity theory, and investigate the cognitive process which is associated with the 
degree of product congruity of the features added and which drives consumers’ 
evaluations as more features are added to the product. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A theoretical framework for product evaluation 
after adding features 
 
 
 
2.1 The role of product perceived congruity of the features 
 
 
In this thesis I propose an innovative framework for explaining product 
evaluation after the introduction of new product features. This model investigates the 
mechanisms underlying consumers’ evaluations of the product as the number of 
features increases. Hence, I do not limit to focus on adding one new feature, as most 
of previous research, with the exception of Thompson et al. (2005), has done. Such 
consumers’ evaluations are investigated by considering the perceived congruity of 
the features added with the base product as a variable that moderates the effect of 
increasing the number of features. In this way, I argue that adding more features has 
an effect that is dependent of the kind of the additional features. This understanding 
helps address the questions when adding more features increases product evaluation, 
and what theoretical mechanisms determine consumers’ reaction to adding more 
features.  
The explanation proposed for the effects I find is based on two constructs, 
cognitive elaboration associated with the product congruity of the features, and 
temporal construal, which acts on consumers’ ability to resolve the moderate 
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incongruity as the number of features increases. The role of these constructs is 
detailed with specific research hypotheses.  
In the light of this theorizing, the framework proposed is based on the predictions 
of the research on categorization and, more precisely, of the research on schema 
congruity. In the next paragraph, I describe the main findings in categorization 
research, while the following section includes a review of the literature on schema-
congruity. Grounding on this theorizing, in the last three paragraphs I present my 
research hypotheses. 
 
2.2 Categorization research: an overview 
 
 
The notion of product perceived congruity of the features is grounded on the 
assumption that consumers use their knowledge about the product as a schema that 
serves as basis for their evaluation of every new feature. My belief is that when new 
features are added to a product they are compared with an existing consumers’ 
cognitive structure, represented by the idea of the product that consumers already 
have in mind. In particular, I argue that the effect of increasing the number of new 
features on product evaluation is different depending on the degree of congruity of 
the new features with the idea of the product, included some product’s typical 
characteristics and functions, as represented in consumers’ mind. 
Research on categorization has typically defined individuals’ cognitive structures 
as schemas. Accordingly, I use the concept of schema defined as consumers’ mental 
representation of a product.  
Categorization literature presents different definitions of schema. For example, 
according to Stayman et al. (1992), schemas are “organized structures of prior 
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knowledge stored in memory”; Fiske and Taylor (1984, p. 140) defined a schema as 
“a cognitive structure that represents the knowledge organized around a concept”, 
whereas Cohen (1982) argued that schema is “a hypothetical cognitive structure that 
integrates existing information into a more cohesive and directive organizational 
unit”. Schemas may also include elements such as attributes of a category, prototypes 
of the category, and the general attitude toward the category (Goodstein 1993). 
According to categorization research, people apply their stored knowledge that 
defines a schema whenever they encounter a new instance of that schema. As such, a 
schema is a perspective to interpret the events (Fiske 1982; Fiske and Pavelchak 
1986). It allows individuals to evaluate new information rapidly, by allowing them to 
apply the knowledge they have about a certain item whenever they meet a new 
stimulus (Mandler 1982). In addition to the cognitive information, schemas have 
been found to contain affect, including attitudes and emotions toward the schema 
(Fiske and Pavelchak 1986), which are likely to determine individuals’ evaluation of 
the new stimulus referred to that schema. Research has provided insight regarding 
how the level of congruity between new stimuli (e.g. products) and their associated 
schemas (e.g. product categories) affects processing and evaluative judgments (e.g. 
Cohen and Basu 1987; Fiske 1982; Srull 1981; Fiske and Pavelchak 1986; Sujan 
1985). In this respect, two extreme cases have been typically contrasted – either a 
complete match between a new stimulus and the schema or a complete mismatch. 
While evaluations for matches are based on the schema affect, for mismatches there 
is more elaborate processing whereby affect is derived piecemeal by aggregating the 
affect associated with the stimulus’ specific attributes (Fiske and Pavelchak 1986; 
Sujan 1985).  
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This model I propose is specifically based on the schema-congruity theory 
(Mandler 1982), which goes on to study the implications of the categorization 
process on people’s evaluations. Schema-congruity theory suggests that, in addition 
to the affective reaction generated by a new stimulus itself, it is the processing such 
information that may generate affect (e.g. Mandler 1982; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 
1989; Peracchio and Tybout 1996; Garbarino and Edell 1997; Campbell and 
Goodstein 2001). While most categorization research has examined how novel items 
are functionally categorized and evaluated, Mandler (1982) predicted that 
categorization process may itself generate affect that contributes to the evaluation of 
the stimulus. In particular, it is the very process of responding to (in)congruity that 
may produce such affect (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989; Garbarino and Edell 
1997). In addition to the two extreme cases of high and low congruity, Mandler 
considered the case in which incongruity lies between the extremes of a perfect 
match or mismatch between the schema and a new stimulus and called this situation 
“moderate incongruity”. His model predicts an inverted U relationship between 
schema (in)congruity and evaluation: responding to moderate incongruity leads to 
more favourable evaluations than responding to either congruity or extreme 
incongruity. 
Congruity is defined as the extent that structural correspondence is achieved 
between the entire configuration of a new stimulus, such as a new product feature, 
and the configuration specified by the schema (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). 
When the new stimulus matches schema expectations, schema congruity is achieved, 
whereas when a mismatch occurs, there is schema incongruity. Depending on which 
of these situations occurs, individuals’ evaluations vary.  
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In sum, there are two different types of affective responses deriving from 
schema-congruity. First, there is the affective response contained within the schema 
itself (Fiske and Pavelchak 1986). Therefore, if a person who hates action films 
attends an action movie, his schema for action movies will prepare him to dislike that 
movie. Second, there is the affective response generated by the match/mismatch 
between the new stimulus and the schema (Mandler 1982). In this sense, the level of 
schema-perceived congruity of a new stimulus has been found to have a direct effect 
on consumers’ judgments of such a stimulus. 
In this thesis I focus on the second form of affective response. I argue that 
different levels of product perceived congruity of the new features generate different 
evaluative responses in terms of product evaluation as more features are added to the 
product. In particular, a difference in responses to congruent versus incongruent 
features is expected, and different outcomes for product incongruent features 
depending on consumers’ ability to resolve incongruity are predicted.  To achieve 
this aim, in this chapter I analyze the predictions of schema-congruity theory about 
the possible evaluative effects of the match/mismatch between stimulus and schema.  
Since schema-congruity theory deals with the implications of the categorization 
processes on evaluations, before analyzing the research on schema-congruity, I 
present some work on the more general framework of categorization as applied to 
product evaluation (Cohen and Basu 1987; Barsalou 1983, 1985; Loken and Ward 
1990). In addition, I report some evidence about the application of categorization 
framework to the research on brand extension (e.g. Boush and Loken 1991; Aaker 
and Keller 1990; Boush et al. 1987; Boush 1993; Barone et al. 2000; Romeo 1991; 
UMCBS 1987; Park et al. 1991; Martin et al. 2005). 
 68 
2.2.1 Categorization theory 
 
 
Categorization theory grew up in the context of artificial and natural objects and 
then has been widely applied to consumer behavior issues related to products and 
product categories. Generally speaking, research on categorization has focused on 
the conditions under which an entity can be considered representative of a category 
and on the different ways in which categorization process may take place. For 
instance, Mervis and Rosch (1981) argued that a category exists whenever two or 
more distinguishable objects or events are treated equivalently (e.g. labelling distinct 
objects with the same name or performing the same action on different objects). 
According to Rosch (1978, p. 28), “to categorize a stimulus means to consider it, for 
purposes of that categorization, not only equivalent to other stimuli in the same 
category but also different from stimuli not in that category”.  
In addition, Mervis and Rosch (1981) addressed two basic questions, such as the 
criteria for setting boundaries for category membership and the whether or not 
category members differ in their degree of representativeness of that category.  
As regards the first point, they argued that objects can be categorized at different 
hierarchical levels (Rosch et al. 1976). Within this hierarchy a basic level exists at 
which objects are recognized as category members more rapidly than as members of 
categories at superordinate or subordinate levels. However, they argued that category 
boundaries are generally not well defined, because the attributes defining a category 
tend to be fuzzy. The categories, once formed, allow people to predict sets of 
properties, object uses, and person behavior on the basis of people assignment of 
such objects and other people to them, without directly observing such aspects for 
each instance (Cohen 1982). The set of beliefs and expectations that people have 
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about objects or other people included in the categories may be said to form a 
schema for that category.  
As regards the second point, empirical evidence demonstrates that members of a 
category are not equally representative of that category, because they vary in their 
degree of typicality, or membership, of the category. As a consequence, category 
membership is often a matter of degree. Typicality has been defined as the degree to 
which an item is perceived to represent a category (Loken and Ward 1990). This 
range in typicality of the category is called “graded structure” (Lingle et al. 1984; 
Barsalou 1985; Mervis and Rosch 1981; Rosch et al. 1976). The most representative 
members of categories are recalled faster and with fewer errors, and are established 
first as category members (Ward and Loken 1986); furthermore, they are the most 
useful bases for learning categories and they are perceived as “standards of 
comparison” for other members. Rosch and Mervis (1975) defined category 
membership in terms of the attributes that some members share with others. This 
variable is called family resemblance. Items having the highest family resemblance 
scores have the most shared attributes and, at the same time, are those items which 
share few (if any) attributes with members of related categories. 
Categorization theory has been widely used in consumer research about product 
categories. In this respect, consumers may perceive some products or brands as more 
typical examples of a certain category than others. For example, consumers may 
perceive McDonald’s as more typical example of the category “fast food restaurant” 
than Pizza Hut (Loken and Ward 1987). But what determines whether a product is 
perceived to be more or less a member of any category? Family resemblance is 
recalled by Barsalou (1983, 1985) as one of three factors that may determine the 
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perceived typicality of a category member. The other two are: (1) the extent to which 
a category member has the attributes useful to achieve the goal(s) served by the 
category (“ideal” attributes) and (2) the number of times that a category member has 
been mentioned as a member of the category (i.e. its frequency of instantiation). 
Barsalou argued that consumers may sometimes judge the typicality of a category 
member not by its family resemblance to other brands but on the basis of the extent 
to which it has attributes related to the goals or uses of the category. These attributes 
are called “ideal” attributes. In particular, Barsalou suggested that individuals create 
two types of categories: taxonomic and “goal-derived” categories. Taxonomic 
categories are those generally used to classify phenomena that share attributes with 
each other to a greater or lesser extent, whereas goal-derived categories are created 
ad hoc putting together items that could be dissimilar along physical dimensions but 
serve to achieve certain goals, called “ideals”, for which the category has been 
formed. In this sense, family resemblance scores do not seem to be good predictors 
of member typicality of goal-derived categories because these scores are based on 
physical comparison among the members of the category and may not be able to 
capture the similarities among members on dimensions related to category goals. 
Addressing some problems in Barsalou’s measure, Loken and Ward (1987) 
presented another measure of typicality. According to these scholars, consumers 
judge the typicality of a product by the extent to which the product has salient 
attributes related to the goals or uses of the category. The measure they use, called 
attribute-structure measure, differs from Barsalou’s one because it focuses on a set of 
salient goals for the category created and not on just one goal.  
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In essence, categorization consists in making a comparison between a new 
stimulus and the organized knowledge. Cohen and Basu (1987) analyzed three 
different models that may be used in the categorization process: (1) the “classical” 
view, (2) the “prototypical” view and (3) the “exemplar” view. The classical view 
predicts that there are some necessary and sufficient attributes that jointly determine 
the category membership. Only if an entity possesses all these attributes it can be 
said to be a category member. As a consequence, this view implies that all the 
members have the same degree of typicality of the category. However, progress in 
cognitive psychology made the difficulty of finding categories with clear boundaries 
relevant. In the light of this, the prototype view recognized the existence of intra-
category variability. Instead of searching for necessary and sufficient attributes, this 
view predicts that people derive the category membership of certain objects on the 
basis of the fit between such objects and individuals’ concept of the meaning implied 
by a category label. This category label may be operationalized either at level of 
features, according to a probabilistic feature-based rule, or by abstracting an 
hypothetical entity used to categorize new instances, according to an overall criterion 
fit. This entity can be seen as an “ideal” category representative. Finally, in the 
exemplar view categorization occurs by comparing the target instance with concrete 
exemplars of the category: the more similar the instance to an exemplar, the more 
likely it is considered as a category member. The difference between prototypes and 
exemplars lies in the fact that prototypes are abstract images embodying attributes 
most commonly associated with members of the category, whereas exemplars are 
known and real good examples of the category (Sujan 1985). In the light of such 
differences in the categorization models, Cohen and Basu (1987) advanced a 
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contingency-based mix model of information processing based on the recognition of 
the variability and flexibility of the ways in which information about new instances is 
processed. The basic tenet of this model is that, when involved in a categorization 
task, consumers deal with a number of contextual factors (i.e. the category learning 
context, their task involvement or motivation, rule complexity and judgment setting) 
on the basis of which they flexibly adopt an analytic processing of the information or 
a nonanalytic one, or both sequentially. Analytic information processing follows the 
feature-by-feature comparison approach, whereas nonanalytic information processing 
uses the “good fit” rule, according to which an instance is matched with some overall 
representation of the category. This model criticizes all the behavioral views 
assuming that consumers base their judgments on the product “in isolation”, ignoring 
the context within which they accomplish this task.  
Broadly speaking, categorization theory provides a framework for studying the 
way in which consumers process the information about products. In particular, two 
types of information processing strategies have been typically contrasted (Fiske and 
Pavelchak 1986; Sujan 1985): piecemeal and category-based. According to 
piecemeal approach consumers evaluate products on an attribute-by-attribute basis. 
On the contrary, categorization process implies that consumers apply their “schemas” 
(Fiske 1982) whenever they encounter a new stimulus. Schema is built on the basis 
of one’s previous experience with the category. This experience is organized around 
the most typical examples of the category (Cohen and Basu 1987). Fiske and 
Pavelchak (1986) reconciled these two approaches to information processing by 
proposing a two-steps process that consumers usually follow when are exposed to a 
new stimulus. The first step is represented by categorizing the new information. If 
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categorization is successful, the new information can be evaluated in a category-
based mode, otherwise if it fails, because no category is cued, a piecemeal, attribute-
by-attribute approach is required. Hence, they argued that matches to product 
category knowledge would evoke category-based affective processes, and 
mismatches would evoke piecemeal processes. 
Furthermore, Sujan (1985) accounted for the role of expertise in information 
processing. Expertise lets subjects recognize standard categories that can be cued to 
classify the new information, so making it not necessary to start a piecemeal 
evaluation. In fact, category knowledge is likely to be more developed for expert 
consumers and the category-affect link more clearly defined than for novices. Sujan 
provides evidence that when information matches category-based knowledge, expert 
consumers rapidly reach final evaluations, whereas when information does not match 
category-based knowledge, experts’ final evaluation is likely to be based on a 
piecemeal review of the attributes.  
 
2.2.2 Brand extension research 
 
 
Categorization framework has also been applied to the research on brand 
extension to explain consumers’ evaluation of the extensions. The general idea of 
these studies is that when a brand extends toward another product category the 
evaluation of the extension depends on the perceived similarity between the 
extension and the core brand. This degree of similarity influences the transfer of the 
affect associated with the core brand to the extension. As a consequence, consumers’ 
reactions to brand extensions are thought to be based on a categorization process, 
because when an existing brand name is applied to a new product, consumers’ 
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affective impressions about this new product may be influenced by the previously 
formed evaluations about the existing brand. Therefore, the point is to understand 
how consumers extend their beliefs about a brand to the new products offered by the 
same brand. 
Most of the studies in this field (e.g. UMCBS 1987; Boush and Loken 1991; 
Romeo 1991; Barone et al. 2000) have argued that the perceived similarity of the 
brand extensions to the core products of the brand is an important determinant of the 
extent to which consumers transfer their overall affective disposition from the “old” 
to the new products. Categorization theory provides a reliable framework for 
explaining how this similarity mediates on the transfer of affect from the existing to 
the new products with the same brand name. In this respect, it is argued that after 
being exposed to many instances of a brand name, consumers form a “prototype” 
that represents the category of branded products. In this respect, Fiske (1982) argued 
that schematic match determines affective response: “to the extent that an instance is 
perceived to fit the schema it will receive the affect linked to that category” (p. 61). 
Aaker and Keller (1990) investigated how consumers form their attitudes toward 
brand extensions. In particular, they found that consumers’ perception of the overall 
quality of the brand has a positive impact on consumers’ attitude toward the 
extension. They also provided evidence about the role of the perceived “fit” or 
similarity between the product classes involved in a brand extension strategy and the 
core brand itself, arguing that such a fit is likely to enhance the transfer of the 
perceived quality of a brand to its extension. Specifically, in the case of high 
perceived fit, consumers are likely to use category-based processing to transfer the 
overall brand quality perceptions to the extension. Otherwise, in the case of low 
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perceived fit, this transfer is inhibited, and consumers may infer negative beliefs and 
associations with respect to the extension.  
In addition, Boush and Loken (1991) highlighted that brands, like many other 
categories, often exhibit graded structure (e.g. Mervis and Rosch 1981; Barsalou 
1985; Loken and Ward 1990), because some products are more representative of the 
brand than others. For example, a television set is likely to be perceived by 
consumers as highly representative of the Sony brand, while shoes are unlikely to be 
viewed in this manner (Boush and Loken 1991, n. 2). As regards the nature of the 
evaluation process, these scholars argued that attitudes toward brand extensions can 
be formed either through a piecemeal process or a categorization one. In the first 
case, attitudes are computed on the basis of brand extensions’ specific attributes, 
while in the second case attitudes associated with the brand category are transferred 
to the specific brand extension whenever this extension is identified as a member of 
the brand category. Boush and Loken have shown that the processing strategy for 
brand extension evaluation depends on how this extension is perceived similar to (or 
typical of) the original category. Specifically, they have considered the case of 
moderate mismatch between brand extension and the original product category, in 
addition to the extreme cases of high match and high mismatch. In this respect, they 
have found that both extremely typical and extremely atypical brand extensions are 
evaluated more rapidly than moderately typical ones, because moderately typical 
extensions require piecemeal process, while both of the extreme typicality cases 
require only the first stage of evaluation.  
In addition to these works, Romeo (1991) investigated how brand extensions 
affect consumers’ perception of both the extensions and the family brand name in the 
 76 
specific case in which such extensions contain negative information (i.e. they do not 
perform well). When exposed to an extension perceived as clearly inferior to the 
brand, negative information about the extensions that are perceived as highly similar 
to the brand is likely to have a strong negative effect on consumers’ evaluations of 
both the extension and the family brand.  
Another contribution to this research stream has been provided by Keller and 
Aaker (1992). They have analyzed the effect of sequential introduction of brand 
extensions on consumers’ evaluations of (1) a proposed extension and (2) the core 
brand. Their findings show that the performance of intervening extensions on 
evaluations of a proposed extension depends on the similarity of the intervening and 
the proposed extensions. In other words, the effects of intervening extensions should 
also depend on their relative similarity to the core brand and proposed extension. 
Furthermore, Broniarczyk and Alba (1994) have underlined the importance of 
brand in consumers’ evaluations of a brand extension. While previous research has 
provided insight about the importance of brand affect and, mainly, product category 
similarity between brand extension and the core brand in consumers’ evaluation of a 
brand extension, they have focused on the role of brand-specific associations 
(MacInnis and Nakamoto 1990). These scholars argued that the traditional definition 
of similarity in terms of features overlap is not completely appropriate because it 
does not take into account that different objects such as brand extensions and the 
target core brands may be classified as members of the same category on the basis of 
criteria others than total feature overlap. In particular, brand-specific associations are 
likely to offer a dimension of “fit” between the core brand and an otherwise 
dissimilar extension category.  
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Gurhan-Canli and Maheswaran (1998) have examined the effect of congruent 
and incongruent extension on family brand perception, focusing specifically on the 
mechanism underlying brand dilution and enhancement effects. In their arguing, 
when consumers are exposed to an incongruent extension, they may use three 
different response models (Weber and Crocker 1983): (1) subtyping model, i.e. the 
new incongruent information is considered as an exception and categorized as 
subtype, (2) bookkeeping model, which predicts that all the information is processed 
and each piece of the new information leads to an incremental modification of the 
schema, and (3) conversion model, which consists in changing the schema only in 
the case in which consumers are exposed to extremely atypical stimuli. Consumers’ 
motivation to process the information has been shown to explain whether subtyping 
or bookkeeping model occurs. Hence, in high-motivation condition, bookkeeping 
model is more likely to occur, because consumers are available to spend time and 
effort in processing new information, according to piecemeal approach, while in low-
motivation condition, subtyping model is more likely to occur, because consumers 
resolve the incongruity without engaging in an effortful, attribute-based processing. 
As a consequence, they form subtypes, according to category-based processing.  
 
2.3 Schema-congruity theory 
 
Schema-congruity theory has its root in social psychology, and in particular in 
the studies about the retrieval of the information from long-term memory. This kind 
of information has been found to let individuals create elaborate associative networks 
(Hastie 1980; Srull et al. 1985). In the context of consumer research, a number of 
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studies have focused on the effect of schema-congruity on the evaluation of new 
products (e.g. Stayman et al. 1992; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989; Peracchio and 
Tybout 1996; Campbell and Goodstein 2001), the schema being typically represented 
by product category. Each of these works has shown that new products’ judgments 
depend on the level of congruity between product category and the new product. 
Mandler (1982, p.3) has defined schemas as “representations of experience that 
guide action, perception and thought”. These schemas are formed on the basis of the 
frequency of encounters with relevant instantiations, that is on the basis of 
individuals’ interactions with their environment. As such, schemas “are abstract 
representations of environmental regularities” (p.16).  
After individuals have developed their schema, they evaluate the interaction 
between every new event and the schema. This evaluation is based on the degree of 
perceived congruity between an event and the schema’s relational structure. Based 
on the cognitive differences between schema congruity and incongruity, Mandler 
(1982) added an affective component to his theory. He suggests that if individuals 
perceive congruity between the structure of the target event and the schema, positive 
valuations of familiarity, acceptability and general sense of liking will occur, because 
they will be able to reconcile easily the new information with their schema. 
However, schema congruent stimuli are not very noteworthy because they are seen as 
something that conforms to people’s expectations, and therefore are unlikely to 
prompt extensive cognitive elaboration. Hence, the positive response that they 
produce typically is mild rather than extreme.  
On the other hand, a different scenario is predicted when schema incongruity is 
encountered. More specifically, Mandler argued that as incongruity between a new 
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stimulus and a schema increases both arousal and cognitive elaboration required to 
try to resolve the incongruity are heightened and this makes the resulting evaluation 
more extreme. Whether the evaluation of incongruent stimuli is positive or negative 
is function of consumers’ ability to resolve the incongruity. This ability depends on 
how extreme the incongruity is (Garbarino and Edell 1997). In this respect, Mandler 
argued that moderate incongruities are those incongruities that can be resolved and 
the process of resolving incongruity makes such incongruities “interesting and 
positively valued” (Mandler 1982, p. 22). This effect is explained by the “intellectual 
satisfaction” that consumers experience for being able to resolve the (moderate) 
incongruity.  
On the contrary, extreme incongruities are those incongruities that cannot be 
resolved or can be resolved only by making undesired structural changes to the 
existing schema. Hence, similar to moderate incongruities, extreme incongruities 
prompt cognitive elaboration, but this elaboration leads to frustration rather than 
resolution and satisfaction. As a consequence, extreme incongruities typically lead to 
more negative evaluation than do moderate incongruities. 
Finally, when a new stimulus is schema congruent it is easily assimilated to the 
schema and does not prompt extensive cognitive elaboration because it is seen as 
something that conforms to people’s expectations. As a consequence, Mandler 
predict that the evaluation of congruent stimuli is positive because, other things being 
equal, people prefer familiarity and predictability, but, different from the evaluation 
of moderately incongruent stimuli, it is mild rather than extreme because 
predictability generates little arousal. 
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Mandler used the notions of assimilation and accommodation to explain the 
cognitive outcomes of schema-congruity. Specifically, assimilation and 
accommodation are processes that follow schema congruity and incongruity. 
Mandler (1982, p.13) defined assimilation as “the integration of external elements 
into evolving or completed structures”, and accommodation as “the modification of 
an assimilatory schema or structure by the elements it assimilates”. While 
assimilation provides cognitive continuity and integration, accommodation allows 
cognitive change. As a result, in the case of schema-congruity the new information 
has a relatively high degree of perceived fit with individual’s schema, which will 
lead to a positive evaluation produced by the little effort required to reconcile this 
information. Therefore, in this case no structural changes will take place. On the 
contrary, when individuals perceive some degree of incongruity between a stimulus 
and the schema, they will engage in a further and more complex mental activity to 
give meaning to the new information. In particular, according to Mandler, schematic 
incongruity may lead individuals to two different outcomes: (1) activation of a new 
schema that fits the new information, and (2) accommodation. The former is likely to 
be associated with positively valued cognitive activity, while the latter will lead to 
negative evaluations, because of the deep structural changes in individuals’ schema 
that would be necessary in that case. In the case of accommodation, current 
schematic expectations are disrupted. 
Apart from the positive or negative outcomes of schema-congruity judgments of 
value, Mandler argued that such evaluations may vary along the emotive dimension. 
The intensity of individuals’ emotions in response to schema-(in)congruity is 
determined by the “autonomic nervous system” (ANS) activity. Such ANS is linked 
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to how much of a discrepancy, or incongruity, exists between what is encountered 
and what was expected. In particular, in the case of congruity between a new 
stimulus and the schema, individuals’ positive evaluations result in relatively little 
arousal and degree of affective intensity, deriving from the essential confirmation of 
schematic expectations. In other words, other things being equal, people like objects 
that allow predictability, but, since schema congruent objects do not generate 
extensive cognitive elaboration and do not require individuals to devote cognitive 
resources to the resolution of incongruity, the positive response that they produce is 
not likely to be strong and extreme.  
On the other hand, in the case of the interruption of individuals’ expectations and 
deep structural changes needed to accommodate the new information (extreme 
incongruity), individuals’ arousal will be relatively intense, even though the affect 
will be negative given the absence of structural congruity.  
A third case considered by Mandler is the one in which individuals are able to 
find another solution to schema-incongruity. This solution is given by activating a 
different schema that fits the available information. Even in this case arousal is likely 
to be relatively high because of the emotional process activated by the initial 
incongruity. The result is a positive and highly arousing evaluation, that is produced 
by individuals’ ability to assimilate the incongruent information. In other words, 
elaboration is thought to enable the identification of a means for integrating the new 
information with existing knowledge. 
In sum, incongruity may lead either to positive evaluative states or to negative 
ones, depending on the successfulness of the assimilation/accommodation 
individuals’ activity. However, regardless of the sign of these judgments, disruption 
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of expectations and accommodation produce arousal and intense affective and 
emotional states. In fact, the novelty of a new object leads to greater cognitive 
elaboration necessary to resolve the incongruity. This mental activity involves a 
relatively high amount of cognitive resources to engage in the activity of resolving 
the incongruity and leads to a high degree of individuals’ arousal. 
On the basis of this arguing, Mandler predicts an inverted U (or nonmonotonic) 
relationship between schema (in)congruity and individuals’ evaluation: the process 
of responding to “moderate” incongruity leads to more favourable evaluations than 
does the process of responding to either congruity or extreme incongruity. 
Further studies provided substantial evidence that the task of resolving 
incongruity is resource demanding, whereas processing congruent information 
requires few cognitive resources (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Meyers-Levy et al. 1994; 
Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989; Maoz and Tybout 2002). 
Meyers-Levy and Tybout (1989) applied Mandler’s model to the case of the 
introduction of new consumer products which present different levels of congruity 
with product category schema. They examined whether responding to different levels 
of schema incongruity led to different evaluations of the same objects. In addition to 
the cases of perfect match and perfect mismatch between the new product and the 
associated product category schema, they considered the case of moderate 
incongruity, defined as the situation in which there is a partial match between the 
product and the product category schema. Mandler argued that the level of schema 
incongruity depends on the ease with which discrepancies can be resolved within the 
individuals’ organized knowledge. On the basis of this, Meyers-Levy and Tybout 
operationalized schema congruity by considering product categories as hierarchically 
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composed by three fundamental levels (e.g. Rosch 1978): superordinate level, basic 
level and subordinate level. Product category incongruity is determined by the ease 
with which consumers can resolve it within this hierarchical structure. The resolution 
of incongruity typically requires that consumers move to the next lower level in this 
structure (e.g. from the basic level to the subordinate one). For example, if a new 
kind of beverage is judged incongruent with the beverage schema (upper level) 
because it contains some attributes that are not contained in consumers’ beverage 
schema, consumers try to resolve such an incongruity by moving to the successive 
lower level represented by soft drink. At this lower level, schema is more detailed 
and, as a consequence, it is more likely that consumers be able to find a match 
between new product’s attributes and soft drinks-schema’s attributes. If this match 
can be found, there is evidence of moderate incongruity. Conversely, in the case of 
extreme incongruity consumers cannot resolve the initial incongruity by using an 
alternative lower-level schema. In this case, consumers’ product evaluations are 
likely to be highly negative. Consumers’ product evaluations resulting from 
moderate incongruity were found to be more favourable than were the positive 
product evaluations generated by extreme congruity, because of the greater arousal 
deriving from consumers’ ability to resolve the initial incongruity. In this respect, 
they concluded that a more positive evaluation “arose because both the context and 
the positive affect presumably generated as a consequence of resolving moderate 
incongruity primed subjects to access or develop positive associations concerning a 
schema that would otherwise have been evaluated unfavourably (Meyers-Levy and 
Tybout 1989, p. 52). However, Meyers-Levy and Tybout showed that a factor that 
moderates the relationship between schema-incongruity and product evaluations may 
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exist. Such a factor is consumers’ dogmatism. In particular, they found that schema 
congruity effect only occurs for “nondigmatic consumers”, that is, for people who 
are available to engage in the cognitive activity required to give meaning to the 
moderately incongruent information. On the contrary, this effect is not found for 
dogmatic people, who are likely to ignore or discount the new information.  
In conclusion, whereas Sujan (1985), Fiske (1982) and Fiske and Pavelchak 
(1986) focused on the alternative processing strategies following the level of 
congruity between products and their associated product category schemas, Meyers-
Levy and Tybout (1989), based on Mandler’s theory, examined the evaluative 
outcomes of the mismatch between schema-level representation and new product 
attributes, finding evidence for the inverted U relationship between the level of 
schema congruity of a new product and consumers’ evaluation of this product. 
Another work in this research stream has been conducted by Ozanne et al. 
(1992). They investigated how product category schemas influence information 
search and reported evidence of an inverted U relationship between information 
search and the degree of mismatch between product and product category schema, 
noting that the highest level of information search occurs in the case of moderate 
incongruent stimuli. In other words, Ozanne et al. found that subjects exposed to a 
moderately incongruent new product engage in more search than do subjects exposed 
to either congruent or strongly incongruent new products. 
Related tests of Mandler’s model were conducted by Stayman et al. (1992) in the 
product-satisfaction context. Their research examined discrepancies between the 
expectations derived from activated schemas and actual product experience. In 
particular, they studied the way in which congruity and incongruity can influence the 
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formation of expectations before product trial and disconfirmation and evaluation 
after trial. As regards consumers’ expectations about new product, they are formed 
by comparing new product information with an initially cued product-category 
schema representation. If new product description is congruent with this schema, 
subjects assimilate the new information within the cued schema. On the contrary, if 
new product description is incongruent with such an initial schema, they are likely to 
look for another schema that is more consistent with attribute information. This new 
schema is taken as the basis for product-performance expectations. After product 
trial, consumers compare product perceived performance with their schema-based 
product performance expectations. If they perceive a match between expectations 
and product performance no change will occur in pre-trial to post-trial evaluations. If 
a strong mismatch is perceived, they may attempt to accommodate this mismatch to 
expectations included in the initially cued schema, but the evaluation will be negative 
given the absence of structural congruity that could lead to a positive evaluation. 
Attempted accommodation is more likely than schema switching because consumers 
are not easily available to change their initially cued schema. As a consequence, 
attempted accommodation following a strong mismatch will produce more negative 
affect than those produced by the match between expectations and performance. 
Moreover, Stayman et al. compared Mandler’s model with Fiske and Pavelchak’s 
one. While the former predicted that moderate incongruity produces higher 
evaluations than congruity and extreme incongruity, the latter would have predicted a 
shift from schema-based to attribute-based information processing in the case of 
strong incongruity between expectations and trial performance. So, while Mandler 
hypothesized an inverted U relationship, Fiske and Pavelchak predicted a monotonic 
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change in consumers’ evaluation as one or more attributes become more incongruent 
with expectations.  
A further application of Mandler’s theory is given by Meyers-Levy et al. (1994).  
These scholars investigated consumers’ evaluations of new products introduced by 
companies with established brand names that were congruent, moderately 
incongruent or extremely incongruent. Consistent with Mandler’s theorizing, they 
demonstrated the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between brand name 
incongruity and consumers’ evaluative responses, such that products bearing 
moderately incongruent brand names may be preferred over those with either 
congruent or extremely incongruent brand names. In fact, when consumers are 
exposed to brand names perceived as congruent with product associations, they are 
likely to respond to them in a mildly favourable manner because such an item is 
familiar and predictable and no extensive processing is involved. In the case of brand 
names with moderate degree of incongruity, consumers may positively value these 
items because they are likely to be able to resolve the incongruity. For example, Levi 
Strauss successfully added to its production of jeans both the production of shoes and 
men’s casual pants bearing the Levi’s name. This strategy can be considered as an 
example of moderate incongruity because the new product lines induced minor 
changes in consumers’ mindsets. In particular, when consumers face incongruent 
brand names, they engage in a relatively intense ads processing activity. In the case 
in which such an incongruity is moderate, this activity will allow consumers to find a 
meaningful relationship between the brand names and the core product. On the 
contrary, in the case of extremely incongruent brand names, consumers may not be 
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able to resolve the incongruity and they may experience negative feelings, such as 
anxiety, frustration and helplessness.  
Schema-congruity effect has been further examined by Peracchio and Tybout 
(1996). They focused on the inverted U relationship existing between schema 
congruity and consumers’ evaluations, such that schema incongruity involves a more 
intense cognitive elaboration that could lead consumers, in the case of moderate 
incongruity, to perceive a greater positive affect than that perceived in the cases of 
congruity and extreme incongruity (Mandler 1982; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989; 
Stayman et al. 1992; Meyers-Levy et al. 1994). Grounded on the effect theorized by 
Mandler and found in other applications of his theory, Peracchio and Tybout argued 
that the cognitive elaboration involved in the case of incongruity requires some 
degree of consumers’ motivation (see in particular Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). 
As a consequence, the typical inverted U relationship may not apply to consumers 
who do not have sufficient motivation to resolve the incongruity. Peracchio and 
Tybout analyzed another factor that may moderate schema-based product evaluations 
by determining the amount of cognitive resources devoted to resolving schema 
incongruity. This factor is consumers’ prior knowledge. Specifically, schema-
congruity effect seems to hold only in the case in which consumers have limited, or 
not elaborate, prior knowledge. In fact, consumers with limited prior knowledge are 
likely to be highly sensitive to inconsistent information, while consumers with well-
developed, or elaborate, knowledge have the ability to use both schema-congruent 
and schema-incongruent information (Fiske and Taylor 1991, p. 128-130). 
Specifically, in the case of not elaborate product category knowledge, the probability 
that consumers experience schema incongruity increases because consumers’ 
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knowledge structure is impoverished and rudimentary. This makes the cognitive 
effort required to give meaning to the incongruent information more likely. When 
this effort produces successful outcomes, it generates positive affect. On the 
contrary, in the case of elaborate knowledge structure, consumers may typically 
assimilate the new incongruent information with less effort than in the case of not 
elaborate prior knowledge. As a consequence, when consumers have elaborate 
product category knowledge, schema-congruity effect on product evaluation is less 
likely to occur.  
Campbell and Goodstein (2001) have addressed the question of the evaluation of 
products based on the level of congruity between product attributes and consumers’ 
expectations for the type of product. Even this study is based on Mandler’s theory, 
defined as “moderate incongruity effect” (Campbell and Goodstein 2001, p. 439), 
already investigated for new product attributes (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989), 
brand extensions (Meyers-Levy et a. 1994), and taste (Stayman et al. 1992). 
Campbell and Goodstein have contributed to this research stream by examining some 
moderating effect on the relationship between incongruity and product evaluations. 
This goal is consistent both with Meyers-Levy and Tybout’s finding about the 
moderating role played by individual trait of dogmatism and with Peracchio and 
Tybout’s finding about the moderating role of consumers’ prior knowledge about the 
product. The variable that Campbell and Goodstein have considered is the perceived 
risk. This variable may act as a boundary condition that has been found to limit the 
moderate incongruity effect. In particular, they argue that moderate incongruity 
effect will not occur when consumers’ perceived risk is relatively high. Perceived 
risk associated with product evaluation is defined in terms of uncertainty and 
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consequences: it is predicted to increase as the level of uncertainty and/or the 
associated negative consequences increases as well. It may include financial, 
performance, social, psychological, and physical risk. When consumers perceive 
high risk about a product, they tend to prefer “familiar” alternatives to even 
moderately incongruent ones. Familiarity is positively related to the level of 
congruity between product and consumer’s product schema. As a consequence, when 
perceiving high risk, consumers are likely to be “conservative”, and they prefer 
“normal” solutions to novel and less familiar ones. Therefore, in the case of high 
perceived risk, Campbell and Goodstein have found that the moderate incongruity 
effect does not hold, because consumers tend to prefer an alternative that is 
consistent with schema expectations to one that is moderately inconsistent. On the 
contrary, no evidence of this effect has been found when perceived risk is low. 
Consistent with previous studies, the moderating effect of the perceived risk has been 
shown to hold in the case in which no-risk condition was considered. 
Grounding on the “moderate incongruity effect”, Maoz and Tybout (2002) have 
applied schema congruity theory to brand extension strategy. In particular, they have 
explored the relationship between congruity of an extension with the parent brand 
and consumers’ responses to the extension. As reported above, Meyers-Levy et al. 
(1994) have shown that consumers evaluate more favourably the extensions 
considered moderately incongruent than the extensions perceived as congruent or 
extremely incongruent with the parent brand. This is due to the fact that consumers 
are able to resolve the moderate incongruity and this resolution will prompt a more 
positive evaluation than that produced by a congruent extension (Mandler 1982). 
Moreover, a number of studies on brand extension have shown that an alternative 
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view of brand extension evaluation may exist. Specifically, categorization literature 
(e.g. UMCBS 1987; Aaker and Keller 1990; Boush and Loken 1991; Keller and 
Aaker 1992; Park et al. 1991) has argued that a linear relationship, instead of an 
inverted U-shaped one, between brand extension congruity and the evaluation of it 
exists. In fact, these studies have shown that the favourableness of the evaluation 
increases as the congruity between the extensions considered and the parent brand 
increases. Given these two opposite predictions, Maoz and Tybout have focused on 
the conditions under which each of these two patterns is more likely to occur. A 
factor that may determine which of the two evaluative processes will occur is 
consumers’ task involvement. In particular, research on schema-congruity effect has 
shown that the process of resolving schema-incongruity is a resource demanding one. 
On the contrary, schema-congruity does not involve many cognitive resources. As a 
consequence, Maoz and Tybout have argued that the amount of cognitive resources 
that consumers may devote to resolving the schema-incongruity moderates the 
relationship between the congruity of an extension with the parent brand and the 
evaluation of the extension. Task involvement has been found to be linked to the 
amount of cognitive resources devoted to brand extension evaluation. In particular, 
these scholars have shown that when task involvement is high, consumers are 
available to engage in a detailed processing of the incongruent information. This is 
likely to make consumers able to resolve the moderate (but not the extreme) 
incongruity, so producing an inverted U relationship. On the other hand, when task 
involvement is low, consumers are expected to devote fewer cognitive resources to 
the resolution of a possible incongruity. As a consequence, the extension’s evaluation 
will be linearly and positively related to the degree of congruity of this extension 
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with the parent brand: the more congruent the extension, the more positive the 
evaluation. Another factor that may moderate this relationship when involvement is 
high is the availability of the information about the attribute-level performance of an 
extension relative to competing alternatives. In particular, in the case of available 
competitive information about the fact that the brand extension is differentiated from 
competitors, this information is diagnostic and becomes more important for 
consumers’ judgments than the level of congruity. Maoz and Tybout have found that 
when involvement is high, a moderately incongruent extension will be evaluated 
more favourably than congruent and extremely incongruent extensions only if such 
an extension is not otherwise differentiated from competitors. On the contrary, if the 
extension is superior to its competitors, moderate incongruity effect is not likely to 
hold because the diagnosticity of the information about the extension’s competitive 
advantage will be perceived as a more important evaluation criterion than the level of 
perceived congruity of the extension with the parent brand. 
 
2.4 The interaction between new features’ number and 
congruity on product evaluation: the role of cognitive 
elaboration 
 
 
In this thesis I apply schema-congruity theory to the investigation of the 
evaluative outcomes occurring as more features are added to product. My theorizing 
is based on the belief that increasing the number of new product features leads to an 
increase in the cognitive elaboration and cognitive effort required to consumers in 
the case in which these features are incongruent with the product. The explanation 
for such an increase in the extensiveness of the cognitive activity required is that as 
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the number of incongruent features increases more incongruities have to be resolved, 
because consumers need to reconcile every additional feature with their product 
schema. As the afore-mentioned research has shown, cognitive effort derives from 
the activity of resolving incongruities.  
On the basis of this, I propose that the probability that consumers perceive an 
increase in the product evaluation as the number of incongruent features increases 
depends on the degree of congruity of these features with the product, and, more 
specifically, on whether consumers are willing to spend the cognitive resources 
necessary to try to resolve the incongruity. In particular, I argue that as the number of 
incongruent features increases consumers might not be willing to spend the cognitive 
resources necessary to elaborate these incongruities and eventually perceive value, in 
terms of product evaluation, from the features added.  
In other words, the increase in the number of either moderately or extremely 
product incongruent new features may lead to a mismatch between the resources 
required to elaborate all the new features and resolve the incongruities and the 
resources that consumers are typically available to spend. This prediction is 
consistent with the finding that humans have limited cognitive resources and allocate 
them judiciously (Payne 1982; Russo and Dosher 1983). Accordingly, other scholars 
have argued that cognitive effort and the activity of thinking in general is costly. In 
this sense, they described human beings as “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor 
1984, p. 12), who tend to eschew any difficult intellectual activity (Burnkrant 1976; 
McGuire 1969) and can expend only a limited amount of cognitive resources in their 
judgments and decision making. Since consumers are assumed to be willing to use a 
limited amount of cognitive resources, I predict that they are not likely to perceive 
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benefits from increasing the number of features when these features are incongruent 
with the product. 
On the other hand, features that are congruent with the product do not require 
extensive cognitive elaboration and effort, because they are easily and quickly 
assimilated to the product. In particular, when exposed to such features, consumers 
do not need to expend cognitive effort to resolve any incongruity, as much as these 
features are seen as familiar and predictable from consumers’ standpoint. As a 
consequence of this reduced cognitive burden, I argue that as the number of features 
that are congruent with the product increases consumers are likely to perceive an 
overall benefit from such an increase. 
Hence, I hypothesize that: 
 
H1: As the number of congruent features increases product attractiveness 
increases, whereas as the number of either moderately or extremely incongruent 
features increases product attractiveness does not increase. 
 
2.5 The role of task involvement in the resolution of 
incongruity: the strengthening of the cognitive elaboration-
based explanation 
 
There is evidence in psychological and behavioral studies that encouraging 
people to think carefully of new stimuli is likely to result in resolution of moderate 
incongruity (Meyers-Levy et al. 1994; Maoz and Tybout 2002). On the contrary, no 
evidence for the resolution of extreme incongruity has been found. According to 
Mandler, extremely incongruent stimuli are not likely to be resolved within the 
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schema, because too deep structural changes to that schema would be involved. Such 
deep modifications to the existing schema are generally seen as undesirable by 
individuals (Mandler 1982).  
H1 is based on the belief that consumers avoid spending all the cognitive 
resources necessary to resolve the incongruity as the number of incongruent features 
increases. In fact, whereas consumers are likely to perceive an increase in product 
attractiveness as the number of product congruent features increases, such an 
increase is not likely to occur in the case in which new features are either moderately 
or extremely incongruent with the product.  
However, basing on the evidence that consumers may be able to resolve the 
moderate incongruity, I extend my theorizing by considering the case in which 
consumers are given the opportunity to devote a relatively high amount of cognitive 
resources to the task of elaborating incongruity. In this respect, the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1981) predicts that as an issue increases in 
personal relevance or consequences, people devote more cognitive resources to it. 
While in H1 I have predicted that consumers may not be able to resolve moderate or 
extreme incongruity as the number of features becomes higher, I add to this by 
investigating what is likely to occur if consumers are made likely to elaborate the 
information deriving from new features when considering a relatively high number 
of new features.  
Extending what predicted in the first hypothesis, I argue that, if encouraged to 
consider new features with respect to the schema more thoughtfully than they 
generally do, consumers can resolve the moderate (but not the extreme) incongruity 
even when new features’ number is relatively high. This is consistent with Mandler’s 
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definition of moderate incongruity as the type of incongruity that can be resolved 
successfully. 
To make this happen, it is necessary to vary the amount of cognitive resources 
that subjects are likely to devote to evaluating the product with features added. This 
has often been done by acting on consumers’ task involvement. High task 
involvement has been shown to lead to more detailed information processing than 
low involvement (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty et al. 1983; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1984, 1986). Hence, highly involved consumers are more likely to resolve 
the moderate incongruities of the features added than lowly involved ones. 
On the other hand, I expect no difference between being highly involved and 
being lowly involved when the features added to the product are either extremely 
congruent or extremely incongruent with the product, for opposing reasons. In 
particular, in the case of product congruent features, consumers do not need to 
elaborate extensively this information, and, as a result, involvement is likely to have 
less than an effect on product evaluation. On the contrary, extremely incongruent 
features cannot be reconciled with the product. According to Mandler, this type of 
features requires cognitive elaboration but, even if consumers devote substantial 
cognitive resources to elaborate such incongruities, this elaboration is likely to lead 
to frustration rather than resolution of the incongruity and satisfaction, because of the 
too strong, undesired modifications required to the existing schema. 
On the basis of this arguing, I hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Product attractiveness after introducing a relatively high number of 
moderately incongruent features is higher for high than for low task involvement, 
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whereas product attractiveness after introducing a relatively high number of 
either congruent or extremely incongruent features is the same for high and for 
low task involvement. 
 
Importantly, one relevant aim of this prediction is to provide further evidence of 
the role played by cognitive elaboration in explaining consumers’ reactions to adding 
more features. This is done by predicting that when consumers do spend the 
cognitive resources necessary for elaborating the moderately incongruent features 
(high involvement condition), they may be able to reconcile them with the product, 
and perceive benefits from adding them, even when their number is relatively high. 
On the contrary, when the cognitive resources employed are not that substantial (low 
involvement condition), I expect, similarly to the general effect predicted in the first 
hypothesis, consumers not to able to perceive value from adding more moderately 
incongruent features, because a mismatch between the resources necessary to deal 
with all these incongruities and the resources that consumers are willing to spend will 
occur. 
 
2.6 Converging evidence for the resolution of moderate 
incongruity: the role of temporal construal 
 
 
The prediction that consumers may be able to reconcile more moderately 
incongruent features with the product schema is interesting because sheds light on 
the possibility that consumers perceive favorably the increase in the number of 
moderately incongruent features. Furthermore, this prediction seems extremely 
relevant if contrasted to Mandler’s general predictions and to the previously-
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mentioned applications of schema-congruity theory to consumer domain. 
Specifically, whereas all these studies have investigated the case of a single new 
stimulus (for instance, a new product within an existing product category, or a brand 
extension within an operating core brand), and have found evidence of the existence 
of the “moderate incongruity effect” (or inverted U relationship between incongruity 
and evaluation), no evidence has been found so far for consumers’ ability to resolve 
more incongruities, such as different new incongruent stimuli.  
My second research hypothesis has predicted that the extensiveness of the 
cognitive elaboration devoted to examine the new moderately incongruent features is 
likely to determine whether or not consumers will be able to resolve such 
incongruities and, as a result, infer value from increasing the number of these 
features.  
In addition to the predicted effect of motivating consumers to elaborate 
extensively the new information, I argue, building on temporal construal theory, that 
the temporal distance between the time of consumers’ evaluation and time of 
consumers’ expected behavior (such as, the purchase of the product) is another factor 
that is likely to influence consumers’ ability to resolve the moderate (but not the 
extreme) incongruity. Hence, the evaluative outcomes of increasing the number of 
moderately incongruent features may be different depending on the temporal frame 
of consumers’ evaluation.  
This arguing is theoretically important because converges with what predicted in 
the second hypothesis, by potentially adding new evidence of the possibility that 
consumers be able to perceive an overall benefit, in terms of product evaluation, 
from such product enhancing as that based on adding moderately incongruent 
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features. This further evidence is grounded on a construct that is different from the 
cognitive elaboration, as much as it refers to the degree of abstractness/concreteness 
associated with the variation in the temporal closeness from the consumers’ expected 
behavior. 
Broadly speaking, experimental research has shown that individuals are typically 
more optimistic and confident about distant future than near future outcomes. 
Furthermore, they have been shown to perform better on a distant future task than on 
a near future one (Nisan 1972). As reported by Gilovich et al. (1993) and Liberman 
and Trope (1998), difficult aspects of many tasks are enhanced when individuals face 
near future compared with distant future.  
In this respect, Liberman and Trope (1998) introduced the temporal construal 
theory. This theory is based on the belief that construals of more distant future events 
are more abstract, whereas construals of near future events are typically more 
concrete. This prediction is explained with the arguing that thinking of near future 
typically includes peripheral and incidental features of the events, whereas thinking 
about distant future typically involves features that are central to the meaning of the 
event. Construals of more distant future events are typically more abstract, because 
they tend to represent the events in terms of general, superordinate, and 
decontextualized features (e.g. Trope 1986, 1989; Vallacher and Wagner 1987; 
Liberman and Trope 1998). In this respect, for example, Vallacher and Wagner 
(1985) have shown that a long time in advance people represented their wedding in 
high-level terms, such as “expressing love”, while on the day of the wedding they 
represented the wedding in lower level terms, such as “having pictures made”. 
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Liberman and Trope (1998) applied temporal construal theory to the role of 
feasibility and desirability considerations in choice among near and distant future 
alternatives. The distinction between feasibility and desirability lies in the fact that 
“desirability refers to the valence of an action’s end state, whereas feasibility refers 
to the ease or difficulty of reaching the end state” (Liberman and Trope 1998, p. 7). 
In other words, desirability refers to the “why” of an action, whereas feasibility refers 
to the subordinate aspects of the “how” of an action. On the basis of this theorizing, 
temporal construal theory predicts that desirability considerations have a stronger 
influence on distant future compared with near future considerations, whereas 
feasibility considerations are likely to have a stronger influence on near future 
compared with distant future considerations. 
Grounding on this theorizing, I argue that, when exposed to the increase of the 
number of moderately incongruent features, consumers base their evaluations on 
different types of considerations depending on the temporal frame of these 
evaluations. In particular, I predict that in the near future consumers develop a more 
concrete construal of the product than they do in the distant future. This leads them 
to assign a relevant weight to the incongruity of the features with the product in their 
evaluations. As the number of incongruent features increases, consumers’ perception 
of the difficulty to reconcile more features with the current configuration of the 
product increases as well. In fact, consistent with Mandler’s theorizing, the schema is 
assumed not to be modifiable in the short term; as a result, when exposed to the 
increase of the number of features that are incongruent with such a schema, 
consumers are likely to focus on the increase in the number of incongruities and, 
finally, on the increase in the extensiveness of the cognitive activity necessary to try 
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to resolve such incongruities. As a consequence, assuming that consumers are not 
purportedly induced to think carefully of the new features, in the near future 
consumers are not likely to perceive value from increasing the number of new 
moderately incongruent features.  
On the other hand, in the distant future consumers develop a more abstract 
construal of the product, focusing on higher-level considerations than those made in 
the near future. These considerations are related to the desirability to have more 
features added. In this sense, consumers are likely to resolve satisfactorily the 
moderate incongruities deriving from the increase of the number of such features, 
because they may see similarities between the new features and the future 
configuration of the product. This outcome is explained by the consumers’ arguing 
that, by the distant time of their expected purchase, the product could have completed 
an evolutionary pattern that might have made those features less incongruent with the 
product than they currently are. This would be manifested by the fact that those with 
high level of construal show more favorable evaluations as the number of moderately 
incongruent features increases than those with lower construal level. Conversely, 
those in a near future condition might not show any increase in product evaluation as 
the number of moderately incongruent features increases. 
On the basis of this, I hypothesize that: 
 
H3: As the number of moderately incongruent features increases in the distant 
future product attractiveness increases, whereas as the number of moderately 
incongruent features increases in the near future product attractiveness does not 
increase. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Methodology and results 
 
 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
 
In this chapter I present three randomized experiments that have the aim to test 
each of the hypotheses on which my theoretical model is based. Broadly speaking, 
the model I propose investigates the causal relationships between some independent 
variables, which are different depending on the specific hypothesis considered, and 
the dependent variable, which, on the contrary, is the same for all three hypotheses. 
In the light of this, my research has to be categorized as a causal research, as much as 
in all three hypotheses proposed I study the effect that the manipulation of some 
independent variables has on an observed variable.  
From a methodological standpoint, causal models in the social sciences 
(Campbell and Stanley 1963; Cook and Campbell 1979; Shadish et al. 2002) are 
usually classified into randomized experiments, quasi-experiments, and non-
experiments. All the studies I present in this section are randomized experiments, 
that are defined as those studies in which units are assigned at random to receive 
treatment and alternative conditions that are deliberately manipulated either by the 
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researcher or by nature to observe their effects (Van de Ven 2007). Hence, the key 
features of randomized experiments are that various treatments (the independent 
causal variable) are manipulated by the researcher, subjects (or groups) are assigned 
by chance to the treatments (i.e. to the different levels of the independent variable), 
so that each subject has the same probability as all the others to be assigned to each 
treatment, and then treatments are compared by measuring the effects (dependent 
variable). Differently from randomized experiments, quasi-experiments are studies in 
which subjects may not be assigned randomly to conditions, and the treatments are 
not deliberately manipulated; instead, they are produced by natural events and then 
compared to measure the effects. Finally, non-experiments are descriptive case 
studies that may lack a comparison group: the researcher observes and compares a 
unit or a case in terms of some naturally occurring conditions or events. 
Within this classification, randomized experiments provide more convincing 
evidence of causal relationships than exploratory or descriptive designs (e.g. 
Churchill and Iacobucci 2005). This statement is based on observing the ability that 
characterizes randomized experiments, as opposed to the above-mentioned other 
kinds of research methods, to provide inferential knowledge that can be said to be 
scientific. More specifically, there are three basic kinds of evidence to support 
scientific inference: concomitant variation, time order of occurrence of variables, and 
elimination of other possible causal factors. Concomitant variation refers to the 
extent to which an independent variable and a dependent variable vary together in the 
way predicted by the hypothesis. Time order of occurrence of variables means that in 
order to have a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables it is 
necessary that the independent variable(s) precedes the dependent one(s). Finally, it 
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is essential that other alternative causal factors be eliminated. This can be done either 
by holding such external factors constant or by adjusting the results to remove the 
effects of other factors. 
Randomized experiment provides all these three types of evidence of causality. 
In fact, it allows researchers to check for concomitant variation, time order of 
occurrence, and, if the experiment has been designed correctly, many alternative 
explanations will have been eliminated. A randomized experiment can provide 
evidence of causality because of the control it affords researchers. In fact, such 
experimental designs are often called “causal research”, as much as the investigator 
manipulates and controls one or more independent variables for variation 
concomitant to the manipulation of the independent variables. Given that 
experimenter controls a manipulation of the presumed causal factors, (s)he can be 
more confident that the relationship discovered is the “true” relationship.  
On the contrary, both exploratory and descriptive designs differ from 
experimental designs in that they can be defined as ex post facto research. This 
means that the researcher observes the dependent variable and then tries to find one 
or more causal variables that offer plausible explanations as to why dependent 
variable occurred. This procedure allows little control of the independent variables 
because the occurrence of the dependent variable may have been due to some other 
factors than the ones being investigated. 
Experiments are usually divided into two basic groups: the laboratory 
experiments and the field experiments. The former type is one in which the 
researcher can observe and measure the effect of the manipulation of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable holding the other variables constant (or at least 
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minimizing their effect). This is done by creating an artificial setting, typically a 
laboratory, with the desired conditions. On the contrary, a field experiment is a study 
conducted in a real setting and involves the manipulation of independent variables. 
Laboratory experiments typically have greater internal validity because they 
allow greater control. In fact, researchers can eliminate the effects of other factors 
that may obscure the relationships, either by physically holding the factors constant 
or by controlling for them statistically. Internal validity is defined as the ability to 
attribute the effect observed to the experimental variable, and not to other factors. On 
the other hand, field experiments have greater external validity, which is defined as 
the extent to which the effect discovered can be generalized to other people, setting 
and time (Cook and Campbell 1979). 
In the rest of this chapter I describe each of the randomized experimental designs 
I have used to give empirical foundation to my theoretical model. In particular, I 
present three studies, each containing detailed information about the procedure 
followed in designing experiments and the description of the results. A discussion of 
the findings is also provided at the end of each study.  
As regards the way in which the three studies have been arranged, Experiment 1 
tests H1 , Experiment 2 tests  H2, and Experiment 3 tests H3. 
 
3.2 Experiment 1 
 
 
3.2.1 Stimulus information 
 
 
Before choosing the product to test my first hypothesis I conducted a pre-test 
with the aim of identifying a brand with specific associations for the 80 
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undergraduate participants that differentiated it from other brands in the category 
(Broniarczyk and Alba 1994). The goal of the pre-test was to select a brand that was 
well-known and relevant to participants. In this way, I could reasonably assume that 
the degree of brand familiarity and knowledge was kept constant. Apple met these 
criteria. It was almost unanimously associated with young, cool and easy to use. I 
pre-tested other two brands in PC category, namely IBM and Toshiba, but the 
associations for both of these brands were much less convergent than those for 
Apple. This pre-test was also conducted on other brands belonging to other 
categories, such as McDonald’s, Starbucks, BMW, Armani, Timex, JcPenny, but the 
results have shown that either they had negative associations (e.g. McDonald’s, 
Timex, JcPenny) or participants were in disagreement about their specific main 
associations. On the basis of these findings, Apple has been used as the stimulus. As 
regards the product within this brand, I have chosen the Apple Ipod Nano, which I 
though to be more tailored to my target.  
An additional pre-test has been subsequently conducted with a separate sample of 
38 undergraduate students to select features that differed along the product congruity. 
In particular, 20 potential Ipod Nano’s new features were listed on a single-item 9-
point semantic differential measure (“extremely inconsistent” vs. “extremely 
consistent” with Apple Ipod Nano).  
The choice of this specific measure and, more generally, the choice of a single-
item measure of product perceived congruity warrant some further considerations.  
As regards the first point, I have measured product perceived congruity by using the 
word “consistency”, instead of “congruity”, in my questionnaire. This choice is 
grounded on the belief that the word consistency is more frequently used in the 
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common American language, especially the one used by young people, than the 
concept of congruity, the meaning of these two words being considered the same. 
This interchangeability has emerged clearly during my conversation with many 
American people both in the academic environment and into the “world outside” in 
the very preliminary stage of my empirical analysis.  
In addition to this, there is some evidence in the literature which supports this 
choice. For instance, Campbell and Goodstein (2001, p. 3) have stated that “under 
high-risk conditions consumers are likely to prefer an alternative that is consistent 
with schema expectations to one that is moderately incongruent”, so using 
interchangeably the two words.  
More broadly, my choice not to use the word “congruity” is further supported by 
the fact that studies that have applied schema-congruity theory to consumer research 
have often used words other than congruity itself to measure this variable. For 
instance, Campbell and Goodstein, after having manipulated this variable, have used 
the concept of “perceived typicality” in the manipulation check to measure the 
congruity of a new product with the schema. Maoz and Tybout (2002) have pre-
tested the degree of congruity of some brand extensions to the core brand by using a 
single 9-point semantic differential scale in which the stimuli varied along the 
“perceived similarity” to the core brand, even tough these scholars have explicitly 
stated that certain brand extensions selected were more or less congruent than others 
to the brand (p. 121). Moreover, Stayman et al. (1992) have used a measure of 
subjective disconfirmation (see also Tse and Wilton 1988) to operationalize schema-
congruity in their Experiment 2, and a measure of how similar the product was to 
schema expectations as a congruity manipulation check in Experiment 3.  
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As regards the second point, assumed that congruity might even have a multi-
dimensional nature, my choice to use a single-item measure for this construct is 
motivated by three main reasons. First, researchers in similar studies have previously 
used single-item measures. In addition to the above-mentioned works by Maoz and 
Tybout (2002), Stayman et al. (1992) and Campbell and Goodstein (2001) in the 
schema-congruity stream, many works in the above-reported brand extension 
research stream have measured the relationship between a brand extension and the 
core brand using a single-item measure of similarity or typicality. For instance, 
Boush and Loken (1991) measured typicality by asking subjects to rate the overall 
similarity of each brand extension to products that the brand was currently making, 
on a 7-point scale anchored between “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” (see 
also Barone et al. 2000). Second, my conversation with subjects in the preliminary 
stage of the analysis has revealed that people have a pretty clear view of what 
congruity (or consistency) means, and they even tend to use it practically. Third, the 
selection of a global measure of congruity seems to be necessary for the purpose of 
my research, because any multi-item measure of congruity of new features with the 
product would not recognize the difference in weights that different subjects would 
assign to the different dimensions. In my analysis each respondent is likely to have 
idiosyncratic perceptions of the degree of congruity between the new features and the 
product to which they are added. This means that any attempt to integrate my 
informants’ responses would bias my results. 
After having listed these potential Ipod Nano’s new features, on the basis of 
inter-quartile ranges, I have retained three features for each congruity level (high, 
moderate and low). The features retained were: screen backlight, rigid plastic case 
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and 10 Gb of memory for extreme congruity, wireless internet connection, calculator 
and Dolby surround sound for moderate incongruity, oval display, GPS and 
integrated camera for extreme incongruity. 
 
3.2.2 Procedure 
 
 
One hundred twenty four undergraduate students at a large Midwestern 
university participated to an online survey with chances to win one of three $80 
prizes in a lottery. A 2 x 3 between subjects factorial design has been employed, in 
which the number of new features has been varied (one vs. three)7 and subjects have 
been asked to rate the attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano after the introduction of 
feature(s) having one of the three levels of congruity with Ipod Nano (congruity, 
moderate incongruity, extreme incongruity), compared to $200 cash (1 = $200 very 
attractive, 9 = Apple Ipod Nano very attractive) (see Appendix A). 
As regards the use of product attractiveness as my dependent measure, it is a 
measure of liking and the choice of using this type of measure is motivated by the 
fact that I look at consumers’ evaluation of different versions of the same product, 
rather than at how consumers choose among different products. In a competitive 
situation, a measure of choice would have been more consistent with the aim of the 
research. On the contrary, my theorizing is based on understanding whether 
consumers perceive a variation in their evaluation of the same product as some 
independent variables are manipulated. This implies that each respondent had to 
evaluate the specific version of the product (deriving from the specific manipulation 
                                                 
7
 The feature chosen in the first number condition was one of the three assigned in the second number 
condition. 
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of the independent variables) to which he is assigned, rating its perceived 
attractiveness.  
As regards the use of a comparative evaluation of Ipod Nano attractiveness ($200 
versus Apple Ipod Nano), the rationale for this choice has been to avoid the ceiling 
effect that would have been likely to occur in the case of noncomparative product 
evaluation.  
Finally, I have chosen $200 as the amount of money to oppose to Apple Ipod 
Nano because I wanted to choose an amount that was slightly higher than the current 
product price in order to obtain more variance in the responses.  
 
3.2.3 Results  
 
 
The manipulation check has confirmed that the features chosen for each of the 
three levels of congruity with the product differed systematically: the ANOVA 
model has been significant (F2,122 = 16.169, p < .000); contrasts have shown that the 
three moderately incongruent features were less congruent with Ipod Nano than were 
the three extremely congruent features (4.1 versus 5.66, F1,122 = 7.57, p < .006), but 
were more congruent with Ipod Nano than the three extremely incongruent features 
(4.1 versus 2.88, F1,122 = 5.92, p < .016).  
An ANOVA on the evaluation index has revealed that the interaction between 
new features’ number and congruity of these features with the product was 
significant (F2,118 = 3.11, p < .048, see Figure 1). As expected, planned contrasts have 
shown that as the number of new features increased, product attractiveness did not 
increase when new features were either moderately incongruent (4.92 vs. 5.257, 
F1,118 = 1.54, ns), or extremely incongruent (3.773 vs. 3.914, F1,118 =.67, ns). On the 
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contrary, there was a significant increase when the features were extremely 
congruent (2.405 vs. 4.950, F1,118 = 12.2, p < .000). Thus, H1 finds support.  
I have also accounted for some possible covariates that I thought to be potentially 
relevant for the purpose of my empirical analysis. In particular, as shown in 
Appendix A, I have controlled for some demographic variables, like gender, age, 
nationality, and, more importantly, for other items associated with the expertise with 
the product, based on previous research (e.g. Peracchio and Tybout 1996; Thompson 
et al. 2005). As regards the measures of expertise, I investigated the ownership of 
both any Apple Ipod and Apple Ipod Nano specifically (using dummy variables), and 
also the number of hours respondents had been using a Mp3 player per week. None 
of these covariates has resulted significant. 
Another way to look at this interaction is to analyze the trends within each of the 
two number conditions. In this respect, in the case of the introduction of one new 
feature, an inverted U relationship has been observed (quadratic trend, F2,118 = 6.384, 
p < .002). Planned contrasts have revealed that the moderately incongruent new 
feature was evaluated better than both the congruent new feature (4.92 vs. 2.405, 
F1,118 = 11.13, p < .000), and the extremely incongruent new feature (4.920 vs. 3.773, 
F1,118 = 5.09, p < .025). However, when the three new features condition was 
analyzed such a quadratic trend was not found (quadratic trend, F2,118 =.682, ns). In 
particular, no differences have been observed between moderately incongruent 
features and congruent ones (5.257 vs. 4.950 F1,118 = 1.56, ns). A graphical 
representation of these results is provided in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Experiment 1 – The number of features by congruity interaction on 
evaluation 
 
 
A main effect of congruity has been also found (F2,118 = 4.507, p < .013). In 
particular, an inverted U relationship has been observed (quadratic trend, F1,118 = 
4.207, p < .042). Planned contrasts have shown that across the two new features’ 
number levels product attractiveness was higher for moderately incongruent features 
than for both congruent features (5.088 vs. 3.667, F1,118 = 6.93, p < .01) and 
extremely product incongruent features (5.088 vs. 3.844, F1,118 = 6.06, p < .015). I 
further wanted to rule out the alternative account that this effect could be explained 
by the fact that the three moderately incongruent new features were perceived as 
more attractive by consumers than the other two types of new features. To achieve 
this goal, I have measured the features’ perceived attractiveness and found no 
significant difference among the different types of features (F2,122 = .386, ns; 
Mcongruent = 6.6, Mmoderately incongruent = 6.35, Mextremely incongruent = 6.2).  
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3.2.4 Discussion 
 
 
These results provide support for what I have hypothesized in H1.  
When new features are either moderately or extremely incongruent with the 
product, consumers are not able to perceive value from increasing their number. In 
fact, the increase in the number of features requires consumers to make a greater 
cognitive effort and to use more cognitive resources than they are required in the 
case of congruent features because in the former case they need to elaborate the 
information in the attempt to resolve incongruities. Given that every incongruent 
feature is a new stimulus to be reconciled with the product schema, consumers are 
not available to spend the cognitive resources necessary to resolve the incongruity 
deriving from more additional features and, finally, they do not perceive value from 
adding more incongruent features. In other words, consumers are not willing to 
elaborate the incongruent features as their number increases, and this results in their 
inability to infer the benefit of adding these features to products.  
On the contrary, when features are congruent with the product consumers are 
able to perceive an overall benefit from increasing their number, because these 
features do not require additional consumers’ cognitive resources for trying to 
resolve the incongruity. As a consequence, consumers may easily assimilate them to 
the product, and thus their product evaluation increases as the number of congruent 
features increases.  
The further analysis within each of the two features’ number conditions provides 
another interesting interpretation of these findings. In particular, the inverted U 
relationship between (in)congruity and product attractiveness has been shown only 
when one new feature has been considered. Otherwise, in the case of three new 
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features this relationship has not been observed because no difference has been 
shown between congruent features and moderately incongruent ones.  
Taken together, these results reveal that consumers are able to reconcile the 
moderate - but not the extreme - incongruity of the features with their product 
schema until they spend the cognitive resources necessary to elaborate the 
information and try to resolve the incongruity. In particular, when the number of new 
features is relatively low (i.e., when it is one) consumers infer more value from 
moderate incongruity than from the two extreme cases (inverted U shape). But when 
the number of new features becomes higher the difference in product evaluation after 
adding congruent versus moderately incongruent features no longer exists. This 
finding is explained by the fact that whereas product evaluation increases as the 
number of congruent features increases, it does not increase as the number of 
moderately incongruent features increases.  
Overall, the explanation I offer for these findings is that the increase in the 
number of incongruent features leads to a mismatch between the cognitive resources 
necessary to resolve the incongruity and the cognitive resources devoted by 
consumers. Such a mismatch makes consumers not able to perceive an overall 
benefit from the product enhancing based on increasing the number of either 
moderately or extremely incongruent features. 
In this experiment I have also found evidence for a main effect of congruity, 
which has shown the same nonmonotonic pattern as that showed in the one feature 
condition. Hence, I have found a significant difference between the three congruity 
conditions, with moderately incongruent features performing better than extremely 
congruent or extremely incongruent ones. However, one could argue that content 
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confounds the effects I have found. In other words, this effect may be due to unique 
information provided by the specific features that were presented in each condition 
rather than to congruity itself. In this respect, I have shown that the specific features 
in each of the three congruity conditions do not differ in terms of their own 
attractiveness. However, I wanted to provide further converging evidence that lets 
me rule out such an alternative explanation for these effects.  
In Experiment 2 I try to address such an issue in order to make the cognitive 
based-explanation I am proposing more robust, by ruling out unique content as a 
possible alternative account. To achieve this aim, I manipulate the amount of 
cognitive resources that consumers are available to spend in the case of the highest 
number of new features and test if there is any difference in product evaluation 
between spending more or less resources within each of the three levels of congruity 
with the product.  
 
3.3 Experiment 2 
 
 
This experiment has the aim to test if encouraging consumers to elaborate the 
information deriving from the new features thoughtfully makes them able to resolve 
the incongruity associated with these features and, as a result, if this makes them able 
to perceive value from adding more incongruent features.  
As a consequence of my theorizing, in this experiment I have set the level of 
features at three, which is the highest level that I have already considered in the first 
study. The logic for considering only the three features condition, differently from 
what I have done in the first experiment, is to provide stronger evidence about 
consumers’ ability of resolving moderate incongruity. More specifically, in 
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Experiment 1 I have found the nonmonotonic effect for the one feature condition, 
thus showing that consumers are able to resolve the moderate incongruity when 
exposed to only one new product feature; on the contrary, this effect has not been 
found for the three features condition.  
My arguing is that consumers are available to spend enough resources to resolve 
the moderate incongruity coming from one new stimulus (e.g. one new product 
feature). This is also consistent with what Mandler and other scholars who have 
employed schema-congruity theory have found. However, Experiment 1’s results 
have also shown that when three features were considered consumers did not seem 
willing to spend enough cognitive resources to elaborate the features and lead to a 
nonmonotonic effect.  
On the basis of this finding, in Experiment 2 I expect to find a replication of such 
a result in the low involvement scenario, whereas I expect to shed light on the fact 
that when the resources devoted to the elaboration of the new features are substantial 
the nonmonotonic effect obtains even in presence of three features. 
In addition to test H2, and related to it, in this experiment I aim at providing 
further evidence that it is not unique content that explains the effects found in the 
first study. This would be proved by finding on the one hand a significant difference 
among the three congruity conditions when involvement is high, on the other hand 
no differences among the same conditions when involvement is low.  
 
3.3.1 Procedure 
 
 
I have used the same product and the same features as Experiment 1.  
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One hundred seventeen undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
university have been my sample. Participation in the online survey has been 
motivated by chances to win three $80 prizes in a lottery.  
A 2 (involvement: low, high) x 3 (congruity: high, moderate, low) between 
subjects factorial design has been employed. I have not varied the number of new 
features because I was interested specifically to the case of higher number (three new 
features).  
Participants first read a short paragraph telling them that the research was being 
conducted as part of an effort to write a marketing case study about a new version of 
the Ipod Nano that Apple was planning to introduce in the North American market. 
Depending on the congruity condition to which they were assigned, participants were 
informed that the version of the Ipod Nano they had been exposed to included three 
additional features with respect to the current version they already knew.  
The next paragraph contained instructions designed to influence participants’ 
motivation to engage in elaborate thought regarding the product after the introduction 
of new features. In this case, I have followed a procedure employed by Maheswaran 
and Sternthal (1990) and Maoz and Tybout (2002). Consistent with these studies, 
subjects that have been assigned to high involvement condition have been told that 
they were one of only very few people providing input for the marketing case, that 
their opinion was of utmost importance, and that each response would have been 
evaluated individually. Subjects in the low involvement condition have been 
informed that they were one of many people providing input and that their responses 
would have been averaged with hundreds of others before the results would have 
been examined (see Appendix B). 
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The dependent variable employed has been the same as that used in Experiment 
1. 
As outlined earlier, an interaction between congruity and involvement was 
anticipated. Specifically, when the three new features were moderately incongruent 
with the product a difference between high and low involvement was predicted, 
whereas when the three new features were either congruent or extremely incongruent 
with the product no difference between high and low involvement was expected. 
 
3.3.2 Results  
 
 
The ANOVA on the evaluation index shows that the main effects of involvement 
(Mhigh = 5.855 vs. Mlow = 4.941; F1,111 = 4.114, p < .045) and congruity  (F2,111 = 
3.340, p < .039), and the interaction between them (F2,111 = 4.065, p < .02, see Figure 
2) were all significant.  
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Figure 2 – Experiment 2 – The congruity by involvement interaction on product 
attractiveness 
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The main effect of congruity took the form of an inverted U relationship 
(quadratic trend, F1,111 = 7.902, p < .006). Planned contrasts have revealed that, 
across the levels of task involvement, product attractiveness after the introduction of 
new moderately incongruent features was higher than product attractiveness after the 
introduction of both congruent features (6.173 vs. 4.765, F1,111 = 5.632, p < .022), 
and the extremely incongruent ones (6.173 vs. 5.256, F1,111 = 3.92, p < .05). 
As regards the interaction between congruity and task involvement, planned 
contrasts have revealed a highly significant difference between high and low 
involvement when the three new features were moderately incongruent with the 
product (7.522 vs. 4.824, F1,111 = 12.26, p < .000). On the contrary, no difference has 
been found when new features were either extremely congruent (4.842 vs. 4.668, 
F1,111 = .84, ns) or extremely incongruent with the product (5.2 vs. 5.313, F1,111 = .51, 
ns). Hence, H2 is supported.  
As reported in Appendix B, in this study I have controlled for the same covariates 
as those in Experiment 1, and none of them has shown to have a significant effect. 
Furthermore, the trend analysis within each of the two levels of task involvement 
reveals that in the case of high involvement an inverted U relationship exists 
(quadratic trend, F1,111 = 16.134, p < .000). Planned contrasts have shown that 
moderately incongruent new features lead to higher product attractiveness than both 
congruent new features (7.522 vs. 4.842, F1,111 = 12.23, p < .000), and extremely 
incongruent new features (7.522 vs. 5.2, F1,111 = 10.52, p < .000). This result is 
consistent with what Maoz and Tybout (2002) have found when considering the 
introduction of a potential brand extension.  
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On the contrary, when involvement was low no evidence of such a trend has been 
found (F1,111 = .062, ns). In particular, planned contrasts have shown that there was 
no significant difference between product attractiveness after introducing moderately 
incongruent features and after introducing extremely congruent features (4.824 vs. 
4.688, F1,111 = .71, ns). Similarly, no difference has been found between product 
attractiveness after introducing moderately incongruent features and product 
attractiveness after introducing extremely incongruent features (4.824 vs. 5.313, 
F1,111 = 2.21, ns). 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
 
I have found that if encouraged to elaborate extensively the new features 
consumers are able to resolve the moderate incongruity even when more features are 
added at once.  
This finding strengthens the cognitive elaboration-based explanation I have 
proposed for the effects predicted in H1 and confirmed by the previous empirical 
analysis. In particular, I have argued that it is the match between the amount of 
cognitive resources required by processing new features and the amount of cognitive 
resources devoted by consumers to this task that determines whether consumers are 
able to infer the benefits associated with the additional features. In fact, when 
consumers are induced to think carefully of new features they have been shown to 
resolve the moderate incongruities and perceive value from adding even more than 
one moderately incongruent feature to the product. Hence, when consumers are 
induced to consider new features thoughtfully, there is no longer evidence for the 
mismatch between the resources required to elaborate the moderately incongruent 
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features and the resources devoted to this task, and this leads them to perceive a 
higher product attractiveness than in the case in which they are not induced to think 
so carefully (low involvement condition) of new features.  
Otherwise, encouraging consumers to consider the features added to the product 
thoughtfully does not have effect in the cases of both congruent and extremely 
incongruent features. In fact, in the first case consumers do not need additional 
cognitive resources because congruent features typically require few cognitive 
resources; on the contrary, extremely incongruent features are features that cannot be 
reconciled with the product, regardless of the amount of cognitive resources that 
consumers spend. 
Another key contribution offered by Experiments 2 is that it provides further 
evidence against the alternative explanation that the effect of different levels of 
congruity might have been due to unique information across the congruity 
treatments. The fact that in the low involvement scenario no differences have been 
found among the congruity levels, whereas such differences have been shown in the 
case of high involvement using the same features, implies that it was not the 
information provided by the specific features that was responsible for the effects I 
have found. 
Finally, Experiment 2 replicates the results found in Experiment 1 in the low 
involvement condition. In fact, in Experiment 1 I have not found a nonmonotonic 
effect when three new features were considered. This means that if consumers do not 
employ more cognitive resources than usual, they are not able to resolve the 
incongruity coming from more features. On the contrary, this second study shows 
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that when consumers are made available to spend additional cognitive resources such 
a nonmonotonic effect occurs even when three new features are considered.  
In conclusion, the explanation I offer for these results is that it is the amount of 
resources that consumers spend in facing new features that determines whether or not 
they are likely to perceive a value from adding more moderately incongruent 
features. 
 
3.4 Experiment 3 
 
 
3.4.1 Procedure 
 
 
I have used the same product and the same moderately incongruent features as 
those used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
One hundred ten undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university have 
been my sample. Participation in the online survey has been motivated by chances to 
win three $80 prizes in a lottery.  
A 2 (level of construal: low, high) x 2 (number of product features: one, three) 
between subjects factorial design has been employed, and subjects have been asked 
to rate the attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano after the introduction of moderately 
incongruent feature(s), compared to $200 cash (1 = $200 very attractive, 9 = Apple 
Ipod Nano very attractive).  
Temporal construal has been manipulated by telling subjects in the near future 
condition to consider purchasing the product in the next few days. On the contrary, 
subjects in the distant future condition have been told to consider purchasing the 
product in about twelve months from the time of the experiment (see Appendix C). 
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I expected a significant interaction between new features’ number and the 
temporal construal. In particular, in the distant future condition an increase in the 
product attractiveness as the number of features increased was anticipated. On the 
contrary, no evidence for such an increase was expected in the near future condition. 
 
3.4.2 Results 
 
 
The ANOVA on the evaluation index shows that the main effect of number (Mone 
= 4.26 vs. Mthree = 5.45, F1,106 = 7.603, p < .01), the main effect of temporal construal 
(Mnear = 4.29 vs. Mdistant = 5.42, F1,106 = 6.824, p < .01), and the interaction between 
number and temporal construal (F1,106 = 4.89, p < .03, see Figure 3) have been all 
significant. 
Similarly to the two previous studies, I have not found evidence for the 
significant effect of any covariate. 
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Figure 3 – Experiment 3 – The number of features by temporal construal interaction on 
product attractiveness 
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As regards the interaction between the two predictors, planned contrasts have 
revealed the existence of a significant difference between one feature condition and 
three features condition when distant future has been considered (4.346 vs. 6.5, F1,106 
= 10.52, p < .000). On the contrary, in the near future condition no difference has 
been revealed (4.172 vs. 4.409, F1,106 = 1.14, ns). As a consequence, H3 finds 
support. 
 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
 
 
Experiment 3 has shown that whether consumers are able to perceive benefits 
from increasing the number of moderately incongruent features depends on the 
temporal frame of their evaluations. The variation in the closeness of their decision 
time determines whether consumers rely on more abstract or on more concrete 
features of the decision task. In the distant future scenario consumers are more likely 
to abstract than in the near future scenario.  
Experiment 3’s results highlight that manipulating the temporal frame of 
consumers’ evaluation influences how consumers perceive the increase in the 
number of moderately incongruent features. In particular, I have found an increase in 
product attractiveness as the number of such features increased when considering to 
purchase the product in a relatively distant future; on the contrary, no evidence for 
such an increase has been found when consumers were considering to purchase the 
product in a near future condition.  
The explanation proposed for these results is that when consumers imagine to 
purchase the product in more distant future they are more likely to see the 
connections between the features and the product, because they may consider that 
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those features may become consistent with the product. On the other hand, in the 
near future scenario consumers are more focused on the more concrete aspects of the 
“how” of the action, that is on the actual incongruity between the features and the 
product; as a consequence, as the number of these features increases consumers feel 
not able to reconcile them with the product as it currently is. 
From a theoretical point of view, this finding is relevant because offers 
converging evidence that adding more moderately incongruent features may be 
beneficial for consumers in terms of product evaluation. Experiment 1 has shown the 
general effect that consumers do not perceive value from being exposed to an 
increase in the number of moderately or extremely incongruent features. Experiment 
3 has replicated this finding in the near future condition, but has also offered the new 
evidence that in a distant future scenario consumers may assign a positive value to 
the product enhancing based on increasing the number of moderately incongruent 
features. 
Experiment 3 is convergent with Experiment 2, as much as it provides further 
evidence that consumers may judge positively the introduction of more than one 
moderately incongruent feature at once. Nonetheless, whereas Experiment 2 has 
shown that different patterns are produced in the case of a higher number of new 
features depending on the level of task involvement, Experiment 3 has varied the 
number of new features showing that the increase in the number of new moderately 
incongruent features determines an increase in the product attractiveness only in a 
distant future scenario. In other words, Experiment 2 has provided evidence that, 
despite the first study’s predictions, it is possible to produce a nonmonotonic effect 
even when adding more features, whereas Experiment 3, despite the first study’s 
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predictions, has revealed that increasing the number of new moderately incongruent 
features may lead to positive evaluations. 
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General discussion 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing research on the effect of adding new 
features to products by offering an innovative framework which explains when 
adding more features is likely to enhance the favorableness of product evaluation and 
when it is not, and on what behavioral mechanisms these findings are based. 
Experimental results have shown that the probability that product evaluation 
increases as the number of features increases depends on the degree of congruity of 
the features added with the product. In particular, I have provided evidence that when 
new features are congruent with the product, consumers are likely to infer value from 
increasing the number of the features added to the product, because these features do 
not require cognitive effort for consumers. On the contrary, when new features are 
incongruent with the product, cognitive effort is required to resolve the incongruity, 
and thus increasing the number of features increases the cognitive effort, and the 
amount of cognitive resources necessary for consumers, because more incongruities 
have to be resolved. I have shown that consumers do not seem willing to spend the 
cognitive resources necessary for elaborating new features, and, as a result, they are 
not able to perceive value from increasing the number of incongruent features. 
Hence, cognitive elaboration required by the kind features added acts as a key 
construct which determines when adding more features is likely to have a positive 
effect on product evaluation and when it is not. 
The evidence of the role played by cognitive elaboration in explaining 
consumers’ reaction to adding product features has been strengthened by further 
showing that when induced to devote additional cognitive resources to process the 
new features, consumers are able to resolve the moderate incongruity - but not the 
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extreme incongruity - even when more features are added. Hence, it is the match 
between the cognitive resources required by the new features and the cognitive 
resources that consumers spend that determines consumers’ ability to perceive a 
benefit from adding more moderately incongruent features.  
On the contrary, even if they are made willing to spend substantial cognitive 
resources, consumers do not seem able to resolve the extreme incongruity and infer 
value from having more extremely incongruent features. The theoretical explanation 
for this effect is that whereas elaborating moderately incongruent stimuli is likely to 
induce a sense of satisfaction, leading to positive evaluation, the elaboration of 
extremely incongruent stimuli is more likely to generate frustration and negative 
evaluation (Mandler 1982). 
This finding is extremely relevant because sheds light on the possibility that 
consumers resolve the moderate incongruity even when exposed to more new 
stimuli. In fact, previous research has provided evidence only about consumers’ 
ability to resolve the moderate incongruity associated with one new stimulus. In this 
case scholars have shown the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between 
incongruity and evaluation. I have subsequently provided further evidence about the 
resolution of moderate incongruities by showing that consumers might be able to 
infer value from increasing the number of moderately incongruent features. In 
particular, I have shown that, regardless of the amount of cognitive resources 
available, consumers are likely to perceive value from increasing the number of 
moderately incongruent features if they are induced to consider purchasing the 
product in a distant future. However, the same effect has not been produced in the 
case in which subjects were considering purchasing the product in a near future. 
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Theoretical implications 
 
The framework proposed in this thesis is clearly different from those proposed by 
the very few studies (e.g. Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Thompson et al. 2005) that 
have accounted for the cost-benefit trade-off of adding features. Specifically, I have 
considered the kind of the features added, as these previous studies have not done. 
The afore-mentioned scholars have proposed accounts for the resolution of this cost-
benefit trade-off based on the definition of differential weights that value and 
learning-cost inferences assumed depending on the specific task. Then, consumers’ 
net evaluations have been made dependent upon the distribution of such weights. 
Contrary to this theorizing, I have not assumed that consumers rely more on one 
inference than the other depending on the context, but I have proposed a more 
general and parsimonious framework which shows that it is the type of the features 
added to products, through different cognitive mechanisms, that determines whether 
consumers perceive benefits from adding features. Interestingly, this framework is 
also different from the one proposed by Gill (2008). Studying convergent products, 
this scholar has focused on the congruity between the new features and the goal 
(utilitarian or hedonistic) of the base product. Grounding on assimilation/contrast 
theory, he has found an asymmetry between adding a feature that is congruent or 
incongruent with an hedonistic product base and adding a feature that is congruent or 
incongruent with an utilitarian product base. He has found that adding a congruent, 
utilitarian feature to an utilitarian base generates an incremental value of the 
convergent product that is smaller than the one generated by adding a hedonistic, 
incongruent feature. This finding seems quite different from the general finding of 
the present work that adding more features that are congruent with the product is 
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better than adding more features that are incongruent with the product. Moreover, he 
has focused on adding a single feature, thus not considering the increase in the 
number of features. 
In addition to this, my thesis shows that the phenomenon of “feature fatigue” 
described in previous work (Thompson et al. 2005) is function not only of the 
increase in the number of new features, but, beyond this, it depends on the degree of 
congruity between new features and products. In other words, feature fatigue does 
not only occur when “too many features” are added to a product; what this research 
shows is that the same increase in the number of features may or may not lead to 
improved product evaluation depending on how congruent with the product itself the 
specific features are perceived to be. 
Finally, this work provides a context-dependent view of product differentiation. 
According to the traditional view of consumer preferences, each consumer has a 
well-defined preference order over a set of options or over different versions of the 
same option (Shafir 1993). These preferences are typically assumed to be static and 
context-independent. As a consequence, if the consumer perceives a feature as 
something valuable, when a product differentiates itself by introducing that new 
feature, consumer should evaluate the differentiated version of the product higher 
than its basic version. On the basis of this view, firms should tend to add as many 
new valuable features to their products as they can, because consumers’ preferences 
do not depend on the decision context (i.e. the specific differentiating product). 
Consistent with some studies of consumer decision making (e.g. Payne et al. 1993, 
Kraus and Carpenter 2005), I have shown that consumers do not always have well-
defined values and preferences for the products. On the contrary, such preferences 
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are often context-dependent, as much as different frames and contexts may bring 
forth different considerations, so giving rise to decisions that appear inconsistent 
with respect to the typical consumer reasoning (Shafir 1993). In particular, I have 
demonstrated that the introduction of new product features does not necessarily lead 
to an increase in product evaluations. Basically, a new feature that increases product 
evaluations when added to product A might not lead to such an increase when added 
to product B. Such a difference in consumers’ evaluations is explained by the 
difference in the contexts in which consumers evaluate the introduction of new 
product features. More specifically, depending on what the mental representation that 
consumers have for different products is, the perceived contribution made by adding 
certain features to the global product evaluation may differ.   
 
Managerial implications 
 
This work has several important managerial implications. For instance, it 
provides further support for believing that managers should consider carefully not 
only the functional improvements of products when adding new features, but also the 
total cost of adding features. As regards the costs, companies often tend to consider 
the financial costs associated with the introduction of new product features as the 
most important part of the full cost. Since developments of Information and 
Communication Technology have been making the financial costs of adding features 
lower and lower, oftentimes managers tend to fully exploit technological progress, so 
adding as many features as technology allows. In this respect, this research sheds 
light on the importance to look at the psychological costs of adding features.  
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I have shown that when features are not consistent with consumers’ idea of the 
product there is no benefit to add many features at once. In other words, product 
enhancing based on increasing the number of new features is not successful when 
such features force consumers to radically change their “product behavior”. Then, the 
question becomes: What should firms do to maximize the performances of their 
product enhancing strategies? My findings suggest that managers should tailor such 
strategies to the typology of features they are thinking to add to products.  
More specifically, adding at once a number of new features to an existing product 
can be a viable strategy only if the features introduced are clearly consistent with the 
basic idea and the current functions of the product. In this case, consumers only infer 
the functional benefits of being exposed to an enhanced product, while they do not 
have their basic idea of the product upset. Examples of these features and the related 
strategies can be given by having introduced on cell phones new ring tones, or the 
possibility to write short messages more quickly through adequate functions, or 
having equipped some cars with the possibility to use automatic gear change or with 
electronically adjustable seats. 
Instead, enhancing products by adding several new features might not have good 
results when the features added are even moderately inconsistent with the product 
idea. This case can be represented by adding to certain technological products 
features that are typical of other high-tech products. Examples of this are given by 
including on cell phones the possibility to connect to the Web or to send faxes, or to 
equip digital audio player with dolby surround sound. In this case, the evaluation of 
the features per sè might even be favorable, but, since consumers need to learn how 
these new features fit the target product, it would be better to introduce them at 
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slower pace. In particular, experimental results have shown that this type of new 
features makes the product more appealing when they are introduced one by one. At 
the same time, my thesis has shown that in the case in which consumers are highly 
involved in the task of evaluating products when considering the introduction of new 
features they perceive value from adding several new features, however slightly 
inconsistent with the product that might be. This suggests companies to add more 
than one moderately incongruent feature to the product when consumers are 
particularly involved in the product. 
Moreover, I suggest that companies should never add features that are too 
inconsistent with the idea of the product that consumers have in mind. Examples of 
this are given by introducing TV on cell phones, by integrating a TV into a 
refrigerator, by adding a video screen saver on a car stereo, or by adding Quick Look 
to Mac OS X Leopard. In these cases, consumers are forced to change the idea of the 
product they already had and this has been shown to produce negative evaluations.  
Interestingly, an important strategic alternative is represented by the choice to 
create new schemas for products. In the current competitive scenario, this strategy 
can be thought as the result of the convergence, which has been playing a dominant 
role in the high-tech electronic sector. Such convergence makes it possible to create a 
single new product which contains a set of features that are part of different existing 
products. One of the clearest example of this phenomenon is the Apple iPhone, a 
multimedia telephone which includes digital camera, e-mailing system, multimedia 
music player, text messaging, and so on. As a consequence, it could be said that 
iPhone has created a schema that is different from schemas associated with existing 
products converging in it, like cell phones, Ipod, MP3 players or digital cameras. 
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Adding too inconsistent features to an existing base is different from adopting the 
above-mentioned strategy of creating new product schemas, because in the latter case 
no base exists, and different features typical of different existing products are put 
together to create a new product category. 
Finally, this work suggests that the temporal distance between the time at which 
consumers are informed about the introduction of new product features and the time 
at which the enhanced product will be made available for being purchased is 
positively linked to the probability that consumers perceive favorably the 
introduction of more features that are moderately incongruent with the product. 
Importantly, this finding may have interesting implications for scheduling promotion 
and launch of such product innovations. For example, it could suggest companies to 
communicate the intention to introduce new product features that are not perceived 
as extremely congruent with the current idea of product quite long time in advance 
with respect to the time at which these features will be made available. In fact,  if led 
to consider purchasing the product in a distant future, consumers are likely to 
imagine that their idea of the product will gradually evolve and this might make 
those feature that are currently perceived as slightly inconsistent more consistent 
with the product as it is imagined to be at the time of the purchase.  
 
Limitation and future research 
 
This research presents limitations that represent interesting challenges for future 
research. First, further investigation is needed for the effects I have found to be 
generalizable across other contexts. In this respect, this thesis has investigated only 
product evaluation in the context of a consumer electronics product (Apple Ipod 
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Nano). My interest in proposing a novel theoretical framework for explaining what 
drives consumers’ reactions to adding more features to products has required me to 
be more concerned about offering a robust theory than about providing an extended 
generalization of the effects found across different settings. Nonetheless, further 
investigation in contexts other than electronics/communications industry would add 
to the robustness of the current findings. For example, in the context of services, 
adding more very incongruent services (e.g., building a swimming pool and a 
massage shop within an university area) may be valued more than I have shown in 
the case of an electronics product and more than adding extremely congruent 
services.  
Second, research would be required to investigate consumers’ evaluations when 
more than two levels of features’ number are considered. In particular, it could be 
interesting for future research to add at least a third level and test what the pattern 
associated with increasing the number of product features within each of the 
congruity conditions is. For example, it would be important to test if product 
evaluation remains linearly and positively related to the number of new features 
when the features added are congruent with the product or if a nonincreasing effect is 
more likely. In the latter case there would be evidence for Weber’s law that the 
sensitivity to increases along a dimension, such as the number of congruent features, 
reduces as the magnitude of the dimension increases. As a consequence, it could be 
interesting to investigate what the optimal number of new congruent features is. 
Similarly, in the case of moderately incongruent features, research might examined 
what is likely to happens when considering a third level of features’ number either in 
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the case of high consumers’ involvement or in the case of distant future purchase 
decisions. 
Third, another important limitation of my research consists in the fact that our 
analysis has focused on the case of stand-alone evaluation of the product. I have 
investigated consumers’ reaction to being exposed to different versions of the same 
product and I have shown that each of these versions is associated with different 
perceived attractiveness. An avenue of research addressing this limitation is given by 
investigating the effect of adding congruent or incongruent features to products in a 
competitive scenario. This scenario could be thought as one in which two or more 
brands are quite closer competitors and one of them differentiates by adding one or 
more features. For example, if these features are incongruent with the product, does 
this kind of differentiation lead to increase in the product market share or choice? 
Based on previous research (e.g. Carpenter et al. 1994), it could possible to imagine 
that introducing a new features that distinguishes a brand from the others in the same 
choice set, however incongruent that might be, is perceived as a positive signal by 
customers. This would lead to different conclusions from the ones I have reached in 
the current study with respect to the opportunity to add as many even incongruent 
features as possible.  
Fourth, future work is required to propose other accounts for extending our 
knowledge about the resolution of the cost-benefit trade-off generated by adding 
product features. This could mean, for instance, to investigate the effect of different 
classifications of features than that based on the congruity with the product. 
Fifth, factors that affect consumers’ probability to infer value from increasing the 
number of moderately incongruent product features other than involvement and 
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temporal distance can be a fruitful area of future investigation. A more specific point 
is the possible investigation of the moderating role of temporal construal in 
explaining consumers’ reaction to increasing the number of extremely incongruent 
features.  
Finally, further research should also examine consumers’ reaction to adding 
product features over an extended period of time. In particular, it would be 
interesting to investigate if there is any difference in consumers’ evaluations after 
using the enhanced product and consumers’ evaluation before the use of the product, 
in each of the three conditions of congruity. Thompson et al. (2005) have shed light 
on the difference existing between the effect of increasing the number of product 
features before using the product and the effect after consumers have experienced the 
enhanced product. I would suggest to add new evidence on what the interaction 
between number of new features and congruity is after consumers’ use of the 
enhanced product. 
 137 
References 
Aaker, D.A. and Keller, K.L. (1990), “Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions”, 
Journal of Marketing, 54 (1), 27-41.  
 
Adams, W.J. and Yellen, J.L. (1976), “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of 
Monopoly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90 (August), 475-498. 
 
Agarwal, M.K. and Ratchford, B.T. (1980), “Estimating Demand Functions for 
Product Characteristics: The Case of Automobiles”, Journal of Consumer Research, 
7 (3), 249-262. 
 
Ammirati, S. (2003), “Other Voices: Ask Your Users: Less Really Can Be More”, 
Information Week, (July 14), (accessed July 17, 2003), [available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=12800101]. 
 
Anderson, N.H. (1970), “Averaging Model Applied to the Size-Weight Illusion”, 
Perception & Psychophysics, 8 (July). 
 
Anderson, N.H. (1974), “Information Integration Theory: A Brief Survey”, in 
Contemporary Developments in Mathematical Psychology, Vol. II, eds. D.H. Krantz 
et al. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
 
Anderson, N.H. (1981), Foundations of Information Integration Theory. New York, 
NY: Academic Press. 
 
Anderson, L.R. and Fishbein, M. (1965), “Prediction of Attitude from the Number, 
Strength, and Evaluative Aspect of Beliefs about the Attitude Object: A Comparison 
of Summation and Congruity Theories”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 3, 437-43. 
 
Barone, M.J., Miniard, P.W. and Romeo, J.B. (2000), “The Influence of Positive 
Mood on Brand Extension Evaluations”, Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (4), 386-
400.  
 
Barsalou, L.W. (1983), “Ad Hoc Categories”, Memory and Cognition, 11 (3), 211-
227. 
 
Barsalou, L.W. (1985), “Ideals, Central Tendency, and Frequency of Instantation as 
Determinants of Graded Structure in Categories”, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 11 (4), 629-648. 
 
Bernardo, J.J. and Blin, J.M. (1977), “A Programming Model of Consumer Choice 
Among Multi-Attributed Brands”, Journal of Consumer Research, 4 (September), 
111-118. 
 
 138 
Bettman, J.R., Capon, N. and Lutz, R.J. (1975), “Multiattribute Measurement Models 
and Multiattribute Attitude Theory: A Test of Construct Validity”, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 1 (March), 1-15. 
 
Bettman, J.R. and Sujan, M. (1987), “Effects of Framing on Evaluation of 
Comparable and Noncomparable Alternatives by Expert and Novice Consumers”, 
Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (2), 141-154. 
 
Boush, D.M. (1993), “Brand as Categories”, in Brand Equity and Advertising: 
Advertising’s Role in Building Strong Brands, ed. David A. Aaker and Alexander 
Biel, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 299-312. 
 
Boush, D., Shipp, S., Loken, B., Gencturk, E., Crockett, S., Kennedy, E., Minshall, 
B., Misurell, D., Rochford, L. and Strobel, J. (1987), “Affect Generalization to 
Similar and Dissimilar Brand Extensions”, Psychology and Marketing, 4 (3), 225-
237. 
 
Boush, D.M. and Loken, B. (1991), “A Process Tracing Study of Brand Extension 
Evaluation”, Journal of Marketing Research, 31 (2), 16-28. 
 
Broniarczyk, S.M. and Alba, J.W. (1994), “The Importance of the Brand in Brand 
Extension”, Journal of Marketing Research, 31(2), 214-228. 
 
Broniarczyk, S.M. and Gershoff, A.D. (1997), “Meaningless Differentiation 
Revisited”, Advances in Consumer Research, 24, 223-228. 
 
Broniarczyk, S.M. and Gershoff, A.D. (2003), “The Reciprocal Effects of Brand 
Equity and Trivial Attributes”, Journal of Marketing Research, 40 (May), 161-175. 
 
Brown, C.L. and Carpenter, G.S. (2000), “Why Is the Trivial Important? A Reasons-
Based Account for the Effects of Trivial Attributes on Choice”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 26 (March), 372-385. 
 
Burnkrant, R.E. (1976), “A Motivational Model of Information Processing 
Intensity”, Journal of Consumer Research, 3 (1), 21-30. 
 
Butzin, C.A. and Anderson, N.H. (1973), “Functional Measurement of Children’s 
Judgments”, Child Development, 44 (June), 529-537. 
 
Cacioppo, J.T., Petty, E.R. and Morris, K.J. (1983), “Effects of Need for Cognition 
on Message Evaluation, Recall, and Persuasion”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45, 805-818. 
 
Campbell, D.T. and Stanley, J.C. (1963), Experimental and Quasi-Experimental 
Designs for Research. Rand McNally Chicago. 
 
 139 
Campbell, M.C. and Goosdtein, R.C (2001), “The Moderating Effect of Perceived 
Risk on Consumers’ Evaluations of Product Incongruity: Preference for the Norm”, 
Journal of Consumer Research, 28, 439-449. 
 
Carpenter, G.S. and Nakamoto, K. (1989), “Consumer Preference Formation and 
Pioneering Advantage”, Journal of Marketing Research, 26 (3), 285-298. 
 
Carpenter, G.S., Glazer, R. and Nakamoto, K. (1994), “Meaningful Brands from 
Meaningless Differentiation: The Dependance on Irrilevant Attributes”, Journal of 
Marketing Research, 31, 339-350. 
 
Chernev, A. (2001), “The Impact of Common Features on Consumer Preferences: A 
Case of Confirmatory Reasoning”, Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 475-488. 
 
Churcill, D.A. and Iacobucci, D. (2005), Marketing Research: Methodological 
Foundation. Thomson South-Western Publishers. 
 
Cohen, J.B. (1982), “The Role of Affect in Categorization: Toward a 
Reconsideration of the Concept of Attitude”, Advances in Consumer Research, 9(1), 
94-100. 
 
Cohen, J.B. and Basu, K. (1987), “Alternative Models of Categorization: Toward a 
Contingent Processing Framework”, Journal of Consumer Research, 13(4), 455-472. 
 
Cook, T.D. and Campbell, D.T. (1979), Quasi-Experimentation: Design and 
Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Houghton Miffin Boston. 
 
Currim, I.S. and Sarin, R.K. (1984), “A Comparative Evaluation of Multiattribute 
Consumer Preference Models”, Management Science, 30 (5), 543-561. 
 
Dansby, R.E. and Conrad, C. (1984), “Commodity Bundling”, American Economic 
Review, 74 (May), 377-381. 
 
Day, G.S. (1972), “Evaluating Models of Attitude Structure”, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 9 (3), 279-286. 
 
Day, G.S., Shocker, A.D. and Srivastava, R.K. (1979, “Customer-Oriented 
Approaches to Identifying Product-Markets”, Journal of Marketing, 43(4), 8-19. 
 
Dobscha, S. and Mick, D.G. (1998), “Preventing the Premature Death of 
Relationship Marketing”, Harvard Business Review, 76(1). 
 
Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993), The Psychology of Attitudes. Orlando, FL: 
Harcourt Brace. 
 
Einhorn, H.J. and Hogarth, R.M. (1985), “Ambiguity and Uncertainty in 
Probabilistic Inference”, Psychological Review, 92 (October), 465-461. 
 
 140 
Eliashberg, J. and Hauser, J.R. (1985), “A Measurement Error Approach for 
Modeling Consumer Risk Preference”, Management Science, 31 (1), 1-25. 
 
Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1988), “Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs”, 
RAND Journal of Economics, 19(1), 123-137. 
 
Fishbein, M. (1963), “An Investigation of the Relationship between Beliefs about an 
Object and the Attitude toward that Object”, Human Relations, 16, 233-240. 
 
Fishbein, M. (1967), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
 
Fishbein, M. and Ajzen I. (1975), Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior. Addison-
Wesley Reading, MA. 
 
Fisher, G.W., Carmon, Z., Ariely, D. and Zauberman, G. (1999), “Goal-Based 
Construction of Preference: Task Goals and the Prominence Effect”, Management 
Science, 45, 1057-1075. 
 
Fiske, S.T. (1982), “Schema-Triggered Affect: Application to Social Perception”, in 
Affect and Cognition: The 17th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition, eds. 
Margaret S. Clark and Susan T. Fiske, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 55-78. 
 
Fiske, S.T. and Neuberg, S.L. (1990). A Continuum of Impression Formation, from 
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and 
Motivation on Attention and Interpretation. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1-74). San Diego, CA: Academic. 
 
Fiske, S.T. and Pavelchak, M.A. (1986), “Category-Based vs. Piecemeal-Based 
Affective Responses: Developments in Schema-Triggered Affect”, in Handbook of 
Motivation and Cognition, eds. Richard M. Sorrentino and E. Tory Higgins, New 
York: Guilford, 167-203. 
 
Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984), Social Cognition. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
 
Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1991), “Conditions of Schema Use”, in Social 
Cognition, ed. Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor, New York: McGraw-Hill, 142-179. 
 
Freund, B., Konig, H. and Roth, N. (1997), “Impact of Information Technologies on 
Manufacturing”, International Journal of Technology Management, 13 (3), 215-28. 
 
Gaeth, G.J., Irwin, P.L., Chakraborty, G. and Levin, A.M. (1990), “Consumer 
Evaluation of Multi-Product Bundles: An Information Integration Analysis”, 
Marketing Letters, 2(1), 47-57. 
 
Garbarino, E.C. and Edell, J.A. (1997), “Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice”, 
Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 147-158. 
 141 
Gilovich, T. (1981), “Seeing the past in the present: The effect of associations to 
familiar events on judgments and decisions”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 40(5), 797-808. 
 
Gilovich, T., Kerr, M. and Medvec, V.H. (1993), “Effect of Temporal Perspective on 
Subjective Confidence”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 552-560. 
 
Goldberg, S.M., Green, P.E. and Wind, Y. (1984), “Conjoint Analysis of Price 
Premiums for Hotel Amenities”, Journal of Business, 57 (Suppl. 1, Part 2), S111-
S132. 
 
Goldenberg, J., Horowitz, R., Levav, A. and Mazursky, D. (2003), “Finding Your 
Innovation Sweet Spot”, Harvard Business Review, 81 (March), 120-129. 
 
Goodstein, R.C. (1993), “Category-Based Applications and Extensions in 
Advertising: Motivating More Extensive Ad Processing”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 20(1), 87-99. 
 
Gourville, J.T., “Eager Sellers and Stony Buyers: Understanding the Psychology of 
New-Product Adoption, Harvard Business Review, 84(6), 98-106. 
 
Green, P.E. and Carmone, F.J. (1970), Multidimensional scaling and related 
techniques in marketing analysis. Allyn and Bacon Boston. 
 
Green, P.E. and Krieger, A.M. (1989), “Recent Contribution to Optimal Product 
Positioning and Buyer Segmentation”, European Journal of Operational Research, 
41, 127-41 
 
Green, P.E. and Rao, V.R. (1972), Applied multidimensional scaling. Dryden Press. 
 
Green, P.E. and Srinivasan, V. (1978), “Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: 
Issues and Outlook”, Journal of Consumer Research, 5 (2), 103-123. 
 
Green, P.E. and Wind, Y. (1973), Multiattribute Decisions in Marketing: A 
Measurement Approach. Hinsdale, III: Dryden Press. 
 
Guiltinan, J.P. (1987), “The Price of Bundling of Services: A Normative 
Framework”, Journal of Marketing, 51 (April), 74-85. 
 
Gurhan-Canli, Z. and Maheswaran, D. (1998), “The Effects of Extensions on Brand 
Name Dilution and Enhancement”, Journal of Marketing Research, 35 (4), 464-473. 
 
Haley, R.I. (1968), “Benefit Segmentation: A Decision-oriented Research Tool”, 
Journal of Marketing, 32, 30-35. 
 
Haley, R.I. (1971), “Beyond Benefit Segmentation”, Journal of Advertising 
Research, 11, 3-8. 
 
 142 
Hanson, W. and Martin, K. (1990), “Optimal Bundle Pricing”, Management Science, 
36 (February), 155-174. 
 
Hastie, R. (1980), “Memory for Information which Confirms or Contradicts a 
General Impression”, in Person Memory: The Cognitive Basis of Social Perception, 
eds. Reid Hastie, E.B. Ebbesen, R.S. Wyer, Jr., D.L. Hamilton and D.E. Carlston, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 155-177. 
 
Herr, P.M., Kardes, F.R and Kim, J. (1991), “Effects of Word-of-Mouth and 
Product-Attribute Information on Persuasion: An Accessibility-Diagnosticity 
Perspective”, Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (4) 454-462. 
 
Hoch, S.J. and Deighton, J. (1989), “Managing What Consumers Learn from 
Experience”, Journal of Marketing, 53(2), 1-20. 
 
Holbrook, M.B. and Havlena, W.J. (1988), “Assessing the Real-to-Artificial 
Generalizability of Multiattribute Attitude Models in Tests of New Product Design”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (February), 25-35.  
 
Horsky, D. and Nelson, P. (1992), “ New Brand Positioning and Pricing in an 
Oligopolistic Market”, Marketing Science, 11 (2), 133-153. 
 
Huber, J. (1975), “Predicting Preferences on Experimental Bundles of Attributes: A 
Comparison of Models”, Journal of Marketing Research, 12 (3), 290-297. 
 
Huber, J. and Holbrook, M.B. (1979), “Using Attribute Ratings for Product 
Positioning: Some Distinctions among Compositional Approaches”  
Journal of Marketing Research, 16 (4), 507-516. 
 
Huber, J. and McCann, J. (1982), “The Impact of Inferential Beliefs on Product 
Evaluations”, Journal of Marketing Research, 19 (3), 324-333. 
 
Huffman, C. and Houston, M.J. (1993), “Benefit-oriented Experiences and the 
Development of Knowledge”, Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 190-207. 
 
Huffman, C. and Kahn, B.E. (1998), “Variety for sale: Mass Customization or Mass 
Confusion?”, Journal of Retailing, 74(4), 491-513. 
 
Hutchinson, J.W. and Alba, J.W. (1991), “Ignoring Irrelevant Information: 
Situational Determinants of Consumer Learning”, Journal of Consumer Research, 18 
(December), 325-345. 
 
Jaccard, J., Brinberg, D. and Ackerman, L.J. (1986), “Assessing Attribute 
Importance: A Comparison of Six Methods”, Journal of Consumer Research, 12 
(March), 463-468. 
 
 143 
Jacoby, J., Speller, D.E. and Berning, C.K. (1974), “Brand Choice Behavior as a 
Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 1(1), 33-42. 
 
Jain, A.K., Acito, F., Malotra, N. K. and Mahajan, V. (1979), “A Comparison of the 
Internal Validity of Alternative Parameter Estimation Methods in Decompositional 
Multiattribute Preference Models”, Journal of Marketing Research, 16 (August), 
313-22. 
 
Johnson, R.D. and Levin, I.P. (1985), “More Than Meets the Eye: The Effect of 
Missing Information on Purchase Evaluations”, Journal of Consumer Research, 12 
(2) 169-177. 
 
Johnson, E.J. and Payne, J.W. (1985), “Effort and Accuracy in Choice” Management 
Science, 31(4), 395-414. 
 
Johnson, M.D. and Puto, C.P. (1987), “A Review of Consumer Judgment and 
Choice”, in Review of Marketing, ed. Michael J. Houston, Chicago: American 
Marketing Association, 236-292. 
 
Kahn, B.E. and Meyer, R.J. (1991), “Consumer Multiattribute Judgments under 
Attribute-Weight Uncertainty”, Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (March), 508-
522. 
 
Keeney, R. and Raffa, H. (1976), Decisions with Multiple Objectives. Wiley, New 
York. 
 
Keller, K.L. and Staelin, R. (1987), “Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information 
on Decision Effectiveness”, Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (September), 200-
213. 
 
Keller, K.L. and Aaker, D.A. (1992), “The Effect of Sequential Introduction of 
Brand Extensions”, Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (1), 35-60. 
 
Klemperer, P. (1987), “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 102 (May), 375-394. 
 
Kraus, P. and Carpenter, G.S. (2005), “Brand Differentiation: The Role of the 
Context in Creating Valuable Differences”, Working paper, Northwestern 
University. 
 
Ladd, G.W. and Zober, M. (1977), “Model of Consumer Reaction to Product 
Characteristics”, Journal of Consumer Research, 4 (September), 89-101. 
 
Lancaster, K.J. (1966), “A New Approach to Consumer Theory”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 74, 132-157. 
 
 144 
Lancaster, K.J. (1971), Consumer Demand: A New Approach. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Liberman, N. and Trope, Y. (1998), “The Role of Feasibility and Desrability 
Considerations in Near and Distant Future Decision: A Test of Temporal Construal 
Theory”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 (1), 5-18. 
 
Lichenstein, S., Earle, T.C. and Slovic, P. (1975), “Cue Utilization in a Numerical 
Prediction Task”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 104 (February), 77-85. 
 
Lim, J.L., Olshavsky, R.W. and Kim, J. (1988), “The Impact of Inferences on 
Product Evaluations: Replication and Extension”, Journal of Marketing Research, 25 
(August), 308-316. 
 
Lingle, J.H., Altom, M.W. and Medin, D.L. (1984), “Of Cabbages and Kings: 
Assessing the Extendibility of Natural Object Concept Models to Social Things”, in 
Handbook of Social Cognition, Vol. 1 eds. Robert S. Wyer and Thomas K. Srull, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 71-118. 
 
Loken, B. and Ward, J. (1987), “Measures of Attribute Structure Underlying Product 
Tipicality”, in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 14 Melanie Wallenford and 
Paul F. Anderson eds. Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 22-28. 
 
Loken, B. and Ward, J. (1990), “Alternative Approaches to Understanding the 
Determinants of Typicality”, Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 111-126. 
 
Maheswaran, D. and Sternthal, B. (1990), “The Effects of Knowledge, Motivation, 
and Type of Message on Ad Processing and Product Judgments”, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17 (1), 66-73 
 
Maoz, E. and Tybout, A.M. (2002), “The Moderating Role of Involvement and 
Differentiation in the Evaluation of Brand Extension”, Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 12 (2), 119-131. 
 
MacInnis, D.J. and Nakamoto, K. (1990), “Examining Factors that Influence the 
Perceived Goodness of Brand Extensions”, Working Paper, Karl Eller Graduate 
School of Management, University of Arizona. 
 
Mandler, G. (1982), “The Structure of Value: Accounting for Taste”, in Affect and 
Cognition: The 17th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition, eds. Margaret S. 
Clark and Susan T. Fiske, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 3-36. 
 
Martin, I.M., Stewart, D.W. and Matta, S. (2005), “Branding Strategies, Marketing 
Communication, and Perceived Brand Meaning: The Transfer of Purposive, Goal-
Oriented Brand Meaning to Brand Extensions”, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 33 (3), 275-294. 
 
 145 
McGuire, W. (1976), “Some Internal Psychological Factors Influencing Consumer 
Choice”, Journal of Consumer Research, 2 (4), 302-319. 
 
McGuire, W.J. (1969), The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change. The Handbook 
of Social Psychology, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
 
McLaughlin, J. and Skinner, D. (2000), “Developing Usability and Utility: A 
Comparative Study of the Users of New IT”, Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 12 (3), 413-23. 
 
Mervis, C.B. and Rosch, E. (1981), “Categorization of Natural Objects”, Annual 
Review of Psychology, 32, 89-115. 
 
Meyer, R.J. (1987), “The Learning of Multiattribute Judgment Policies”, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 4 (September), 155-173. 
 
Meyer, R.J. (1981), “A Model of Multiattribute Judgment Under Attribute 
Uncertainty and Information Constraint”, Journal of Marketing Research, 18 
(November), 428-441. 
 
Meyers-Levy, J. and Tybout, A.M. (1989), “Schema Congruity as a Basis for 
Product Evaluation”, Journal of Consumer Research, 16(1) 39-54. 
 
Meyers-Levy, J., Louie, T. and Curren, M.T. (1994), "How Does the Congruity of 
Brand Names Affect Evaluations of Brand Name Extensions?" Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 79 (1), 46-53. 
 
Mick, D.G. and Fournier, S. (1998), “Paradoxes of Technology: Consumer 
Cognizance, Emotions, and Coping Strategies”, Journal of Consumer Research, 25 
(September), 123-143. 
 
Mukherjee, A. and Hoyer, W.D. (2001), “The Effect of Novel Attributes on Product 
Evaluation”, Journal of Consumer Research, 28 (December), 462-72 
 
Myers, J.B. and Alpert, M.I. (1977), “Semantic Confusion in Attitude Research: 
Salience vs. Importance Determinance”, in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 4, 
ed. William Perreault, Jr. Atlanta, GA: Association for Consumer Research, 106-110. 
 
Neslin, S.A. (1981), “Linking Product Features to Perceptions: Self-Stated Versus 
Statistically Revealed Importance Weights”, Journal of Marketing Research, 18 
(February), 80-86. 
 
Nielsen, J. (1993), Usability Engeneering. San Diego: Academic Press. 
 
Nowlis, S.M. and Simonson, I. (1996); “The Effect of New Product Features on 
Brand Choice”, Journal of Marketing Research, 33 (February), 36-46.  
 
 146 
Ozanne, J.L., Brucks, M. and Grewal, D. (1992), “A Study of Information Search 
Behavior during the Categorization of New Products”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 18 (March), 452-463. 
 
Park, C.W. and Smith, D.C. (1989), “Product-level Choice: A Top-down or Bottom-
up Process’”, Journal of Consumer Research, 16, 289-299. 
 
Park, C.W., Milberg, S. and Lawson, R. (1991), “Evaluation of Brand Extensions: 
The Role of Product Feature Similarity and Brand Concept Consistency”, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 18 (2), 185-193. 
 
Payne, J.W. (1982), “Contingent Decision Behavior”, Psychological Bullettin, 92 
(September), 382-402. 
 
Payne, J.W., Bettman, J.R. and Johnson, E.J. (1988), “Adaptive Strategy Selection in 
Decision Making”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 14, 534-552. 
 
Peracchio, L.A. and Tybout, A.M. (1996),“The Moderating Role of Prior Knowledge 
in Schema-Based Product Evaluation”, Journal of Consumer Research, 23(3), 177-
192. 
 
Petty, R.E. and Cacioppo, J.T. (1981), Attitude and Persuasion: Classic and 
Contemporary Aprroaches. Dubuque, IA: Wm.C. Brown. 
 
Petty, R.E., Cacioppo, J.T. and Schumann, D.W. (1983), “Central and Peripheral 
Routes to Advertising Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement”, Journal 
of Consumer Research, 10, 135-46. 
 
Petty, R.E. and Cacioppo, J.T. (1984), “The Effects of Involvement on Responses to 
Argument Quantity and Quality: Central and Peripheral Route to Persuasion”, 
Journal of Personality and Social Pshycology, 46, 69-81.  
 
Petty, R.E. and Cacioppo, J.T. (1986), “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
Persuasion”, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123-205, ed. 
Berkowitz. Orlando, FL: Academic. 
 
Porter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Pras, B. and Summers, J.O. (1978), “Perceived Risk and Composition Models for 
Multiattribute Decisions”, Journal of Marketing Research, 15(3), 1978, 429-437. 
 
Ratchford, B.T. (1975), “The New Economic Theory of Consumer Behavior: An 
Interpretive Essay”, Journal of Consumer Research, 2 (2), 65-75. 
Ratchford, B.T. (1979), “Operationalizing Economic Models of Demand for Product 
Characteristics”, Journal of Consumer Research, 6 (June), 76-85. 
 
 147 
Ratneshwar, S.,  Warlop, L., Mick, D.G. and Seeger, G. (1997), “Benefit salience 
and consumers' selective attention to product features”, International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 14 (3), 245-259. 
 
Romeo, J.B. (1991), “The Effect of Negative Information on the Evaluations of 
Brand Extensions and the Family Brand”, in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 
18, Rebecca H. Holman and Michal R. Solomon, eds. Provo, UT: Association for 
Consumer Research, 399-406. 
 
Rosch, E. (1978), “Principles of Categorization”, in Cognition and Categorization, 
ed. E.Rosch and B.B Lloyd, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 27-48. 
 
Rosch, E. and Mervis, C.B. (1975), “Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal 
Structure of Categories”, Cognitive Psychology, 7 (4), 573-605. 
 
Rosch, E., Simpson, C. and Miller, R.S. (1976), “Structure Bases of Typicality 
Effects”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
2 (4), 491-502. 
 
Rosen, S. (1974), “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in 
Pure Competition”, Journal of Political Economy, 82, 34-55. 
 
Russo, J.E. and Dosher, B.A. (1983), “Strategies for Multiattribute Binary Choice”, 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 9 (4), 676-
96. 
 
Sampson, P. and Harris, P. (1970), “A User’s Guide to Fishbein”, Journal of the 
Market Research Society (July), 145-166. 
 
Schmalensee, R. (1984), “Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling”, Journal of 
Business, 57 (Suppl. 1, Part 2), S211-S230. 
 
Shadish, W.R., Cook, T.D. and Campbell, D.T. (2002), Experimental and quasi-
experimental designs for generalized inference, Houghton Mifflin, Boston. 
 
Shafir, E. (1993), “Choosing versus Rejecting: Why Some Options are both Better 
and Worse than Others”, Memory and Cognition, 21 (July), 546-556. 
 
Shafir, E., Simonson, I. and Tversky, A. (1993), “Reason-based Choice”, Cognition, 
49, 11-36. 
 
Shocker, A.D. and Srinivasan, V. (1979), “A Consumer-Based Methodology for the 
Identification of New Product Ideas” Management Science, 20 (6), Application 
Series (Feb., 1974), 921-937. 
 
Shocker, A.D. and Srinivasan, V. (1979), “Multiattribute Approaches to Product 
Concept Evaluation and Generation: A Critical Review”, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 16 (May), 159-180. 
 148 
Shanteau, J. (1975), “Averaging versus Multiplying Combination Rules of Inference 
Judgment”, Acta Psychologica, 39 (February), 83-89. 
 
Shugan, S. (1980), “The Cost of Thinking”, Journal of Consumer Research, 7 
(September), 99-111. 
 
Simonson, I., Carmon, Z. and O’Curry, S. (1994), “Experimental Evidence on the 
Negative Effect of Product Features and Sales Promotions on Brand Choice”, 
Marketing Science, 13 (Winter) 23-40. 
 
Skowronski, J.J. and Carlston, D.E. (1987), “Social Judgment and Social Memory: 
The Role of Cue Diagnosticity in Negativity, Positivity, and Extremity Biases”, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(4), 689-699.  
 
Srinivasan, V., Lovejoy, W.S. and Beach, D. (1997), “Integrated Product Design for 
Marketability and Manifacturing”, Journal of Marketing Research, 34 (February), 
154-163. 
 
Srull, T.K. (1981), “Person Memory: Some Tests of Associative Storage and 
Retrieval Models”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 7(6), 440-63. 
 
Srull, T.K., Lichtenstein, M. and Rothbart, M. (1985), “Associative Storage and 
Retrieval Processes in Person Memory”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11 (2), 316-345. 
 
Stayman, D.M., Alden, D.L. and Smith, K.H. (1992), “Some Effects of Schematic 
Processing on Consumer Expectations and Disconfirmation Judgments”, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 19 (2), 240-255. 
 
Steenkamp, J.E.M., Van Trijp, H.C.M. and Ten Berge, J.M.F. (1994), “Perceptual 
Mapping Based on Idiosyncratic Sets of Attributes”, Journal of Marketing Research, 
31 (February), 15-27. 
 
Stefflre, V.J. (1971), New Products and New Enterprises: A Report of an Experiment 
in Applied Social Science. Irvine, California: University of Carolina (March). 
 
Stefflre, V.J. (1972), “Some Applications of Multi-Dimensional Scaling to Social 
Science Problems”, in Multi-Dimensional Scaling: Theory and Applications in 
Behavioral Sciences, Rogers N. Shepard, A.K. Romney, and Sarah B. Nerlove, eds. 
New York: Seminar Press. 
 
Sujan, M. (1985), “Consumer Knowledge: Effects on Evaluation Strategies 
Mediating Consumer Judgments”, Journal of Consumer Research, 12(1), 31-46. 
 
Tetlock, P.E. and Boettger, R. (1989), “Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the 
Dilution Effect”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57 (3), 388-398.  
 
 149 
Thompson, D.V., Hamilton, R.W. and Rust, R.T. (2005), “Feature Fatigue: When 
Product Capabilities Become Too Much of a Good Thing”, Journal of Marketing 
Research, XLII, 431-442. 
 
Thompson, D.V., Hamilton, R.W. and Rust, R.T. (2006), “Defeating Feature 
Fatigue”, Harvard Business Review, 84 (2), 98-107. 
 
Trope, Y. (1986), “Identification and Inferential Processes in Dispositional 
Attribution”, Psychological Review, 93, 239-257. 
 
Trope, Y. (1989), “Levels of Inference in Dispositional Judgment”, Social Cognition, 
7, 296-314. 
 
Troutman, C.M. and Shanteau, J. (1976), “Do Consumers Evaluate Products by 
Adding or Averaging Attribute Information?” Journal of Consumer Research, 3 (2), 
101-106. 
 
Tse, D.K. and Wilton, P.T. (1988), “Models of Consumer Satisfaction Formation: An 
Extension”, Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (May), 204-212. 
 
Tversky, A., Sattah, S. and Slovic, P. (1988), “Contingent Weighting in Judgments 
and Choice”, Psychological Review, 95, 371-84. 
 
University of Minnesota Consumer Behavior Seminar (1987), “Affect 
Generalizations to Similar and Dissimilar Brand Extensions,” Psychology and 
Marketing, 4 (3), 225-237. 
 
Vallacher, R.R. and Wagner, D.M. (1985), A Theory of Action Identification. 
Hilsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Vallacher, R.R. and Wagner, D.M. (1987), “What Do People Think They’re Doing? 
Action Identification and Human Behavior”, Psychological Review, 94, 3-15. 
 
Van de Ven, A. (2007), Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and 
Social Research. Oxford University Press. 
 
von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1947), Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. Princeton University Press. 
 
Ward, J. and Loken, B. (1996), “The Quintessential Snack Food: Measurement of 
Smack Prototypes”, Advances in Consumer Research, 13 (1), 126-131. 
 
Weber, R. and Crocker, J. (1983), “Cognitive Processes in the Revision of 
Stereotypic Beliefs”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (November), 
961-77. 
 
Wiklund, M. (1994), Usability in Practice: How Companies Develop User-Friendly 
Products. San Diego: Academic Press. 
 150 
Wilkie, W.L. and Pessemier, E.A. (1973), “Issues in Marketing’s Use of Multi-
Attribute Attitude Models”, Journal of Marketing Research, 10 (November), 428-41. 
 
Wright, P.L. (1974), “Analyzing Media Effects on Advertising Responses”, The 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 38 (2), 192-205.  
 
Wright, P. and Rip, P.D. (1980), “Product-class Advertising Effects on First-time 
Buyers’ Decision Strategies”, Journal of Consumer Research, 7, 176-188. 
 
Yadav, M.S. (1994), “How Buyers Evaluate Product Bundles: A Model of 
Anchoring and Adjustment”, Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (2), 342-353. 
 
Youngblood, J. and Himmelfarb, S. (1972), “The Effects of Prior Neutral Messages 
on Resistance to Evaluative Comunications”, Psychonomic Science, 29 (6A), 348-
350. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
Appendix A 
 
Examples of stimulus for Experiment 1 (the case of three extremely incongruent new 
features) 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the perceived attractiveness of the Apple 
Ipod Nano. Below you can see a picture of this model. 
 
  
You will be asked to rate the perceived attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano after 
the addition of three particular below indicated features, relative to $200 cash.  
There are no correct or incorrect answers. Simply rate the perceived attractiveness of 
the Apple Ipod Nano relative to $200  cash. Note that “1” means that $200 are 
extremely attractive relative to the Apple Ipod Nano, whereas “9” means that the 
Apple Ipod Nano is extremely attractive relative to $200 cash.  
   
Thinking about the Apple Ipod Nano, imagine that three new features are going to be 
added to it. These features are: 
 
• Screen backlight 
• Rigid plastic case for Ipod 
• 10 GB of memory. 
 
Considering these new features added to the Apple Ipod Nano, how attractive is the 
Apple Ipod Nano relative to $200 cash? 
 
$200 cash  
Apple Ipod 
Nano 
Very 
attractive  
Very 
attractive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
What is your gender? 
What is your age? 
What is your nationality? 
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Do you own an Apple Ipod Nano? 
Do you own any other Apple Ipod? 
How many hours do you listen to an Mp3 player a week? 
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Appendix B 
 
Examples of stimulus for Experiment 2 (the case of three extremely incongruent new 
features in the high involvement condition) 
 
This study examines people’s perceived attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano. 
Below you can see a picture of this model. 
 
This study is being conducted as part of an effort to write a marketing case study 
about a new version of the Apple Ipod Nano that Apple is planning to introduce in 
the North American market. Such a version includes the addition of three particular 
below indicated features to the current version. 
Consider that you are one of only few people providing input for the marketing case 
and your opinion is of utmost importance. Each response will be evaluated 
individually. 
You will be asked to rate the perceived attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano after 
the addition of these three features, relative to $200 cash. Note that “1” means that 
$200 are extremely attractive relative to the Apple Ipod Nano, whereas “9” means 
that the Apple Ipod Nano is extremely attractive relative to $200 cash.  
   
Thinking about the Apple Ipod Nano, imagine that three new features are going to be 
added to it. These features are: 
 
• Screen backlight 
• Rigid plastic case for Ipod 
• 10 GB of memory. 
 
Considering these new features added to the Apple Ipod Nano, how attractive is the 
Apple Ipod Nano relative to $200 cash? 
 
$200 cash  
Apple Ipod 
Nano 
Very 
attractive  
Very 
attractive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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What is your gender? 
What is your age? 
What is your nationality? 
Do you own an Apple Ipod Nano? 
Do you own any other Apple Ipod? 
How many hours do you listen to an Mp3 player a week? 
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Appendix C 
 
Examples of stimulus for Experiment  3 (the case of three moderately incongruent 
new features in the near future condition) 
 
The purpose of this study is to learn your views about the attractiveness of the Apple 
Ipod Nano. Below you can see a picture of this model. 
  
You will be asked to rate the attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano. To do this, you 
will be asked to rate the attractiveness of the Apple Ipod Nano in relation to being 
given $200 in cash. Note that “1” means that $200 is extremely attractive in relation 
to the Apple Ipod Nano, whereas “9” means that the Apple Ipod Nano is extremely 
attractive in relation to $200 cash.  
   
In making this evaluation, imagine that Apple is planning to add three new features 
to Ipod Nano. These new features are: wireless internet connection, a calculator, 
and Dolby Surround sound. Also imagine that you are considering the purchase of 
this product category in the next few days. 
 
How attractive would it be to purchase the Apple Ipod Nano with the three new 
features listed above in the next few days compared to $200 cash? 
 
$200 cash  
Apple Ipod 
Nano 
Very 
attractive  
Very 
attractive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
What is your gender? 
What is your age? 
What is your nationality? 
Do you own an Apple Ipod Nano? 
Do you own any other Apple Ipod? 
How many hours do you listen to an Mp3 player a week? 
 
